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It is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that 
democracies appear to me decidedly inferior to other goo- 
ernments. . . . Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those 
qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, 
on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which 
it is deficient.- ALE^ DE TOCQUEVILLE 
If, at the present time, the limitation imposed by  democratic 
political practices makes it dificult to conduct our foreign 
affairs in the national interest, this dificulty will increase, 
and not decrease, with the years.-DEAN ACHESON 
INTRODUCTION 
THE PROBLEM RAISED A CENTURY AND A QUARTER AGO BY THE 
author of Democracy in America seldom troubled the American 
people during the many years that they enjoyed an isolation 
protected by two broad oceans. In our generation, however, 
every new foreign crisis brings increased international responsi- 
bilities to this country and further emphasizes the difficulties of 
conducting foreign relations in a democracy. Any nation, but 
particularly the leader of an alliance, needs to have depend- 
ability and continuity in its foreign policy; yet in a democracy 
the opposition party may overturn established policies at any 
time. Diplomatic moves must often be planned and executed 
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with a speed and secrecy that contradict the democratic prin- 
ciples of consultation and consent. For success in international 
power politics a nation is often dependent on a degree of domes- 
tic unity that seriously restricts the democratic opposition party. 
Perhaps most important, international problems have become 
too complicated for public understanding, and foreign policies 
have grown too costly and risky for public popularity-and yet 
in a democracy these policies need public understanding and 
approval if they are to succeed. 
In the United States there are additional handicaps not found 
in all democratic governments. The decision-making process in 
this country resembles John Calhoun's "concurrent majority": 
A large number of groups both within and outside the govern- 
ment must, in practice, approve any major policy. The division 
of authority between the American President and Congress is 
particularly conducive to difficulties in the field of foreign affairs. 
For as Professor Edward S. Corwin says, "the Constitution . . . 
is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American 
foreign policy."' Furthermore, the United States, just now emerg- 
ing as a leader in international affairs, has not developed the 
traditions, attitudes, and political techniques that are most valu- 
able in adapting democratic government to the tasks of formu- 
lating foreign policy. 
In most of its postwar foreign policy decisions the United 
States has been spared deep-seated disagreement on funda- 
mentals. Before World War 11, however, the interventionalist- 
isolationist split was a profound one accentuated by party dif- 
ferences. Since the war there has been a large measure of 
agreement in principle on our aid and alliance policies in Europe; 
but the less successful Asian policies have caused deep and 
bitter disagreements culminating in the frustration of the dead- 
locked Korean war. William S. White has called the last months 
of the Truman administration "perhaps the most enfevered 
months of modern times in a nation savagely divided on foreign 
p01icy."~ As the stakes in international relations continue to in- 
crease, the possibilities of political conflict and deadlock grow. 
1 Edward S. Convin, The President: Ofice and Powers, 1787-1957 (4th rev. ed.; 
New York: New York University Press, 1957), p. 171. 
2 William S. White, "Two Parties and One Foreign Policy," New York Times 
Magazine, Aug. 7, 1955, p. 12. 
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POLITICAL PARTIES AND BIPARTISANSHIP 
Political parties, scorned and feared by the founding fathers, 
have gradually won recognition as essential in producing both 
an organized majority and an effective opposition in our system 
of democracy. The two parties bring a measure of order and 
unity out of the many varied interests, regions, and viewpoints 
found in this nation. Furthermore, by providing a strong bond 
between the President and a majority or a large minority in 
Congress, the party system has been primarily responsible for 
making workable the system of divided authority between an 
independent executive and legislature. 
But the value of the party system in the realm of foreign 
affairs is often questioned because it produces not only a ma- 
jority but also a minority, often a strong and vocal one. In the 
words of one veteran observer of Congress, the political party 
"restlessly snipes at unanimity in foreign p~licy."~ The need 
for unity in foreign policy is clear; foreign policy that must 
be implemented by treaty requires a two-thirds vote in the 
Senate. Frequently the administration lacks a party majority in 
one or both branches of the Congress; therefore, issues which 
have become sharply partisan are likely to be deadlocked. The 
election of a President of the opposing party can destroy the 
continuity so valuable in foreign policy if his party has funda- 
mentally opposed the programs of his predecessor. Overshadow- 
ing these constitutional considerations is the fact that success 
in foreign policy depends largely on a nation's strength; and 
unity is a major element of this strength. The necessity of unity 
in a hot war is obvious; its value in a prolonged cold war is 
almost as great. 
After World War 11, both the Truman and Eisenhower ad- 
ministrations sought bipartisan support for some of their foreign 
policies, often through consultation and collaboration with op- 
position leaders in Congress. The argument for a bipartisan 
foreign policy has always been a simple one-the need for unity. 
Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg emphasized that "it permits our 
democracy to speak with a great degree of unity at critical mo- 
a Ernest S. Griffith, Congress-Its Contemporay Role (2d rev. ed.; New York: 
New York University Press, 1956), p. 163. 
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ments when swift decision is vital and when we face totalitarian 
opponents who can command their own instant unity by police 
de~ree."~ Despite the force of this argument, politicians and 
scholars have raised serious objections to the bipartisan prin- 
ciple in foreign affairs. It may weaken the party system and blur 
the lines of party responsibility. Bipartisanship may damage the 
opposition party. By capturing its leaders, the administration 
may silence the opposition, or at least those members most 
responsible and skillful in foreign affairs, and may intensify 
divisions within that party. Bipartisanship may lead to the 
hasty adopton of unwise policies or perhaps to an illogical and 
ineffective compromise between the desires of the administration 
and minority demands. It may prevent an intelligent and com- 
prehensive debate of the issues involved and cause rigid ad- 
herence to policies, once e~tablished.~ 
In addition, the difficulties of effective bipartisan cooperation 
are widely recognized by both supporters and critics. Neither 
of the congressional parties regularly produces leaders who can 
commit their colleagues to an agreed policy. The problem of 
secrecy constantly plagues executive-legislative consultations on 
delicate diplomatic questions. In practice both congressional 
leaders and executive officials are often too busy for the frequent, 
detailed consultation that both believe to be necessary for 
bipartisan cooperation. 
The debate over the merits of bipartisanship and partisanship 
in foreign policy often creates the impression of a choice between 
two absolutes. The realities of post-war politics, however, have 
ruled out either extreme and have necessitated a blend of the 
two systems. A purely partisan conduct of our foreign policy 
is impossible because the parties are not unified and disciplined 
and because control of government is sometimes divided be- 
tween the parties. Even when the President's party controls 
Congress and when there is no treaty involved requiring two- 
4 Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg 
(Boston: Houghton Mi%n Co., 1952), pp. 450-51. 
5 The best recent analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of bipartisanship 
is Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., Bipartisan Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality? (Evanston, Ill.: 
Row, Peterson and Co., 1957). See also George H. E. Smith, "Bipartisan For- 
eign Policy in Partisan Politics," American Perspective, IV (Spring, 1950), 157-69; 
James MacGregor Bums, "Bipartisanship-and Partisanship, Too," New York Times 
Magazine, Jan. 27, 1957, pp. 17, 70-71. 
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thirds support in the Senate, the administration has to seek 
votes from the minority because it cannot usually depend on 
unanimous support from the majority. That being the case, the 
administration naturally takes steps to assure some bipartisan 
support. From the viewpoint of the opposition, a partisan stand 
is equally impractical. One observer has pointed out that "since 
there are two parties and only one integrated foreign policy, 
that which may be developed by the Presidency, the policy may 
well be advocated by both par tie^."^ 
On the other hand, bipartisanship cannot be applied to every 
foreign policy. The opposition is not usually willing to cooperate 
in the reexamination or resurrection of a program that appears 
doomed to failure. Sudden crisis may leave little time for bipar- 
tisan consultation. An administration-that lacks domestic 
- 
strength or that is engaged in bitter domestic struggles with the 
opposition may find the political atmosphere not conducive to 
bipartisan cooperation in foreign affairs. Some foreign policies 
are so interwoven with controversial domestic questions, such as 
the level of the budget, that bipartisan agreement is difficult 
or impossible. 
In practice both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations 
have developed a blend of bipartisanship and partisanship, which 
H. Bradford Westerfield describes as "extra-partisanship": The 
President seeks "to associate in active collaboration with his 
administration's conduct of foreign relations enough influential 
members of the opposition party to prevent its lines from solidi- 
fying against basic administration foreign policies-while at the 
same time the President's position as leader of his own party is 
used to mobilize support for those policies, to the limited extent 
that it can safely be done without causing the opposition party 
to consolidate in co~nteraction."~ Under these conditions bipar- 
tisan consultation has been most frequent when it was necessi- 
tated by events, above all by the fact of one party controlling 
the Presidency and the other the Congress. Senator Vandenberg 
has said: "It is to be noted that this bipartisan liaison is much 
6 George L. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy (John 
Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, ser. 68, no. 3; 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), p. 173 14811. 
7 H. Bradford Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor t o  
Korea (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 16. 
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simpler (as in the 80th Congress) when each major party con- 
trols one end of the executive-legislative process involved in for- 
eign affairs. . . . We both confront unavoidable and obvious re- 
sponsibilities in such  case^."^ 
Although extfapartisanship seems to have been developed in 
response to the political necessities of recent years, it has liabili- 
ties. From the administration's viewpoint, it is a fragile system, 
because the support for policies must be based on unreliable 
and shifting coalitions and because policies must often be seri- 
ously compromised to win bipartisan support. On the other 
hand, the opposition party finds it increasingly difficult to chal- 
lenge the administration's policies and present clear alternatives 
in foreign affairs. In an age of permanent international crisis, 
the danger is simply that we may drift to disaster through a 
chain of uneasy compromises and misguided policies that are 
protected from effective criticism by the umbrella of bipartisan 
consultation. The question is whether the policy-forming process 
in this country can be improved to produce sounder policies that 
are more strongly supported after fuller discussion. Critics of 
the existing techniques for framing foreign policy have fre- 
quently suggested some strengthening of party ma~hinery.~ A
stronger majority party organization in Congress, working closely 
with the President, would offer the possibility of a more depend- 
able, coherent foreign policy and reduce the risk that vital pro- 
grams of the administration would wither away in the congres- 
sional labyrinth. It would give the individual congressman 
greater protection from the demands of pressure groups and 
constituents and would perhaps provide an instrument through 
which the reluctant voters could be persuaded to accept the ex- 
pensive and dangerous policies that the administration so fre- 
quently is forced to sponsor. A stronger opposition party in 
Congress might be better able to present alternatives to the ad- 
ministration's policies. Without becoming obstructionist, it might 
serve a watchdog role, to prevent the President's misuse of the 
increasingly broad powers being granted to him in the execution 
of foreign policy. Since the techniques of bipartisanship ob- 
8 Vandenberg, p. 562. 
9 See, for example, W. Y. Elliott and others, United States Foreign Policy: Its 
Organization and Control (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952). 
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viously cannot be completely abandoned, the question is whether 
the political party can contribute more to framing both adminis- 
tration and opposition policy within the framework of the exist- 
ing extrapartisan system. 
The most realistic way of appraising the prospects for partisan 
contributions to policymaking is to examine in detail how party 
organizations and leaders have functioned in the past. Most of 
the recent studies of foreign policy formation have stressed the 
use of bipartisan techniques, but policymaking in Washington 
is fundamentally a partisan process. The President and the 
powerful congressional leaders are primarily party leaders, who 
exercise party authority, understand current issues in political 
terms, and owe strong allegiance to their party. Few are the 
issues, domestic or foreign, that have no political implications 
when they arise in Congress. Even bipartisanship has never sig- 
nified nonpartisanship but has meant cooperation among party 
leaders to achieve support for a policy from substantial groups 
in both parties. Neither the opportunities for bipartisanship nor 
the chances for strong parties can be understood when they are 
simply debated in a theoretical vacuum. We can gain insight 
about both through an examination of the political process in 
Congress applied to international problems. 
THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN  THE SENATE 
Although the international responsibilities of the House of Rep- 
resentatives have greatly expanded in recent years, the Senate 
still remains the more important body. Here the "great debates" 
are carried on, and here alone are treaties ratified. Those mem- 
bers of Congress who speak with authority on international 
problems are almost invariably senators. Despite the growing 
importance of the House, members of that body still defer to 
senatorial leadership on a large proportion of foreign policy 
questions. Constitutional provisions and tradition have combined 
to give the Senate the preeminent role in foreign policy. Con- 
sequently this study is confined to the Senate. To attempt a 
survey of both branches would require sacrificing the depth 
of analysis necessary for an understanding of senatorial politics. 
Bernard Cohen in his study of conflicts arising from the Jap- 
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anese peace settlement observes that "American political party 
differences are strong enough so that they cannot all be hidden 
by the blanket of a bipartisan political process. In a system of 
undisciplined parties, bipartisanship does not preclude differences 
of opinion on a party basis."1° So much has been said about 
bipartisan foreign policy that the importance of differences be- 
tween the parties on foreign policy has been little understood. 
Despite some differences between the parties on matters of policy, 
there is evidence that party positions and voting records changed 
when a Democratic administration was replaced by a Repub- 
- 
lican one. 
A rollcall analysis that produces evidence of party voting 
suggests questions about the nature of leadership in the Senate. 
Do members of a party vote together on an international ques- 
tion solely because of conviction and perhaps loyalty to the 
President, or are they infiuenced by the organizational or persua- 
sive efforts of party leaders in the Senate? Leadership in the 
Senate is a highly personal affair. Are the leaders of the admin- 
istration party primarily the President's representatives in the 
Senate or the Senate's ambassadors to the White House? What 
techniques or tools do they possess beyond their own intellectual 
prestige? Can the opposition leaders in the Senate unite their 
party behind foreign policy alternatives, or can they achieve unity 
only in support of the President's policy? If party leadership is 
not to be dependent on the accidents of personality, it must be 
institutionalized. What evidence is there that party policy com- 
mittees and caucuses are widely enough used and effective 
enough to be useful tools of party leadership? Does leadership 
in foreign policy rest primarily on the Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee and on its talented leaders? How can this committee, a 
model of bipartisanship, provide party leadership as well? 
If the political parties are to become more effective instm- 
- 
ments for the creation of foreign policy, much of the initiative 
must rest with the President, who not only holds the initiative 
in foreign policy but is the recognized leader of his party. Can 
he be a party leader in foreign policy without losing bipartisan 
10 Bernard C. Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of 
the Japanese Peace Settlement (Princeton, N .  J . :  Princeton University Press, 1957), 
p. 200. 
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support? Presidential leadership in foreign policy rests in part 
on his powerful influence over public opinion. In turn, the will- 
ingness of senators to support presidential programs rests in 
part on the climate of public opinion that they sense. How is 
public opinion manifested? To what extent has foreign policy 
been an issue in election campaigns? Will electoral controversies 
over foreign policy strengthen or weaken the President's position? 
Bernard Cohen concludes: "The study of bipartisanship will 
make useful progress only when the normative element can be 
set aside long enough to accumulate more specific knowledge 
about the forms, the substance, and the results of the various 
political processes that the word describes."ll The same questions 
apply to the role of parties in the formation of foreign policy. 
This study attempts to answer them by examining the political 
process in the United States Senate and the influence of two 
forces-the President and the public-on this process as it was 
demonstrated in the international issues that engaged the Senate's 
attention from 1947 through 1960. The final chapter presents 
some tentative answers with regard to one major question: Can 
the political parties contribute a greater measure of rationality 
and responsibility to the policymaking process in foreign affairs? 
In an age when our very existence may depend on the wisdom 
of our foreign policy, there are few questions more important. 
In both of the two great fluid periods of the twentieth 
century-the periods just before, during, and after the two 
World Wars-the Democrats were in the position of respon- 
sibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. . . . This, I think, 
had more to do with the hardening of attitudes than innate 
party characteristics. The Democratic attitude was formed 
by government in power, responsible for its acts, and with 
that innate knowledge of the new pressures and necessities 
which comes only from the conduct of affairs. 
-DEAN ACHESON 
THE DECLINE OF DEMOCRATIC 
INTERNATIONALISM 
SAMUEL LUBELL HAS CALLED ELECTION RETURNS THE "WATER- 
marks which reveal the flow of history."l As the student of party 
politics must start by examining election returns, so the student 
of senatorial politics must first analyze rollcalls. I t  is true that 
some issues never reach a rollcall vote and that the votes alone 
leave questions of causation unanswered. Yet rollcalls are vital 
to our study because they alone provide unbiased, uncontro- 
vertible evidence of decisions on foreign policy questions in the 
Senate. Because our foreign policy has so often been labeled 
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bipartisan, it is important to emphasize the frequent contrasts 
in voting patterns of the two parties and to identify the most 
partisan issues. The change in both Democratic and Republican 
voting patterns with the advent of the Eisenhower administration 
was radical enough to require careful examination. This change 
may well provide the key to understanding the potential role of 
parties in foreign policy. Finally, the outstanding sources of 
disunity in the two parties-notably regionalism-deserve exami- 
nation. 
The analysis of Democratic and Republican records in this 
and the following chapter is based on a selection of rollcalls from 
1947 through 1958. This twelve-year period is evenly divided 
between Democratic and Republican administrations and in- 
cludes Congresses in both periods controlled by the opposition 
as well as by the administration party. The necessity of compar- 
ing party voting records during the various Congresses has dic- 
tated the selection of recurring issues rather than the inclusion 
of all rollcalls relevant to foreign policy. Most of the analysis 
is based on 179 rollcalls in three fields: foreign aid, reciprocal 
trade, and collective security. These are also the categories of 
rollcalls that best measure "internationalist" and "isolationist" 
voting, terms that may be usefully defined respectively as sup- 
port for and opposition to foreign commitments of the United 
States. 
The rollcalls on foreign aid provide a particularly good 
measure of party voting because the authorization and appropria- 
tion of funds must be renewed annually. There are two groups 
of foreign aid rollcalls in our compilation. The first (totaling 35)  
includes all those taken on the passage of authorization and ap- 
propriation bills and on the approval of Senate-House confer- 
ence committee reports of such bills.2 The second (totaling 76) 
includes all amendments to foreign aid bills designed to in- 
crease or reduce the funds to be authorized or appropriated for 
1 Samuel Lubell, Revolt of the Moderates (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 
. . 
p. 261. 
2 I n  addition, there are included votes on a few substitute amendments that 
would have had the effect of killing the aid program. After 1950, all rollcalls 
were on the extension of existing programs rather than on new ones. In the roll- 
calls on conference reports, opposition votes were sometimes cast by senators who 
objected simply to certain features inserted by the conference committee. 
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foreign aid.3 These two groups are treated separately because 
the records of the two parties and of regional groups of senators 
were different on the two categories. At times, particularly after 
a foreign aid program has been generally accepted, a key vote 
on an amendment cutting the aid funds has given a clearer 
picture of foreign aid sentiment than has the final vote on pass- 
age of the bill. On the other hand, there are many senators who 
have regularly supported foreign aid bills while voting for most 
amendments to reduce funds. The large number of other amend- 
ments offered to foreign aid bills are excluded from this com- 
pilation because they have varied considerably in substance from 
year to year and have seldom provided clear-cut tests of inter- 
nationalist ~entiment.~ 
In six of the twelve years under study Congress voted on 
extensions of the reciprocal trade program. There has been 
strong substantive continuity in the issues reaching a rollcall 
vote. In addition to the final passage of bills, votes have been 
recorded concerning how many years the program should be 
extended, how much discretion the President should be given, 
and whether special protection should be accorded certain 
products-all questions going to the heart of the program. The 
30 rollcalls in this compilation include all except a few omitted 
because they did not distinguish clearly even the strongest 
supporters and opponents of the program. 
In eight of the twelve years the Senate voted some expansion 
of American military commitments abroad: the NATO and SEATO 
pacts; mutual defense treaties with Japan, Korea, and Nation- 
alist China; and resolutions authorizing the President to send 
troops to Europe, defend the area of Formosa, and resist Com- 
munist aggression in the Middle East. The 38 rollcalls on these 
questions have a substantive homogeneity because they were all 
concerned either with whether this country's military commit- 
s Throughout this study, rollcalls on reducing aid and those on increasing aid 
have been lumped together. These are different questions, of course, and on the 
relatively few rollcalls concerning proposed increases the sentiment for economy 
was usually stronger than on rollcalls proposing reductions. For our purposes, 
the record of a party or a group of senators on the two types of rollcalls can be 
combined. 
4 Examples are amendments designed to prevent recipients from selling strategic 
materials to Communist countries and to encourage European political cooperation 
or to discourage cartels or socialism in Europe. 
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ments abroad should be extended or with how much discretion 
the President should be given in implementing new security 
cornmitment~.~ 
Although these three major categories of rollcalls provide the 
best measure of both voting continuity and internationalism, a 
larger sample would provide a more comprehensive picture of 
party voting. A supplementary group of 104 rollcalls has been 
added to the compilations on those occasions when a larger 
sample seemed desirable. These include nearly all of the pre- 
viously omitted amendments to bills in the three major categories6 
and votes on four other questions that stirred considerable con- 
troversy: the Truman-Attlee talks in 1950, the MacArthur hear- 
ings in 1951, the Japanese Peace Treaty in 1952, and the Bricker 
amendment in 1954. 
A rough measure of partisanship in senatorial voting is the 
proportion of rollcalls on which a majority of Republicans took 
a position opposed to that of the majority of Democrats. This 
occurred on just over half of the 283 rollcalls in the comprehen- 
sive sample (excluding rollcalls on which either party was evenly 
divided). Partisan conflict dropped when Eisenhower entered 
the White House; the proportion of such rollcalls fell from 63 
percent in the first six years to 32 percent in the latter period. 
The two parties (that is, a majority of the senators in each) 
agreed on most of the foreign aid bills and the collective security 
commitments. They disagreed half the time on the size of foreign 
aid funds and more often than that on other amendments to 
foreign aid bills. They disagreed on a majority of rollcalls con- 
cerning reciprocal trade and concerning the discretion granted 
President Truman to implement security commitments. In other 
words, there was bipartisan support for most of this country's 
fundamental commitments abroad, but considerable partisan 
5 In addition to the issues listed, there are included rollcalls on the Vandenberg 
resolution, which preceded American membership in NATO; measures to admit 
Greece, Turkey, and West Germany to NATO; and the Status of Forces Treaty. 
A few rollcalls on amendments to measures concerning collective security have 
been omitted because they did not deal with this topic. 
6 Those amendments not included in this broader category are ones on which 
the administration's position was not clear. In order to measure the support pro- 
vided by each party for the administration, it was necessary to include only ques- 
tions on which the administration had announced a position or on which its position 
was clear from the substance of the issue. 
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controversy over many important details of carrying out these 
 commitment^.^ 
THE DEMOCRATIC VOTING PATTERN 
In a survey of voting on foreign policy issues during the Truman 
administration, one fact stands out: the consistently high degree 
of support given by Democratic senators to the administration's 
program. As Table 1 illustrates, this meant not only the support 
TABLE 1-Foreign Policy Rollcalls by Percentage of Demo- 
cratic Senatorial Support of the Truman and Eisenhower 
Administrations, 1947-1952 and 1953-1958 (283 Rollcalls) 
Percentage Truman, 1947-1952 Eisenhower, 1953-1958 
of support Number Percentage Number Percentage 
90-100 81 47.4 11 9.8 
80-89.9 41 24.0 16 14.3 
70-79.9 25 14.6 14 12.5 
60-69.9 9 5.2 24 21.4 
50-59.9 10 5.8 14 12.5 
40-49.9 1 0.6 13 11.6 
30-39.9 2 1.2 12 10.7 
20-29.9 2 1.2 2 1.8 
10-19.9 0 0.0 3 2.7 
0-9.9 0 
-
0.0 
-
3 
-
2.7 
-
Total 171 100.0 112 100.0 
of a majority of Democratic senators on nearly all rollcalls, but 
also the support of 80 percent or more of the Democrats on 71 
percent of the rollcalls. Moreover, Democratic support was 
greatest on those measures most important to the Truman ad- 
ministration. When the major foreign aid programs were passed 
the first time, three-quarters or more of the Democrats voted for 
them. There were seldom more than one or two Democrats 
voting against the extension of these programs thereafter. Most 
of the rollcalls on which Democratic majorities were small and 
the few on which a majority opposed the administration involved 
amendments to the foreign aid bills. The Democratic vote was 
7The rollcalls compiled in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac (hereafter 
CQA)  are the source of all statistics used in this book. They are used with the 
permission of Congressional Quarterly, Inc. In every case, only the votes actually 
cast for and against measures have been included, with pairs and announced 
positions excluded except where specifically mentioned. 
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nearly unanimous for the two major security commitments of 
the Truman administration, the North Atlantic Treaty and the 
Japanese Security Treaty. In a series of twelve rollcalls on these 
issues, there were a total of only 15 Democratic votes cast against 
the admini~tration.~ The Democrats were equally willing to grant 
President Truman authority to implement the NATO treaty by 
sending troops to Europe. On the key votes to approve this 
policy and to bar any military limitation on the troops or any 
binding restrictions on the President (through a joint resolution), 
Truman had the support of all but one or two Democrats. There 
was greater disagreement in Democratic ranks about framing 
the resolution to request that Congress be consulted about the 
assignment of further troops to Europe without unduly binding 
the Pre~ident .~ On the most important rollcalls involving re- 
ciprocal trade, almost complete unanimity prevailed in the ~ e m o -  
cratic party. 
The Truman administration was defeated on only 31 of 171 
rollcalls, including the 5 on which it lacked majority Democratic 
support. None of these were rollcalls on the passage of foreign 
aid or collective security measures or on amendments vital to 
any of these measures. The only important defeats suffered on 
reciprocal trade involved several attempts in 1948 to extend the 
program beyond one year. When the administration lost, it was 
usually because of the opposition of a large number of Republi- 
cans and a sizable minority of Democrats. Most of the losses 
involved amendments to foreign aid bills and, although some 
were damaging to the administration, they were far less im- 
portant than defeats on the major bills would have been. 
This Democratic record does not mean that President Truman's 
efforts to secure bipartisan backing for his foreign programs were 
unnecessary. The constitutional requirements for passing treaties, 
the need of large majorities on major legislation to reassure our 
European allies, and the Republican Senate majority in 1947 
and 1948 were all factors necessitating bipartisanship. Moreover, 
the Democratic margin in the Senate was never great enough to 
8 CQA, 1948, p. 218; 1949, pp. 429-30; 1952, pp. 177, 182. There was virtually 
no Democratic support for reservations to the North Atlantic Treaty that would 
have required prior congressional authorization for armed assistance to NATO 
partners. 
9 Ibid., 1951, pp. 257-58. 
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assure victory even if the party remained nearly united. There 
were nearly always two reasons for the administration's victory 
in a legislative battle: the high degree of Democratic unity and 
the success in winning at least a few and often many Republican 
votes. 
The Democratic record during the Truman administration is 
important because it proves that political support for foreign 
programs can be built primarily on the massive unity of the ad- 
ministration's party. Conversely, it suggests that an administra- 
tion cannot expect legislative success for its foreign programs 
unless it can depend on strong, consistent support from its own 
party in the Senate. The Truman administration had substantial 
numbers of Republican votes for its major programs. But it was 
the Democrats who not only provided the majority of votes for 
the Marshall Plan, foreign military assistance, Point Four, NATO, 
and the other important measures, but who also repeatedly de- 
feated amendments (usually Republican-sponsored) that would 
have undermined these measures. With a few minor exceptions, 
a higher proportion of Democrats than of Republicans supported 
the Truman administration on all foreign policy rollcalls from 
1947 through 1952. 
A look at the right hand side of Table 1 reveals a different 
pattern of voting from 1953 through 1958. The Eisenhower ad- 
ministration had majority Democratic support on 71 percent of 
the rollcalls, a substantial proportion but much less than the 97 
percent support that President Truman had enjoyed. Perhaps 
more important, 80 percent or more of the Democrats backed the 
Eisenhower administration on only 24 percent of the rollcalls 
(compared to 71 percent previously). During the Eisenhower 
administration a remarkably unified party became a divided one. 
If the Democratic senators had remained as united against the 
Eisenhower programs as they had been in support of the Truman 
programs, the explanation would be simple: The senators were 
motivated by a sense of loyalty to and confidence in one admini- 
stration that disappeared with the advent of the next admin- 
istration. In fact the picture is more complex. The Democrats 
- 
gave President Eisenhower much more support for some of his 
policies than for others. Moreover, certain groups of Democrats 
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voted nearly as often for Eisenhower's policies as they had for 
Truman's, while others voted very differently. We must look 
more closely at the variations that appeared during the Eisen- 
hower administration. 
The simplest way to demonstrate the differences in voting on 
various issues is to record the percentage favorable to the ad- 
ministration of all votes cast by Democratic senators on all roll- 
calls concerning the issue. During the Truman administration 
this figure had been 89 or 90 percent for each of three categories: 
collective security, foreign aid measures, and reciprocal trade. 
During the Eisenhower administration this figure slipped to 80 
percent for collective security, 74 percent for foreign aid, and 
69 percent for reciprocal trade. In the case of the other category, 
amendments determining the size of foreign aid funds, support 
dropped from 77 to 54 percent.'' 
The Democratic commitment to collective security weakened 
only slightly during the Eisenhower administration. Until the 
debate on the 1957 Middle East resolution, the Democrats sup- 
ported the administration on every rollcall involving security and 
did so nearly unanimously on the key rollcalls. There was only 
a two-to-one Democratic margin for the Middle East resolution 
and there was a slight majority for one amendment to it opposed 
by the administration.'' The Democrats voted for foreign aid 
(but by decreasing margins) on every rollcall except one in- 
volving an amendment to eliminate financial aid from the Middle 
East resolution. The Democrats continued to vote for reciprocal 
trade measures by lopsided majorities but were much more 
closely divided than before on amendments affecting the Presi- 
dent's discretion. The greatest change was in the Democratic 
senators' attitude toward the size of the foreign aid program. 
The only time the Democrats voted against the Truman admin- 
istration (out of 33 rollcalls) on this question was in 1951 when 
they opposed an amendment to restore one billion dollars elimi- 
nated in committee. But they voted against the Eisenhower ad- 
10 These percentages provide only a convenient general impression of voting 
support and obscure many details. Support of 70 percent on ten rollcalls, for 
example, could mean 70 percent support on each rollcall, or 100 percent support 
on seven and none on the other three, or many other things. The percentages are 
based cn the total votes cast; nonvoting or paired senators are ignored. 
11 CQA, 1957, pp. 286-87. 
18 SENATORIAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
ministration on 17 out of 43 rollcalls involving the size of the 
foreign aid program.12 
REGIONALISM 
To understand better the inconsistencies in the Democratic 
record, we must explore the regional variations in the Democratic 
ranks, outlined in Table 2.13 During the Truman administration 
the regional variations were relatively minor (Table 3 ) .  The 
only region falling below 85 percent support was the South, 
where the average was pulled down by the vote on a single 
category-foreign aid spending amendments. Democrats from 
the Northeast and Midwest (containing most of the industrial 
states) supported both administrations overwhelmingly. In any 
geopolitical map of the Democratic party these would be the 
regions of internationalism. During the Eisenhower administra- 
tion there was a distinct change in the voting pattern of Demo- 
cratic senators from the other four regions, most notably in the 
South and the Mountain States. The trend away from inter- 
nationalism in the South deserves particular attention because 
southern senators cast about 45 percent of all Democratic votes 
12 In 1959 and 1960 Democratic support for foreign aid measures remained 
nearly stable, averaging 70 percent. Support for higher aid totals dropped to 42 
percent, and a majority of Democrats favored cuts on about half of the rollcalls. 
13A study of regionalism in the Senate may be less accurate than a similar 
study in the House because of the distortion that may result from one or two 
maverick senators. The regions used by other political scientists have varied with 
the purpose of the writer. The following criteria have been used in establishing 
seven regions: ( 1 ) to follow other regional breakdowns wherever possible; ( 2 )  
to group together states whose senators behaved alike in voting on international 
issues and separate those states whose senators have contrasting records; ( 3 )  
to establish contiguous, compact regions, small enough to emphasize regional 
voting differences but large enough to provide a statistically significant number of 
senatorial votes in each party in each region except for one-party regions. 
The seven regions are: (1) The Northeast-the six New England states, New 
York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; (2 )  The Midwest-Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin; ( 3 )  The Plains States-Kansas, 
Nebraska, and North and South Dakota; ( 4 )  The Border States-Delaware, Ken- 
tucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Virginia; (5) The South- 
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North and South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia; (6) The Mountain States-Arizona, 
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming; and ( 7 )  
The West Coast-California, Oregon, and Washington. 
In other studies, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin are often considered Plains 
States, or else the Plains States and Midwest are combined. The different method 
used here is designed to sharpen voting differences. 
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on foreign policy in each administration and because they cast 
58 percent of all Democratic votes against the Eisenhower pro- 
TABLE 2-Democratic Senatorial Support by Region of the 
Truman and Eisenhower Administrations' Foreign Policy, 
1947-1952 and 1953-1958 (Percentage of 179 Rollcalls) 
Truman, Eisenhower, 
Region 1947-1952 1953-1958 
Northeast 99 90 
Midwest 91 89 
Border States 90 69 
South 79* 54 
Mountain States 85 59 
West Coast 98 69 
* If votes on the size of foreign aid spending were excluded, 
the southern figure for 1947-1952 would be 88 percent. 
TABLE 3-Democratic Senatorial Support by Region of the 
Truman Administration's Foreign Policy, by Various Cate- 
gories of Issues, 1947-1952 (Percentage of 97 Rollcalls) 
Foreign Aid Foreign Aid Security Reciprocal 
Region Measures Spending Measures Trade 
Northeast 100 99 97 100 
Midwest 95 83 95 98 
Border States 97 90 93 82 
South 84 63 87 93 
Mountain States 88 85 84 85 
West Coast 100 97 100 97 
All Regions 90 77 89 90 
TABLE 4-Democratic Senatorial Support by Region of the 
Eisenhower Administration's Foreign Policy, by Various 
Groups of Issues, 1953-1958 (Percentage of 82 Rollcalls) 
Foreign Aid Foreign Aid Security Reciprocal 
Region Measures Spending Measures Trade 
Northeast 100 89 87 86 
Midwest 100 87 82 93 
Border States 83 62 87 61 
South 59 40 79 70 
Mountain States 80 47 80 51 
West Coast 91 67 65 64 
All Regions 75 54 80 69 
grams. While the percentage shift in southern voting is no 
greater than that in several other regions, the South was primarily 
responsible for the altered record of the Democratic senators. 
Table 4 presents more precise information on the nature of 
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the regional shifts. Democrats in the Northeast and Midwest 
supported all Eisenhower programs by large margins. There 
were no significant regional variations on collective security 
between administrations except on the West Coast, where the 
low figure results from Senator Wayne Morse's opposition to 
nearly all security programs. The South was the only region in 
which a significant proportion of senators opposed foreign aid 
bills. The South and Mountain States contained the largest pro- 
portion who voted for reducing foreign aid. During the Truman 
administration the South had provided the lowest proportion of 
Democratic votes for foreign aid measures (84 percent) and by 
far the lowest proportion of votes against reductions in aid funds 
(63 percent). In the Border States, West Coast, and especially 
the Mountain States, Democratic support for maintaining high 
spending levels declined despite continued large majorities for 
foreign aid measures. Since Democrats in these three regions 
had provided the Truman administration with larger majorities 
on spending amendments than southerners had, their voting 
pattern underwent a greater shift during the Republican ad- 
ministration even though the percentages did not drop so low 
as in the South.14 The figures for reciprocal trade present a dif- 
ferent picture: Southern support for the Eisenhower admini- 
stration (70 percent) was higher than that of the other three 
regions; the Mountain States, where Democrats were almost 
equally divided, ranked lowest. 
The first conclusion to be drawn from the Democratic record 
during the Eisenhower administration is that, with a couple of 
exceptions, there was some decrease in the willingness of senators 
from each region to vote for each major category of foreign 
programs. Even the most internationalist Democrats seemed to 
feel less constrained to guarantee support for Eisenhower than 
they had for Truman. The variations in the voting pattern are 
more important. They indicate that Democratic internationalism 
was more consistent, and less dependent on loyalty to one ad- 
ministration, in the field of collective security than in the areas 
of foreign aid and reciprocal trade. The figures indicate that 
14 During 1959 and 1960, southerners continued to provide a higher proportion 
of votes against foreign aid and for reductions in the program than Democrats 
from other regions. Democrats from the Northeast and Midwest continued to 
give the strongest support for foreign aid. 
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the trend away from internationalism was greatest in the south- 
ern and western sections of the party. The Democratic senators' 
remarkably strong loyalty to the Truman administration ob- 
scured the motivations for internationalist voting by a variety 
of senators on a variety of issues. The voting record in recent 
years makes possible a closer look at the changing motivations 
of Democratic senators. 
The South has long been regarded as the bulwark of inter- 
nationalism in the Democratic party, and yet during the Eisen- 
hower administration the largest number of senators whose 
voting records changed were southerners. For these reasons we 
shall focus our search for the causes of declining internationalism 
on the South, without neglecting the attitudes of Democratic 
senators in other regions. One possible cause would be the 
reluctance of Democrats to grant a Republican President such 
broad discretionary powers in foreign affairs as they had given 
President Truman. A second cause might be a belief by some 
senators that international economic policies of this country are 
increasingly damaging the economy of their states, an argument 
that has been applied particularly to the South. A third might 
be opposition to continuing the heavy drain on the national 
budget by prolonging large-scale foreign aid, a view motivated 
primarily by what we shall call fiscal conservatism. Finally, 
since we have already recognized the Democrats' decreasing 
sense of obligation to support a Republican administration's 
programs, we must consider whether certain of these programs 
seem to have taken on greater Republican coloration than others. 
MILITARY SECURITY AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
The first question-the discretion that should be granted to the 
President-is associated almost entirely with the issue of collective 
security. On several occasions during the Truman administra- 
tion the Democrats stood firm against attempts to curb the 
President's authority through resenrations to collective security 
treaties or through amendments to the troops for Europe resolu- 
tion. In 1955, when President Eisenhower asked advance con- 
gressional approval for whatever policies he found necessary to 
protect the vaguely defined area of Formosa, many Democrats 
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had grave misgivings about the consequences of such a step. 
Yet only two Democrats voted against the Formosa resolution 
and no more than twelve voted for a series of amendments to 
the resolution designed to define more precisely the area of 
presidential authority. The Democratic voting pattern was simi- 
lar on the related defense treaty with Nationalist China. 
In 1957, when President Eisenhower asked for a similar broad 
grant of authority to provide military assistance to any victim 
of Communist aggression in the Middle East, the Democrats 
became sharply divided. One-third of the Democratic senators 
(11 southerners and 5 others) opposed the resolution. Just over 
half of the Democrats (including the same number of south- 
erners) supported an unsuccessful amendment that would have 
tied the President's hands by requiring him to notify Congress 
before sending armed forces to the Middle East or, if this were 
impossible, to submit his action for congressional approval. 
These votes on the Middle East resolution were certainly out 
of step with traditional policies of the Senate Democrats; the 
result likely would have been very different had a Democrat been 
in the White House. But the Democratic split apparently repre- 
sented less a growing distrust of presidential power than the 
sober belief that the administration had failed to present a strong 
enough case for the authority it was seeking in the Middle East. 
Southern opposition was caused partly by the fact that the 
resolution provided funds for Middle Eastern countries both for 
military and developmental purposes. Fourteen out of nineteen 
southerners voted for Senator Richard Russell's unsuccessful 
amendment to eliminate this aid provision.15 
Democratic voting on the Bricker amendment, considered by 
the Senate in 1954, might appear to indicate that the Democrats 
had abandoned their devotion to strong presidential authority in 
foreign affairs. The amendment would have placed executive 
agreements under the control of Congress and would have limited 
the treaty making power to those areas that fall within the dele- 
gated powers of Congress. The Bricker amendment was subject 
to a variety of interpretations, but it would clearly have imposed 
considerable limits on the authority of the President, as well as 
the Senate, in foreign affairs. No rollcall was taken on the version 
16 CQA, 1955, pp. 115-16; 1957, pp. 286-87. 
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of the Bricker amendment that would have imposed the greatest 
curbs on the conduct of foreign affairs. In rollcalls on other 
versions, the southern senators represented the hard core of 
Democratic support for the principle of the Bricker amendment. 
On the final vote on the Bricker amendment-which had been 
completely rewritten by Senator Walter F. George-eighteen 
southerners voted affirmatively, one was paired for it, and three 
opposed. The remaining Democrats voted against it 13-10.16 
These votes can be misinterpreted, however, if it is not realized 
that many southerners viewed the issue primarily as one of states' 
rights. Many of them were primarily interested in trying to 
prevent the use of treaties to effect domestic reforms, particularly 
in the area of civil rights. The southern Democratic vote appears 
to have been as much a conservative vote as an isolationist vote. 
Moreover, Senator George's substitute was viewed by some 
normally internationalist Democrats (northern and southern) as 
a relatively harmless compromise far preferable to more damaging 
versions of the Bricker amendment. 
The southern vote for the Bricker amendment must also be 
explained in terms of personal support for two distinguished 
southern senators, Russell and George. Russell's advocacy of 
severe limits on the treatymaking power appears to have in- 
spired a strong stand by the most conservative or isolationist 
southerners. George, with a long record of internationalism, 
seems to have won moderate and internationalist southerners 
to his compromise by making it appear to be above reproach. 
By and large, Democratic votes against the broad grants of 
authority sought by President Eisenhower in the collective se- 
curity field reflected doubts about the wisdom of specific policies 
rather than suspicions of presidential power. Many years of 
responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy have bred in the 
Democratic party a strong respect for the authority of the 
President in this field. 
FOREIGN AID 
The changing economic situation of the South has been used 
most often by analysts to explain the declining internationalism 
16 Ibid., 1954, p. 294. 
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of senators from that region. With increased industrialization 
the South is less dependent on exports of cotton and tobacco. 
While this factor might primarily affect voting on reciprocal 
trade measures, it could iduence voting on amendments to 
foreign aid bills intended to limit imports and even voting on 
the basic issue of foreign aid. Senator Herman Talmadge of 
Georgia, a vigorous opponent of foreign aid, has argued: "While 
unfair competition is closing the doors of numerous American 
industries, we continue to send our technicians and machines to 
foreign lands to provide the know-how to produce goods that 
will destroy markets for our own, due to the vast differential 
between slave wages and free wages."17 If southern senators 
generally accepted this line of argument, they would presumably 
vote against foreign aid to protect the new industries of their 
states. But industrialization has not proceeded rapidly enough 
in the South to account for the considerable drop in southern 
votes for foreign aid during the Eisenhower administration. 
A more pertinent economic reason for the recent shift in the 
voting pattern might be the changing nature of the foreign aid 
program. As the program's geographic emphasis has shifted 
from Europe to the underdeveloped areas, southerners have 
seen a threat to cotton exports in irrigation programs and other 
agricultural measures that might cause increased cotton pro- 
duction abroad. Cotton is still important enough in some south- 
ern states to make the threat of competition carry weight with 
the voters. Strong substantiation of such reasoning came in 
1956, when southern senators opposed the administration's plan 
to help Egypt build the Aswan Dam, a project likely to expand 
cotton production. Senator Walter F. George, then at the height 
of his influence, expressed strong opposition to the project. The 
Senate Appropriations Committee, containing seven southerners, 
wrote into its report on the foreign aid bill a requirement that 
no funds be spent for this project without advance approval by 
the committee. Shortly thereafter John Foster Dulles abruptly 
withdrew the American offer of aid to Egypt. While other groups 
both in Congress and in the State Department had strong reasons 
for opposing the grant to Egypt, southern concern over cotton 
17 Quoted by Marquis Childs in the Washington Post and Times Herald, July 
2, 1957. 
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exports was undoubtedly one factor in the decision to withdraw 
aid. 
Yet, southern support for the aid program has not been con- 
sistently lower on rollcalls dealing specifically with economic aid 
to underdeveloped areas than on those dealing with other aspects 
of aid. The Point Four Program, inaugurated in 1950, was the 
only aid bill during the Truman administration opposed by a 
majority of southern senators.ls In 1955, when slightly over half 
of the southern senators voted for several cuts in military and 
defense support spending, fifteen out of nineteen voted against 
an increase in the Fund for Asian Economic Development, but 
twelve out of nineteen opposed eliminating the Fund. In 1957, 
twelve out of twenty southern Democrats voted for a severe 
cutback in the Development Loan Fund, virtually the same 
number that voted several times for large cuts in military and 
defense support aid. Although seventeen out of nineteen south- 
ern Democrats ia 1955 approved a $10 million cut in aid to India 
already suggested by the Appropriations Committee, only five 
out of nineteen agreed to a $40 million cut in aid to India the 
next year, and a slight majority supported the amendment in 
1958 pledging American aid to India's development program. 
During the Eisenhower administration, southern senators have 
repeatedly voted-often overwhelmingly-to make large cuts in 
military and defense support aid.lg 
Probably some southern senators are becoming increasingly 
hostile to the principle of foreign aid itself because of the belief 
that the program as a whole damages the southern economy. 
Yet, in a period when northern Democratic senators have been 
voicing repeated demands for greater emphasis on economic 
development programs rather than military aid, those southern 
senators friendly to the principle of aid have not dissented. 
Moreover, the rollcalls do not reveal that the development of 
Asian and African countries has less southern support than mili- 
tary assistance has. Further reasons must be sought for southern 
voting trends in the Senate. 
One explanation for decreasing southern support for foreign 
18 Southern senators voted against Point Four by a margin of 11-8. CQA, 1950, 
p. 267. 
19 lbid., 1955, pp. 127, 132; 1956, p. 175; 1957, pp. 300-301, 313; 1958, p. 437. 
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aid might be the election, in recent years, of senators who were 
not committed to the major postwar aid programs and who might 
be identified as isolationists. As a rule, however, isolationism 
has not been a campaign theme of successful southern candidates 
for the Senate. I t  is true that Herman Talrnadge of Georgia 
campaigned successfully in 1956 on a platform of opposition to 
aid and trade and fuElled his campaign promises in the sub- 
sequent rollcall voting. Some other candidates have followed 
this tactic and failed at the polls. The evidence does not suggest 
that a new generation of southern senators is committed to iso- 
lationism by campaign promises or by strong trends in southern 
public opinion. 
Fiscal conservatism, a factor that has distinguished southern 
from northern Democrats in their attitude toward domestic 
issues, may now be a factor in the issue of foreign aid, which 
represents an annual tax burden of several billion dollars. Be- 
cause it is difficult to cut domestic expenditures without first 
cutting those for foreign aid, reductions in the aid program have 
had a growing appeal to conservative senators-men like Harry 
I?. Byrd and Walter F. George. ("Conservative" is used here 
simply in a fiscal sense to describe those who attach a high 
priority to the reduction of governmental spending, taxes, and 
the public debt, who give more than lipservice to the slogan of 
"economy.") Although the distinction may not always be clear 
or measurable in rollcalls, there is an important difference be- 
tween opposition to the principle of foreign aid and opposition 
to the high levels of foreign aid consistently sought by the ad- 
ministration. Concern over the cost of foreign aid, inspired by 
fiscal conservatism, would appear to be the explanation for a 
senator's consistently voting for foreign aid and for reductions 
in aid spending. It would also logically explain a senator's fol- 
lowing this pattern for several years and then finally voting 
against foreign aid itself. 
Although a few southern Democrats voted against new foreign 
aid programs introduced by the Truman administration, they 
supported the annual extensions of these programs virtually 
unanimously through 1954. Yet from 1947 through 1954 south- 
ern Democratic support for higher funds on spending amend- 
ments dropped from 78 to 43 percent, presumably because of 
growing concern over the burden placed on the national budget 
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by an annual foreign aid expenditure of several billion dollars. 
The sharp drop in southern Democratic support for aid bills 
that began in 1955 probably reflected primarily a protest against 
the scope of the Eisenhower program rather than a vote in 
principle against foreign aid. 
Those veteran southern senators who continued to vote for 
most of President Eisenhower's aid measures were nearly all 
men who voted for higher funds on a majority of spending 
amendments during both administrations. Among veteran south- 
erners the opposition to Eisenhower's aid program came pri- 
marily from those who supported most of Truman's aid program 
but who more often than not voted for reductions in it, generally 
men with relatively conservative records on domestic issues. 
This latter group consistently voted for amendments to foreign 
aid bills intended to increase the proportion of funds designated 
as loans rather than grants-another symptom of fiscal conserva- 
tism. Most Democrats who continued to vote for foreign aid 
were opponents of these amendments. 
The explanation for the changing attitude of other Democratic 
senators toward foreign aid is somewhat similar. Foreign aid 
would not seem to present any direct economic threat to the 
Mountain States and some of the Border States, where this 
change was most evident. In these regions the change came 
primarily on amendments affecting the size of the aid program. 
This strongly suggests a desire for economy rather than a dissent 
from the principle of foreign aid. Most of the nonsouthern Demo- 
crats voting frequently to reduce foreign aid during the Eisen- 
hower years, however, cannot be classified as conservatives on 
domestic issues; moreover, most of them are men who voted 
regularly to supply maximum funds for aid during the Truman 
administrat i~n.~~ Some of them simply wanted more funds avail- 
able for domestic purposes, and some were influenced by growing 
constituent antipathy to the aid program, while some believed 
that the foreign needs had d e c r e a ~ e d . ~ ~  Another cause of dis- 
20Examples are Robert S. Kerr of Oklahoma, Mike Mansfield of Montana, 
Dennis Chavez and Clinton P. Anderson of New Mexico, and Warren Magnuson 
of Washington. 
21 One senator, explaining to the writer his growing opposition to foreign aid, 
pointed to an architect's drawing of a post office scheduled for a major city in his 
state, construction of which had been barred by an executive order while foreign 
aid spending continued. 
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satisfaction was clearly some disagreement with the direction 
the program had been taking in recent years. Numerous Demo- 
cratic senators stated both publicly and privately their concern 
that a disproportionate share of aid funds had gone for military 
purposes. A large proportion of the spending amendments on 
which rollcalls were recorded during the Eisenhower admini- 
stration involved proposed cuts in military spending. Several 
Democratic senators voted for most of these cuts while support- 
ing other aspects of the program more fully. Frequent votes to 
reduce the foreign aid program were cast for a variety of reasons 
by nonsouthern as well as southern Democrats, by liberals as 
well as conservatives, and usually by Democrats who would not 
be judged as isolationists on the basis of their votes on other 
international issues. 
RECIPROCAL TRADE LEGISLATION 
The strongest opposition to reciprocal trade legislation may be 
anticipated in states having industries suffering from foreign 
competition, particularly if these are new industries not yet 
strongly established. The textile and apparel industries of the 
South have not only been growing in recent years but have faced 
rapidly increasing competition from Japanese industries. There 
is some correlation between the states whose senators have re- 
cently grown hostile to reciprocal trade and states in which 
textile and apparel industries are important. In 1954 South 
Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia were the only three south- 
ern states in which the textile and apparel industries employed 
over 10 percent of the civilian labor force and the three with 
the greatest increase in these industries since 1947.22 All senators 
from these three states supported the Truman administration on 
every rollcall involving reciprocal trade. These were the only 
southern states, however, having senators who opposed the 
Eisenhower administration's stand on more than half of the roll- 
calls dealing with reciprocal trade. While support for reciprocal 
trade in these three states dropped from 100 to 34 percent, in 
22 Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Manufactures, 1954, Vol. 11, 
Part 1, pp. 22-23; Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
1958, p. 207, 
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the eight southern states where textiles are less important the 
drop was only from 90 to 83 percent after 1952, not enough to 
suggest that voting on this issue was significantly affected by 
the change in  administration^.^^ 
The voting shift by senators from the three textile states is 
apparently not an accidental byproduct of changes in personnel. 
Although several strong supporters of reciprocal trade left the 
Senate and were succeeded by men less favorable to it,24 Richard 
B. Russell of Georgia and Olin D. Johnston of South Carolina, 
who served throughout the twelve-year period, abandoned their 
strong voting support for reciprocal trade after 1952. 
In the case of a few amendments designed to benefit specific 
commodities, the economic motivation for voting was even 
clearermZ5 In 1956 two amendments were introduced to the for- 
eign aid bill designed to limit imports of cotton and cotton 
textiles. The southern vote on the two amendments was identical. 
Voting for the limits on imports were all six senators from the 
three states in which textile and apparel firms employ the largest 
proportion of the working force (North Carolina, South Carolina, 
and Georgia) and five other senators from major textile or cotton- 
growing states (Alabama, Mississippi, and Arkansas) .26 
During the Eisenhower administration, as Table 4 indicates, 
there was more opposition to the reciprocal trade program among 
Democrats from the Mountain States, Border States, and West 
23 For purposes of comparison, an analysis of two House rollcalls was made: 
one in 1955 on a motion to return the reciprocal trade bill to committee in order 
to curb the President's tariff-cutting powers and one in 1958 on passage of the 
reciprocal trade bill. Only 58 percent of the Southerners opposed the motion 
in 1955 and 75 percent voted for the trade bill in 1958. In 1955, South Carolina, 
Georgia, and North Carolina were the three southern states with the largest 
proportions of members opposing reciprocal trade and in 1958 these were three 
of the four states in that category. This gives added support to the theory that 
the shift in southern voting on foreign trade has largely resulted from the problems 
faced by the textile industry. CQA, 1955, pp. 138-39; 1958, pp. 388-89. 
24 Walter F. George, Clyde Hoey, Frank Graham, and Burnet R. Maybank were 
replaced by Herman Talmadge, Sam Ervin, W. Kerr Scott, and J. Strom Thurmond. 
25 Amendments to foreign aid bills designed to promote the export of surplus 
agricultural products drew a mixed response in the South. Those that seemed 
likely to apply primarily to northern crops gained the fewest votes. Three of the 
four southern states whose senators most often voted for agricultural amendments 
were Mississippi, Arkansas, and South Carolina, the three having the largest 
percentage of the labor force employed in agriculture in 1950. 
26 Senator George A. Smathers of Florida cast the only other southern vote for 
limiting imports. CQA, 1956, pp. 173-74. 
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Coast than among those from the South. During the Truman 
administration some of this opposition was already evident in 
the Mountain and Border states. As in the South, the opposition 
in these three regions can be pinpointed to states in which sig- 
nificant segments of industry face serious foreign competition. 
Because mining and petroleum are outstanding examples of 
such industries, Democratic opposition to reciprocal trade as- 
sumed a more distinctly regional character in the Mountain 
States than it did in the South or in other regions during the 
Eisenhower administration. Democratic senators in Wyoming 
and Nevada voted to restrict or oppose the trade program on a 
majority of rollcalls from 1953 through 1958, while those from 
New Mexico, Montana, and Colorado voted that way on over 
one-third of the rollcalls. These five states include some of the 
largest producers of copper, lead, zinc, and petroleum, all in- 
dustries concerned about substantial foreign competition; and 
several of these states produce wool, which also faces compe- 
tition from imports. Democratic senators from Oklahoma, who 
were evenly divided on rollcalls involving trade during both ad- 
ministrations, were concerned about protecting petroleum, lead, 
and zinc industries as well as glass manufacturing. West Vir- 
ginia's Democratic senators on several occasions voted against 
foreign trade. That state has a high proportion of industries 
claiming protection: coal (competing with imported petroleum), 
glassware, pottery, and textiles. In Washington and Oregon 
the fruitgrowers and fishing industry were among those clamor- 
ing for protection and apparently helping to produce some of the 
votes against reciprocal trade among Democrats from those states. 
The states whose Democratic senators have frequently voted 
to curtail or abolish the reciprocal trade program are not in all 
cases those states containing major industries affected seriously 
by foreign competition. Some Democratic senators have con- 
tinued to vote for the full, unrestricted trade program despite 
the demands for protection from important industries in their 
states. But in all of those states where Democratic senators have 
broken with traditional party policy of consistent support for 
reciprocal trade, there are important industries seeking pro- 
tection. On the other hand the loyalty of Democrats from the 
Northeast and Midwest to the trade program is clearly related 
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to the dominant position in most of those states of established 
manufacturing industries able to compete well with foreign 
industries .27 
DEMOCRATS AND THE CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATIONS 
Dean Acheson has argued that the Democratic party's inter- 
nationalism results primarily from its control of the administra- 
tion and its responsibility for conducting foreign policy during 
the major wars and critical postwar periods in this century. 
Conversely, the Republicans have lacked until recently both 
the responsibility and the continuing, detailed familiarity with 
foreign problems that engender internationali~m.~~ While often 
differing with both Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman 
over domestic policy, senators appeared to have had confidence 
in the foreign policy of both Democratic administrations and to 
have felt a sense of responsibility and loyalty to them in this 
area. Despite the emphasis placed on bipartisan foreign policy 
by the Eisenhower administration and by Senators Walter F. 
George and Lyndon B. Johnson, both southern and northern 
Democratic senators apparently felt a smaller obligation to sup- 
port President Eisenhower's foreign policies. 
There is a significant interrelationship between Democratic 
senators' views on international issues and their attitude toward 
the administration. Most Democrats supported most of Truman's 
programs because of convictions that grew out of the traditional 
internationalism of Democratic administrations. On some occa- 
sions Democrats voted for Truman's programs, despite serious 
misgivings or pressure from constituents, in order to avoid under- 
mining a Democratic President's position on foreign policy. 
During the Eisenhower administration these misgivings were 
unhampered by party loyalty. But there remained a strong sense 
of loyalty to those policies most traditionally associated with the 
Democratic party, coupled with a strong respect for the Presi- 
dent's authority in foreign policy. 
27 See the similar conclusions of Richard A. Watson, "The Tariff Revolution: A 
Study of Shifting Party Attitudes," Journal of  ~ o l k c s ,  XVIII (Nov., 1956), 
678-701. 
28 Dean Acheson, A Democrat Looks at His Party (New York: Harper & Broth- 
ers, 1955), pp. 64-67. 
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The principle of support for collective security has been widely 
accepted by Democrats since Woodrow Wilson's battle for the 
League of Nations, and it was natural that Democratic senators 
should support the collective security programs of both Truman 
and Eisenhower. The Democratic party has also been tradition- 
ally committed to low tariffs, and the principle of reciprocal 
trade is closely associated with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Cordell 
Consequently, it is not surprising that the Democrats 
claimed greater devotion to President Eisenhower's reciprocal 
trade program than Republicans did and occasionally prodded 
Eisenhower to take a bolder stand in defense of his program. 
Except for senators from states where industry was suffering from 
foreign competition, most Democratic senators were consistent 
supporters of reciprocal trade.30 
Large-scale foreign aid is a relatively new issue and lacks the 
long history of Democratic endorsement enjoyed by the policies 
of a low tariff and collective security. Moreover, it is a costly 
program contrary to the conservative fiscal beliefs of many Dem- 
ocrats, particularly southerners. Never in the postwar period 
does it appear to have had the enthusiastic southern endorsement 
given to reciprocal trade and collective security. Few southern 
senators, however, wanted to repudiate programs that had be- 
come established policies-and outstanding achievements-of the 
Democratic party. The southerners as well as many other Dem- 
29A study of nine key rollcalls in the House of Representatives on tariff meas- 
ures from 1929 through 1953 showed this to be an issue on which party lines were 
closely drawn. Of all the votes cast on these rollcalls, only one out of every fifteen 
did not fall into the pattern of Democratic opposition to the tariff and support 
for reciprocal trade and Republican backing for the tariff and opposition to recip- 
rocal trade. Three-fifths of the nonconforming votes were cast by Democrats. 
The margin of victory usually approximated the margin of the majority party in 
the House. Howard R. Smith and John F. Hart, "The American Tariff Map," 
Geographical Review, XLV (1955), 337. In a study of seven congressional ses- 
sions from 1933 through 1945, V. 0. Key found that on nine rollcalls on which 
the parties took opposite sides an average of 95 percent of southern Democrats, 
84 percent of northern Democrats, and only 13 percent of the Republicans in the 
Senate supported reciprocal trade. Southern Politics in State and Nation (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 353. 
30 In 1954 President Eisenhower urged Congress to adopt the recommendations 
of the Randall Commission in reciprocal trade legislation but agreed to the Re- 
publican congressional demand for a one-year extension of the existing law while 
the recommendations were studied. The Democrats sought to amend the bill to 
incorporate the commission's recommendations immediately. Although all of the 
Republicans opposed this in the Senate, just six Democrats (one a southerner) 
voted against it. 
DECLINE O F  DEMOCRATIC INTERNATIONALISM 33 
ocrats continued to vote for foreign aid in the Eisenhower years 
of 1953 and 1954 probably because they still thought of it as a 
Democratic program. Over a period of time not only the spon- 
sorship of the aid program changed but also its emphasis and 
content. Moreover, the Republican administration gradually 
began to stress the need for a long-term program-an idea that 
had little appeal to those senators most concerned about the 
cost of foreign aid. 
Southern senators appear to make the greatest distinction be- 
tween traditional Democratic programs and other measures. The 
South has long been regarded as the bulwark of internationalism, 
its senators have longer seniority than many others, and in lean 
years the Democratic record has been primarily a southern record 
in the Senate. Democrats from the northern industrial states, 
most of whom came to the Senate after World War 11, have 
backed the entire range of foreign programs with consistently 
only slight reductions in support during the Republican admin- 
istration. In the West, Democratic senators have subordinated 
tradition to the demands for tariff protection. 
This pattern of voting in the 1947-1958 period has an interest- 
ing parallel in the pattern of Democratic voting in the Senate 
from 1921 through 1941. George L. Grassmuck studied voting 
in both houses of Congress on several topics that are comparable 
to postwar issues.31 The question of membership in or coopera- 
tion with the World Court and the League of Nations is some- 
what similar to the more recent controversies over collective 
security. There is a closer parallel between the neutrality legis- 
lation from 1935 through 1941 and recent security measures; 
moreover, both involved-the grant of discretionary power to the 
President. There has also been some continuity in foreign fiscal 
policy. The war debts settlements of the 1920s and the Export- 
Import Bank late in the 1930s are comparable to economic aid, 
and the Lend-Lease program resembles military aid. 
Approximately three-quarters of the Democrats voted for 
31 Although Grassmuck in Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy, 
studied both branches of Congress, comparisons are made here only with his 
figures for the Senate. Using slightly different regions, Grassmuck included Iowa, 
Minnesota, and Wisconsin in the Plains States and Delaware in the Northeast. 
His regional comparisons were handicapped by a paucity of Democratic senators 
in the Midwest, Plains States, and West Coast from 1921 through 1932, and a 
shortage of Republicans from the Mountain and Border states after 1932. 
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membership in international organizations during both Repub- 
lican and Democratic administrations between the wars and 
favored relaxation of neutrality legislation before World War 11. 
Variations among regions and those within each region between 
administrations were comparatively small in the case of regions 
with substantial Democratic strength. The Democratic record 
on foreign debts and aid is very different. Senate Democratic 
support for war debt settlement proposals and foreign aid 
measures rose from 42 percent during Republican administra- 
tions to 85 percent during Roosevelt's regime. The contrast was 
greatest in the South, where the percentage rose from 36 to 92. 
Among northeastern Democrats the support for the financial 
measures was more consistently high. The similarity of this 
pattern to that in recent years is not simply that the Demo- 
crats, and particularly those from the South, supported foreign 
economic programs less consistently than other types of foreign 
commitments. During the 1920-1932 period the Democrats were 
endorsing the Wilsonian principle of international cooperation 
and voting for measures that involved the authority and prestige 
of a Democratic President even though the immediate sponsors 
were Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover. Actually, in key votes on 
joining the World Court, the Democrats provided more united 
support in 1926 than in 1935, when the Wilsonian tradition had 
begun to fade. The Democrats gave stronger support to these 
foreign policy measures than Republican senators did. 
The comparison with voting records of the 1920s and 1930s 
is useful because it adds perspective to and reinforces the con- 
clusions from our analysis of the 1947-1958 period: The Demo- 
crats have not been consistently a party of internationalism but 
have supported international programs much more strongly dur- 
ing Democratic administrations. Democratic support has been 
consistently higher, however, even during Republican admin- 
istrations, for policies traditionally associated with the Demo- 
cratic party-most notably collective security. In voting on for- 
eign policy, southern Democrats have been more influenced than 
others in the party by a sense of loyalty to Democratic Presidents 
and traditional party policies. Northeastern Democrats have been 
more consistently internationalist. 
I believe that if the Republican party is going to stay in 
power it must support the President. As a result, 1 some- 
times "hold my nose"-as the saying goes-and go along 
with the Administration, though I might personally prefer 
to vote the other way. 
-Republican senator quoted by DONALD R. MATTHEWS 
3 
THE REPUBLICAN RECORD 
THE REPUBLICAN VOTING RECORD ILLUSTRATES, EVEN MORE 
vividly than the Democratic record, the transformation that can 
occur when partisan responsibility for foreign policy changes. 
As shown in Table 5, a majority of Republican senators supported 
the Truman administration on only 37 percent of the rollcalls; 
the party was almost united in opposition on a substantial num- 
ber of the remainder. During the Eisenhower administration, 
majority support rose to 83 percent. There are some striking 
differences between the Democratic and Republican records, 
notably the greater resistance to internationalism in Republican 
ranks. A majority of Republicans voted for Truman's programs 
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only about half as frequently as a majority of Democrats backed 
Eisenhower. The Republican support for Eisenhower fell some- 
what short of Democratic support for Truman. Yet these con- 
trasts simply emphasize the importance of loyalty to the admin- 
istration as a factor in voting on foreign policy. Although the 
Republicans had a long isolationist tradition, although many 
of them deeply distrusted the Democratic authors of programs 
inherited by President Eisenhower, and although many of them 
disliked Eisenhower's internationalist views, Republican senators 
TABLE 5-Foreign Policy Rollcalls by Percentage of Repub- 
lican Senatorial Support of the Truman and Eisenhower 
Administrations, 1947-1952 and 1953-1958 (283 Rollcalls) 
Percentage Truman, 1947-1952 Eisenhower, 1953-1958 
of Support Number Percentage Number Percentage 
90-100 10 5.8 22 19.6 
80-89.9 8 4.7 12 10.7 
70-79.9 15 8.8 22 19.6 
60-69.9 14 8.2 28 25.0 
50-59.9 17 9.9 9 8.0 
40-49.9 15 8.8 5 4.5 
30-39.9 17 9.9 6 5.4 
20-29.9 31 18.2 1 0.9 
10-19.9 17 9.9 0 0.0 
0-9.9 27 15.8 7 6.3 
- ,- -
Total 171 100.0 112 1oo.o 
reversed their stand on a wide variety of issues to provide strong 
support for the Republican President, particularly on the most 
important elements of his program. 
President Eisenhower had broader bipartisan support for his 
foreign programs than Harry Truman usually enjoyed. This is 
because Eisenhower gained Republican votes faster than he lost 
Democratic votes. Commentators have emphasized those occa- 
sions when Eisenhower's programs drew more votes from Demo- 
cratic than Republican ranks. I t  seems more remarkable and 
more significant for our study that Eisenhower had a majority of 
Republican votes more often than a majority of Democratic votes. 
His defeats more often resulted from defection by a majority of 
the opposition than by a majority of his own party. As the 
Eisenhower administration progressed, Republican voting sup- 
port grew and Democratic support fell. 
Eisenhower had to secure bipartisan support for the same 
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reasons that Truman did: the need of large majorities to satisfy 
the Constitution or our allies and the absence of a Republican 
majority after 1954. Eisenhower had less support from his own 
party and gained more votes from the opposition than Truman 
did. Yet each President discovered his own party to be the more 
dependable source of votes, and each became increasingly de- 
pendent on his own party as his administration progressed. 
THE REPUBLICANS OUT OF OFFICE 
The Republican record during the Truman administration was 
not uniform. During the early years, while the major economic 
and military programs for Europe were being launched with the 
active support of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, the Republi- 
cans provided substantial support despite the rigid opposition 
of an isolationist wing. In later years, during the annual struggles 
over implementation of these measures, there was growing oppo- 
sition from the party, now led by Robert A. Taft and increasingly 
hostile to the policies being carried out in Asia. 
Republican backing for the Truman administration was 
strongest and most consistent on the major issues of collective 
security. In 1948 only two Republicans voted against the Van- 
denberg resolution on collective security. Both the North Atlantic 
Treaty and the Japanese Security Treaty had nearly three-to- 
one Republican majorities. The party was divided, however, on 
the reservations and resolutions concerning the relative authority 
to be permitted the President and retained by Congress in imple- 
menting collective security measures. Only about one-fourth of 
the Republicans favored a reservation to the NATO pact in 1949 
reserving for Congress sole authority to send armed assistance 
to the NATO allies; when similar reservations were proposed to 
an expanded NATO pact in 1951 and to the Japanese Security 
Treaty in 1952, only 10 and 12 of 47 Republicans, respectively, 
were opposed. The prolonged controversy over sending troops 
to Europe found the Republicans sharply divided not only on 
the question of limiting the President's authority but on the wis- 
dom of sending troops. Nearly one-third of the Republican 
senators favored the sending of troops and opposed placing 
binding restrictions on the President through a joint resolution. 
The remainder, who thought that the President should be re- 
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quired by law to get congressional approval for any further 
troop assignments to Europe, were divided when the joint 
resolution was defeated; a minority voted for the simple resolu- 
tion and a majority opposed it because it lacked binding au- 
thority and in some cases because they flatly opposed sending 
tr0ops.l 
The Republican votes cast for the North Atlantic Treaty were 
vitally important. A bitter partisan contest in the Senate would 
have drained from the treaty most of its value as an assurance to 
our European allies. In the face of Soviet expansion in eastern 
Europe and dangerously strong Communist parties in western 
Europe, Republican senators did not dare to risk the conse- 
quences of defeating the treaty. Two years later, Republican 
indecision on the troops for Europe issue was costly to the ad- 
ministration because the prolonged debate on both the military 
and political questions shook the confidence of our allies in the 
reliability of American commitments. The changed attitude of 
Republican senators resulted primarily from decreasing con- 
fidence in the President, resentment over his unilateral decision 
to send troops to Korea, and frustration with the unsuccessful 
Korean war. The military commitment in Europe was never 
seriously challenged by many Republican senators; enough of 
them voted against restrictive amendments to prevent serious 
handicapping of the European program. Yet in the later years 
of the Democratic administration, the implementation of mili- 
tary as well as economic policy in Europe became a partisan 
question, affected by partisanship over Asian issues. 
The Asian controversy began with the collapse of Chiang 
Kai-shek's forces and the Communist conquest of mainland 
China. Republicans blamed the Truman administration for in- 
itially encouraging Chiang to reach a compromise with Com- 
munist Chinese leaders during 1946 and then for refusing to 
provide substantial military assistance to Chiang in late 1948 
and 1949 in an attempt to prevent the rout of his forces. After 
Chiang Kai-shek withdrew to Formosa, many Republicans criti- 
cized the Truman administration for refusing to help defend that 
island until the start of the Korean war. Some Republicans 
charged that the administration had in effect invited the Korean 
1 CQA, 1948, p. 218; 1949, pp. 429-30; 1951, pp. 257-58; 1952, pp. 177, 182. 
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attack by the weakness of its stand against Communist expansion 
in Asia. After Chinese troops entered the war at the end of 
1950, there was mounting Republican criticism of President 
Truman for sending American forces to Korea without con- 
gressional approval. The Asian controversy was climaxed by 
the President's dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur in April, 
1951, which precipitated a partisan debate on whether to expand, 
limit, or terminate the Korean war. Ultimately the Korean war 
became the major issue of the 1952 e l ec t i~n .~  
Although these Asian issues frequently dominated the head- 
lines throughout Truman's second administration and created an 
atmosphere of controversy undermining bipartisan support for 
all his foreign programs, very few of them reached the point of 
a rollcall. Controversies on aid to Chiang Kai-shek were settled 
in committee without being carried to the floor. The Senate did 
unanimously pass in 1951 a resolution opposing Communist 
China's admission to the United Nations, and there was a series 
of rollcalls along party lines involving Republican efforts to open 
hearings on the MacArthur dismissal to all senatorsS3 The only 
other important Asian issue to reach the rollcall stage was the 
Japanese Peace Treaty ratified in 1952. Although the fact that 
John Foster Dulles had negotiated the treaty helped to create 
a three-to-one Republican margin for it, the Republicans sup- 
ported most of the proposed reservations to the pact, sometimes 
by substantial margins4 The peace treaty, however, like the 
Japanese Security Treaty, was largely removed from the partisan 
controversy over China and Korea. 
The Republicans were more opposed to the major components 
of President Truman's foreign aid program than to the collective 
security treaties. The Greek-Turkish aid program in 1947 and 
the Marshall Plan in 1948 were launched with the backing of 
substantial Republican majorities. In later years, Republican 
doubts about the changing emphasis of the aid program and its 
continued high cost, together with declining confidence in the 
administration, diminished the ranks of Republican supporters. 
2 For analyses of Republican policy toward China, see Crabb, Bipartisan Foreign 
Policy, Ch. 5;  Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, Chs. 12, 16. 
3 Senator Pat McCarran, Democrat of Nevada, was the only senator crossing 
party lines on these rollcalls. CQA, 1951, p. 259. 
4 Ibid., 1952, p. 177. 
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During 1947 and 1948, 76 percent of the Republican votes cast 
on foreign aid measures were favorable; in succeeding two-year 
periods the figures fell to 60 and 51 percent. Republicans voted 
for the first general military assistance program in 1949 by a 
narrow 19-14 margin. The next year they opposed the Point 
Four Program for technical assistance, 25-8 and almost de- 
feated ita5 
During the later years of the Truman administration, when 
the concept of continuing foreign aid itself had become well 
established, questions tended to center on the size of the appro- 
priations. During 1947 and 1948, 70 percent of all Republican 
votes cast on spending amendments were in favor of increases 
or in opposition to reductions. This figure fell to 36 percent and 
21 percent in the successive two-year periods. During the sec- 
ond Truman administration a majority of Republicans voted for 
reductions on 23 out of 28 rollcalls involving spending amend- 
ments. Not only did the proportion of Republicans voting for 
economy grow steadily during these years, but the size of re- 
ductions they supported likewise grew. The strength of Repub- 
lican economy sentiment suggests that most of the votes cast 
against the extension of existing aid programs were primarily 
protests against the size and scope of these programs. 
I t  was on the question of reciprocal trade that Republican 
senators most consistently opposed the Truman administration. 
On eighteen rollcalls involving various aspects of trade, only 
24 percent of all votes cast by Republicans were favorable to the 
administration. Substantial numbers of Republicans voted to 
extend the trade program on several occasions and voted against 
amendments to give special preference to certain products. But 
the party opposed the administration almost unanimously on 
the most important amendments affecting the President's au- 
thority to reduce tariffs and the length of time for extending 
the program. 
THE EISENHOWER YEARS 
The Eisenhower administration brought about an increase in 
Republican voting support that extended to all the major cate- 
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gories of foreign programs. Collective security continued to be 
the issue on which the administration received most consistent 
backing, but even here the voting pattern changed considerably. 
The minority of Republican senators opposing major security pro- 
grams almost shrank from sight. The larger number-and fre- 
quently a majority-of Republicans who voted to restrict Presi- 
dent Truman's power voted almost to a man to give Eisenhower 
freedom in implementing the collective security program. This 
voting pattern did not immediately arise when Eisenhower 
entered the White House. In 1953 the Republicans voted 37-9 
for the Status of Forces Treaty after defeating Senator John 
Bricker's crippling reservation 27-15. These margins of support 
were adequate but did not appear to foreshadow any major 
change in Republican voting on security. On ten rollcalls dur- 
ing 1954 and 1955, however, there were never more than two 
Republican votes cast against the administration's security pro- 
posals. On most of these there was only one dissenter: William 
Langer, the North Dakota maverick, consistent only in his isola- 
tionism. In addition to several relatively noncontroversial issues, 
these rollcalls included the Formosa resolution, the Chinese 
Mutual Defense Treaty, and amendments to these measures de- 
signed to restrict the President. In 1957, although seventeen 
Republicans voted to set an expiration date for the Middle East 
resolution, only four voted to require presidential notification 
of Congress before the dispatch of troops, and only three voted 
against the resolution. On this most controversial of Eisenhower's 
major security proposals, Republican support was much stronger 
than that provided by the Democrats6 
President Eisenhower never had the overwhelming Republican 
support for foreign aid that was provided on security issues. 
He was able rather quickly to regain and eventually to surpass 
the level of Republican voting support that President Truman 
had enjoyed in the early days of his administration. In the roll- 
calls on foreign aid measures, favorable Republican votes had 
fallen from 76 percent in 1947-1948 to 51 percent in 1951-1952. 
The figure rose to 76 percent in 1953-1954 and to 80 percent in 
1957-1958. The percentage of votes for higher spending had 
fallen more precipitously in the comparable time periods, from 
6 Ibid., 1953, p. 257; 1954, p. 296; 1955, pp. 115, 116, 121; 1957, pp. 286-87. 
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70 to 21 percent. I t  rose to 64 percent and eventually to 73 
percent during the Eisenhower administration. There was a 
Republican majority for every one of Eisenhower's foreign aid 
measures. During the first six Eisenhower years there were 
43 rollcalls involving the total to be spent for foreign aid; on 
only 5 of these did a Republican majority vote for lower funds. 
Three of these five defections involved rollcalls to suspend aid 
to Yugoslavia in 1956. Except for Yugoslav aid, the Republicans 
surpassed the Democrats in voting for aid and aid spending 
during the Eisenhower admini~tration.~ 
The Eisenhower administration had a greater impact on Re- 
publican voting concerning aid than on that involving collective 
security. By the end of the Truman administration the Republi- 
cans had clearly grown more disillusioned with the foreign aid 
program than with collective security. The reversal in the Re- 
publican record on aid spending that began in 1953 was more 
complete than changes in other aspects of the record. Yet this 
Republican record occurred during a period when many sena- 
tors thought that foreign aid was losing its popular support. The 
voting change did not represent renewed enthusiasm for foreign 
aid; it was a continuing vote of confidence in the Republican 
administration. 
During the Eisenhower administration the proportion of Re- 
publican votes cast for the reciprocal trade program more than 
doubled. Yet the Republican record on this issue contrasts with 
the records on security and aid; it remained a highly partisan 
issue during both administrations. It was the only issue on which 
more Democrats than Republicans supported the Eisenhower 
administration. A large, but not increasing, majority of Repub- 
licans continued to vote for the final passage of trade bills. The 
significant differences occurred on major amendments. In 1954 
most Democrats but no Republicans voted for a three-year exten- 
sion of the measure along the lines recommended by the Randall 
Commission and originally endorsed by Eisenhower before he 
yielded to Republican pressure. In 1955 two attempts by Senator 
Paul Douglas to eliminate protective features of the measure met 
7 The percentages of Republican support for foreign aid remained high in 1959 
and 1960: 81 percent on aid measures and 76 percent on spending amendments. 
A majority of Republicans supported the President on all rollcalls in both of these 
categories. 
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unanimous Republican (and considerable Democratic) opposi- 
tion. In 1958 both parties were badly divided on several amend- 
ments involving protectionism and presidential discretion.' The 
change in Republican voting on reciprocal trade was important 
to the Eisenhower administration and in fact became essential 
as Democratic support began to wither. But, in contrast to the 
aid and security measures, the President had to depend more on 
Democratic than Republican votes to secure satisfactory recip- 
rocal trade measures. 
A DIVIDED PARTY 
Regional differences on foreign policy have been even deeper 
in the Republican party than in Democratic ranks. Several con- 
clusions stand out from an appraisal of Tables 6, 7, and 8. Among 
Republicans, internationalism has been consistently strong in 
the Northeast and nearly as strong on the West C ~ a s t . ~  The 
simplest description of regional differences in the party is the 
contrast between these two coastal regions and the four interior 
regions. During the Truman administration coastal Republicans 
provided majorities for all categories of international programs 
except reciprocal trade. No other region provided such ma- 
jorities on any issue (except the Midwest on foreign aid meas- 
ures). Coastal support for the Eisenhower administration on 
all issues except trade was remarkable. Coastal Republicans cast 
377 votes for and only 3 votes against foreign aid measures and 
collective security, a record not even matched by Democrats 
from these areas during the Truman administration. Coastal 
Republican support for the full amount of aid sought by Eisen- 
hower was an impressive 90 percent. 
Figures for Republican voting in the four interior regions can- 
not be combined without overlooking significant variations. 
During the Truman administration there was more internation- 
alist voting in the Midwest than in the other three regions. Dur- 
ing the Eisenhower administration senators from the Midwest 
and Border States ranked approximately halfway between those 
from the coastal regions and those from the Plains and Mountain 
8 CQA, 1954, p. 296: 1955, p. 123; 1958, p. 454. 
9 See note 13, chapter 2, for a list of the states in each region. 
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states. This meant a considerable change in the voting of sen- 
ators from the Midwest and a complete reversal in the voting of 
TABLE 6-Republican Senatorial Support by Region of the 
Truman and Eisenhower Administrations' Foreign Policy, 
1947-1952 and 1953-1958 (Percentage of 179 Rollcalls) 
Truman, Eisenhower, 
Region 
- 
1947-1952 1953-1958 
Northeast 67 90 
Midwest 42 73 
Plains States 27 44 
Border States 26 71 
Mountain States 22 51 
West Coast 57 94 
TABLE 7-Republican Senatorial Support by Region of the 
Truman Administration's Foreign Policy, by Various Cate- 
gories of Issues, 1947-1952 (Percentage of 97 Rollcalls) 
Foreign Aid Foreign Aid Security Reciprocal 
Region Measures Spending Measures Trade 
Northeast 87 59 76 43 
Midwest 61 38 43 24 
Plains States 47 21 29 13 
Border States 42 18 29 18 
Mountain States 45 14 22 5 
West Coast 77 61 56 23 
All Regions 63 38 47 24 
- 
TABLE 8-Republican Senatorial Support by Region of the 
Eisenhower Administration's Foreign Policy, by Various 
Groups of Issues, 1953-1958 (Percentage of 82 Rollcalls) 
Foreign Aid Foreign Aid Security ~ e c i ~ r a  
Region Measures Spending Measures Trade 
Northeast 100 91 99 69 
Midwest 77 69 90 62 
Plains States 46 32 81 39 
Border States 89 62 87 66 
Mountain States 49 45 85 35 
West Coast 100 89 97 69 
All Regions 76 65 90 56 
those from the Border States. The change was evident on all 
categories of issues. Republicans from the Plains and Mountain 
states, who voted nearly alike, were among the least internation- 
alist during the Truman administration. Their response to the 
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change of administrations was less enthusiastic and varied with 
the issues. Republicans from these latter two regions, who so 
frequently voted against Truman's security proposals, voted al- 
most as consistently as other Republicans for Eisenhower's 
security program. In both administrations the Plains and Moun- 
tain states were the sources of greatest Republican opposition to 
the trade program; the contrast with other regions was much 
sharper after 1952. Yet there was a substantial increase in voting 
for the trade program in these two regions. There was least 
change on the question of foreign aid. Although Republicans 
from the Plains and Mountain states no longer voted overwhelm- 
ingly for reductions in aid, the proportion voting against aid 
measures remained about the same. 
The growing Republican internationalism might be explained 
in part by the defeat or retirement of veteran isolationists. The 
regional variations, however, do not seem to be explained by 
the election of new Republican senators; moreover, in all of the 
regions with changing voting patterns there were Republicans 
serving during both administrations who changed their voting 
pattern. 
A comparison with regionalism in the Democratic party (Table 
2)  reveals striking similarities. In both parties the Northeast 
has been the most consistently internationalist region, where a 
high proportion of senators have supported the foreign programs 
of both administrations. The West Coast and Midwest rank 
next, although the order varies between the two parties. Despite 
the major difference in party records, the effect of changing 
administrations, and the regional variations already noted, the 
outstanding intraparty difference on foreign policy is a conflict 
between the major urban-industrial states and the more rural 
ones. The least internationalist regions in both parties are those 
where only one party elected senators during the Truman and 
Eisenhower administrations-the South and the Plains States. 
There are vast differences between these two regions in geog- 
raphy, degree of two-party competition. and attitude toward 
foreign policy. Nevertheless, in their respective parties these 
are the centers of isolationism. 
A major explanation for the shift in Republican voting pat- 
terns after 1952 is the greater Republican loyalty to and con- 
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fidence in President Eisenhower and his policies, a response that 
the Truman administration had elicited with decreasing success 
from 1947 through 1952. The variations in this change from 
region to region and issue to issue invite further speculation. 
Was President Eisenhower's voting support, initially at least, 
primarily from the "Eisenhower Republicans7' who had favored 
him over Taft in 1952? Did the Republicans give greater sup- 
port to security proposals because they were more clearly identi- 
fied as Eisenhower programs than aid and trade measures? 
TABLE 9-First Ballot Votes Cast for Eisenhower, Taft, and 
Other Candidates a t  the 1952 Republican Convention" 
Eisenhower Taft Others 
Region No. Pct. No. Pct .  No. Pct .  
Northeast 276 87.9 35 11.1 3 1.0 
Midwest 63 22.7 190 68.3 25 9.0 
Plains States 28 41.2 37 54.4 3 4.4 
Border States 50 43.8 58 50.9 6 5.3 
South 98 50.8 93 48.2 2 1.0 
Mountain States 37 34.9 68 64.2 1 0.9 
West Coast 38 33.9 4 3.6 70 62.5 
" This is the vote before some states switched their votes. 
Based on the state-by-state tabulations in Paul T. David, Mal- 
colm Moos, and Ralph M. Goldman, Presidential Nomination 
Politics in 1952, Vol. I, The National Story (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1954), pp. 95-97. 
Can Republican resistance to aid and trade be linked to fiscal 
conservatism and local economic interests? In short, do the 
conclusions we can draw from an analysis of the Republican 
record confirm or refine those drawn in the previous chapter 
from the Democratic record? 
President Eisenhower's strongest support in the voting on 
international issues came from senators representing "Eisen- 
hower territory." A comparison between Table 6 and Table 9, 
illustrating Eisenhower's strength in the 1952 Republican con- 
vention, makes this clear.1° Individual senators who had sup- 
ported Eisenhower during the 1952 campaign for the nomina- 
tion were often among his most dependable supporters in the 
10 It should be noted that most of the votes for other candidates shown in 
Table 9 were cast for men whose internationalist views were similar to Eisen- 
hower's. For a chart showing the regional strength of Taft forces on seven major 
issues at the convention, see Westerfield, p. 41. 
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voting on foreign policy, and even those who had not been among 
his early allies in 1952 tended to vote for his policies with greater 
consistency if their states had been pro-Eisenhower at the con- 
vention. Cause and effect are too scrambled to permit any simple 
conclusion that these senators voted for Eisenhower's programs 
because of personal support for him. Obviously many Republi- 
cans endorsed Eisenhower rather than Taft precisely because 
they preferred Eisenhower's internationalism to what they con- 
sidered isolationism on the part of Taft. Disagreement on inter- 
national issues was the sharpest policy difference between the 
two candidates.ll Senators who had been won to Eisenhower's 
cause because of his internationalist views would naturally vote 
for his foreign programs and would presumably have voted 
similarly even if Taft had been elected and had chosen to pro- 
pose some of the same programs. 
The significant facts to bear in mind when analyzing re- 
gional Republican variations are that Eisenhower was the can- 
didate representing one wing of the party and that the issues 
creating party differences in the rollcalls under study were pre- 
cisely those creating the split between Eisenhower and Taft. 
There were two parallel forces pulling the Republicans apart: 
the different attitudes toward Eisenhower and the different 
views on foreign policy. Yet Eisenhower gradually became a 
President of all the party, one who could depend on the votes 
of most Republicans on many issues of foreign policy. 
REASONS FOR THE REPUBLICAN RECORD 
Why did Republican senators vote in greater numbers for Presi- 
dent Eisenhower's security proposals than for his other foreign 
programs? First, the threat of Communist aggression lent an 
air of urgency to the security measures introduced by both 
Truman and Eisenhower. Many Republicans who sincerely 
doubted the value of economic programs believed that security 
commitments were essential to prevent a further expansion of 
Soviet and Communist Chinese power. The pattern of Repub- 
11 "[Eisenhower] rather vaguely remarked that he 'guessed he had become a 
candidate' because Robert A. Taft was an isolationist." Joseph and Stewart Alsop, 
The Reporter's Trade (New York: Reynal and Co., 1958), p. 40. 
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lican support for collective security had become established 
before 1953. In the immediate postwar period, Republicans had 
taken the lead in urging a tougher policy toward the Soviet 
Union. Because of this stand, they recognized that opposition 
to NATO would make them vulnerable to the charge of incon- 
- 
sistency. President Eisenhower's requests for congressional au- 
thority to act in the Formosa area and in the Middle East were 
presented in an atmosphere of crisis. Senators of both parties 
felt that congressional refusal to agree would be construed 
abroad as an invitation to Communist forces to advance. 
Second, in the case of Eisenhower's security proposals, par- 
ticularly his emergency requests for authority to block Com- 
munist aggression, the President's prestige was directly at stake. 
Republican senators naturally identified these measures more 
closely with Eisenhower than they did the aid and trade policies 
that Eisenhower inherited from Truman. This helps to explain 
why Republicans, who had repeatedly sought to curb Truman's 
discretionary power, voted to grant Eisenhower the widest lati- 
tude in implementing collective security measures. They did 
not have confidence in Truman's Asian policies, blaming the 
administration for the fall of China and for the deadlocked 
Korean war. They did have confidence in President Eisenhower 
and particularly in his military judgment. 
One further reason why Republican support for collective 
security increased after 1952 was that several of the hardcore 
isolationists left the Senate before the major Eisenhower security 
proposals were introduced. Ten of the eleven Republicans who 
voted against the North Atlantic Treaty were the most con- 
sistent opponents of security measures. Half of these left the 
Senate before 1955.12 Of those who remained, only William 
Langer of North Dakota usually voted against security; the 
others voted for parts of Eisenhower's collective security program. 
The vote on the proposed Bricker amendment to the Con- 
stitution tested Republican attitudes both toward the President 
and toward the maintenance of American commitments abroad. 
Since the rollcalls occurred in 1954, the party was still badly 
12 Those who left the Senate were Guy Cordon, Henry Dworshak, James Kem, 
Robert A. Taft, and Kenneth Wheny; those who remained through much or 
all of the Eisenhower administration were William Jenner, William Langer, George 
Malone, Arthur Watkins, and Milton Young. 
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split even though the Republican President's prestige was at 
stake. The Republican senators initially voted nearly unani- 
mously for a compromise acceptable to the administration. In 
later rollcalls, almost two-thirds of the Republicans voted for 
revised versions offered by Senators Bricker and George, ver- 
sions unacceptable to the President. Regional differences were 
clearest on the rollcall concerning final passage of the revised 
(and unacceptable) constitutional amendment. Voting against 
it were nine out of thirteen recorded Republicans from the 
Northeast, and five of fourteen from the Midwest and Border 
States, and none of the nineteen voting from the other regions.13 
The comparatively low Republican support for foreign aid 
follows the same pattern set by some Democrats toward the end 
of the Truman administration; it derives mainly from fiscal 
conservatives who object to the high cost of the program. Dur- 
ing the first six years of the Eisenhower administration, there 
were sixteen Republicans who voted for reductions on a ma- 
jority of rollcalls involving the size of aid spending; twelve of 
them also voted against foreign aid measures on a majority of 
rollcalls. Three of the sixteen came from the Midwest, seven 
from the Plains, one from a Border State, and five from the 
Mountain States.14 Four of the sixteen might be classified as 
hardcore isolationists because of their frequent opposition to 
collective security measures, but were not all conservative on 
domestic issues. All of the remainder had a conservative record, 
often a deeply conservative record, on domestic issues. There 
were other Republicans, equally conservative on domestic is- 
sues, however, who voted regularly for Eisenhower's aid pro- 
gram. One test used in Chapter 2 may be applied here. Two 
rollcalls were taken, in 1954 and 1955, on amendments to increase 
the proportion of aid funds to be granted as loans, not grants. 
Twenty-seven of the forty Republican votes for these amend- 
13 CQA, 1954, p. 294. 
1 4  The sixteen were: John W. Bricker, William Jenner, and Joseph McCarthy 
from the Midwest; Francis Case, Carl Curtis, Roman Hruska, William Langer, 
Karl Mundt, Andrew Schoeppel, and Milton Young from the Plains States; John 
Williams from the Border States; and Frank Barrett, Henry Dworshak, Barry 
Goldwater, George Malone, and Herman Welker from the Mountain States. 
All except Case, Mundt, Schoeppel, and Williams voted against aid measures on 
a majority of rollcalls. Eight of these-Curtis, Hruska, Langer, Schoeppel, Young, 
Williams, Dworshak, and Goldwater-cast virtually all the Republican votes 
against foreign aid measures and most of those for reductions in 1959 and 1960. 
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ments were cast by the sixteen senators voting more often for 
reductions in aid after 1952; the remainder were cast by domestic 
 conservative^.^^ 
Many Republicans had greater confidence in the administra- 
tion of the aid program under Eisenhower than under Truman.16 
Many felt it important to vote for the aid bills, undiminished in 
size, to which a Republican President was giving his unqualified 
support. Yet there were sharp differences in the reactions of 
Republicans to the change in administrations. While coastal 
Republicans gave Eisenhower nearly everything he requested 
for the aid program, Republicans from the Plains and Mountain 
states were willing to loosen the purse strings only slightly. 
Republicans from the latter regions voted against Eisenhower's 
foreign aid measures in almost exactly the same proportion as 
they had voted against Truman's aid requests. 
Those Republican senators who had approved the principle 
of foreign aid advanced by Truman but only had doubts about 
its size and administration were consistent backers of Eisen- 
hower. Those who viewed foreign aid as an extravagant Demo- 
cratic spending program and distrusted Eisenhower's commit- 
ment to it continued to vote for major reductions or the elimi- 
nation of the program. The opposition to foreign aid among 
Republicans was more fundamental than among Democrats, 
more concentrated geographically, and at times was an expres- 
sion of unmitigated isolationism. 
Reciprocal trade, unlike foreign aid and collective security, 
has long been a matter of partisan controversy. Yet the Repub- 
lican differences over the trade question resemble those con- 
cerning security and particularly foreign aid. The Republican 
split was most clearly indicated after 1952, when the Republican 
administration became the sponsor of trade bills. As Tables 
7 and 8 show, Republicans from the Plains and Mountain states 
differed sharply from other Republicans. Eleven of the fourteen 
15 CQA, 1954, p. 295; 1955, p. 126. 
16 This was a constant theme of Republican senators interviewed by the writer. 
An indication of increasing Republican confidence in the administration was the 
changing attitude toward bills banning or limiting aid to nations selling strategic 
goods to certain Communist nations. Both administrations opposed most such bills. 
Only 15 percent of Republican votes cast on this issue were favorable to the 
Truman administration; the figure increased to 62 percent after Eisenhower took 
office. 
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Republicans who cast a majority of votes against reciprocal 
trade during the Eisenhower administration came from these 
two regions.17 Eleven of these fourteen were senators who had 
also voted for reductions in foreign aid on a majority of roll- 
calls during the Eisenhower administration and included most 
of those who often opposed collective security during Eisen- 
hower's administration. 
The local economic interests, which usually motivated Demo- 
cratic opposition to the trade program, played a part in Repub- 
lican voting. Republican critics of reciprocal trade from the 
Mountain States of Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, and Wyoming were 
concerned about protecting the copper, lead, zinc, petroleum, 
lumber, and wool industries, for example. In the Plains States, 
the producers of petroleum, lead, and zinc were seeking pro- 
tection from foreign competition. The two Republican senators 
from West Virginia, who served during the Eisenhower admin- 
istration, although voting for foreign aid, responded to the 
pressure for tariff protection in that state. 
I t  is difficult to compare protectionist voting in the two parties 
because there were no Democrats in the Plains States and no 
Republicans in the South. After 1952, while some Democrats 
voted against both aid and trade, Democratic opposition to the 
trade program usually reflected localized economic interests. 
Although there were economic explanations possible for most 
Republican votes against trade, such opposition was usually 
part of a pattern of isolationism-resistance to most of the for- 
eign economic and military policies of both Republican and 
Democratic administrations. The Eisenhower administration 
created a new voting alignment on this issue. New divisions in 
both parties became evident. The strongest support for re- 
ciprocal trade now comes from the northern industrial states, 
where business today has less need of protection and greater 
opportunities for export than in the past. Opposition to the 
trade program is centered in those southern and western states 
where senators are seeking to protect new industries (such as 
textiles), mining and petroleum industries, and a few agricul- 
17The fourteen were: Jenner from the Midwest; Hugh Butler, Case, Curtis, 
Langer, Schoeppel, and Young from the Plains States; John Hoblitzell, and Chap- 
man Revercomb from the Border States; and Barrett, Dworshak, Goldwater, Ma- 
lone, and Welker from the Mountain States. 
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tural products. At a time when three-quarters of American 
exports are manufactured goods and half of the imports are 
raw materials, the traditional alignments on the tariff issue are 
changing. The changing economy has made the Northeast and 
Midwest not only the centers of support for collective security 
and foreign aid programs in both parties but also the source of 
bipartisan support for reciprocal trade.'' 
The Republican record during the Eisenhower administration 
offers new proof that a party's stand on foreign policy is heavily 
dependent on control of the White House. The Roosevelt ad- 
ministration in 1933 had brought a complete reversal of Re- 
publican voting on international issues. Twenty years later, the 
change was less only because the party's record had become 
much more internationalist since World War 11. Regional dif- 
ferences followed the same pattern as they did earlier, but in 
many respects the Eisenhower administration brought, not greater 
unity, but greater regional differences to the Republican party.l9 
All elements of the party rallied around a Republican President 
when he requested security treaties or resolutions permitting him 
to use military force in emergencies. On the other hand, when he 
sought legislation to extend the Democratic-established aid and 
trade programs, the depth of foreign policy daerences in the 
Republican party became more evident than ever. 
The voting records of the two Senate parties on foreign policy 
not only show a clear contrast but also demonstrate that the 
responsibilities of office give a party a new outlook on foreign 
policy. A Republican senator's loyalty to President Eisenhower 
makes possible but not inevitable a change in that senator's 
voting record. To what extent do the parties' voting records re- 
sult from the organized efforts of party leadership? Anyone 
familiar with the Senate will doubt that party unity on any 
issue beyond the broad limits already suggested can be primarily 
the result of organizational efforts. Yet there are enough examples 
of remarkable party unity and sudden changes in voting pat- 
terns on specific issues to suggest that the mechanics of party 
leadership in the Senate deserve further examination. 
1s See Watson, "The Tariff Revolution," Journal of Politics, XVIII (Nov., 1956), 
678-701. 
19 See Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy. 
Everyone knows something of leaders and leadership of 
various sorts, but no one knows very much. Leadership, 
especially in the political realm, unavoidably or by design 
often is suffused by an atmosphere of the mystic and the 
magical, and these mysteries have been little penetrated 
by systematic observation.-DAVID B. TRUMAN 
The Senate always has had two duly chosen leaders, one 
for the majority and one for the minority. But the questions 
as to how and when (and sometimes whether) they really 
lead are open to a variety of answers. In this business there 
is no constant. The ways of the place are passing strange 
and the personalities and purposes of the various leaders 
are highly individual and highly at variance. 
-WILLIAM S .  WHITE 
PARTY LEADERS 
THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS O F  THE SENATE CAN BE UNDER- 
stood only in terms of the men who operate them. The student 
of leadership in the Senate must be constantly aware not only 
that he is dealing with intangibles but that the far greater part of 
his concern is hidden from scrutiny. The importance of personal 
influence rather than institutional techniques results from the 
relatively small membership of the Senate, the diffusion of 
power among a number of veteran senators, and the absence 
of party sanctions. Party leaders in the Senate have varied widely 
in their concept of the role they should play. William S. White 
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has asserted that, except in times of emergency or during the 
political dominance of a man with Franklin Roosevelt's stature, 
the administration's leader in the Senate will be more respon- 
sible to the senatorial party than to the President.' In practice 
the leaders of the Senate do not view their role with such simple 
consistency. 
Who is a party leader? The floor leader is not necessarily the 
most powerful figure in his party and may be overshadowed by 
senators holding other party posts or committee chairmanships. 
The Democrats concentrate formal leadership in one man, who 
serves as floor leader and chairman of both the Policy Commit- 
tee and party Conference. When Lyndon Johnson held these 
posts, there was no doubt that he was the party leader, though 
when Ernest McFarland held the same posts, some observers 
thought that other Democrats exercised considerably more party 
authority. The Republicans divide formal leadership among 
three senators: the floor leader and the chairmen of the Policy 
Committee and of the Conference. Senator Robert Taft was 
clearly his party's leader whether he served as floor leader or 
chairman of the Policy Committee; among his successors, the 
floor leader has served as primus inter pares. The role of the 
party whip is not only ill defined, as Professor Truman has 
pointed out, but appears to vary substantially between the two 
parties2 The Democratic whips have more often been able to 
serve in practice as assistant leaders because of a close kinship 
of views with the floor leader. Cooperation between the Repub- 
lican floor leader and whip has frequently been difficult because 
of wide differences of opinion (Kenneth Wherry and Leverett 
Saltonstall, for example). The Republican whip's post has 
sometimes been given to a member of a faction defeated in a 
contest for floor leader. 
Professor Truman has well defined the di5culties of describing 
the floor leader: "A search for the substance and sources of power 
in the position, however, is frustrating, not because they do not 
exist but because they are tremendously varied and often in- 
accessible. One cannot draw up for this pist a neat list of authori- 
1 William S. White, Citadel: The S toy  of the U.S. Senate (New York: Harper 
& Brothers, 1957), p. 96. 
2 David B. Truman, The Congressional Party (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1959), pp. 117-22. 
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ties and prerogatives that describes its power adequately if not 
exhaustively, as one can for a place in a tightly structured 
hierarchy. The sum total of influence in the role as played by 
any individual senator depends upon the skill with which he 
combines and employs the fragments of power that are avail- 
able to him." Truman proceeds to identify some of the more 
important powers: influence over committee assignments, the 
ability to facilitate passage of pet bills, responsibility for sched- 
uling legislation, a frequent role in the planning of tactics, and 
(for the administration party) frequent contact with the Presi- 
dente3 
The difficulties of identifying party leaders and defining their 
roles and techniques dictate caution to anyone trying to con- 
struct valid generalizations about senatorial leadership. I t  is 
possible, however, to measure the scope of the leaders' concern 
over foreign affairs and describe the variations in their tech- 
niques. It is impossible to prove that given leaders were respon- 
sible for specific degrees of party unity in rollcall voting, but 
some cautious conclusions can be drawn about the success of 
their efforts toward such unity. One further step is to assess 
the attempts to institutionalize party leadership. Can a strong 
leader establish traditions and create machinery that may help 
less skillful successors? Although personal techniques may be 
the most effective today, the political party is unlikely to play 
an increasing role in framing foreign policy if political leader- 
ship depends entirely on the accidents of personality. 
Despite the variations in purpose, technique, and viewpoint, 
party leaders in the postwar period have one pertinent common 
denominator: They have had a relatively small influence on the 
development of foreign policy. Leaders of the administration 
party have seldom challenged the President on issues of foreign 
policy; in the Senate they have often played an important but 
unobtrusive role in support of the party's leader on the Foreign 
Relations Committee. When a leader such as William Knowland 
has differed with the President on an important international 
question, he has usually lost the support of his party. The 
most important opposition leaders in recent years, Robert Taft 
and Lyndon Johnson, had less impact on foreign policy than on 
3 Ibid., pp. 104-105. 
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domestic affairs. The reasons lie partly in their lack of interest 
and specialized knowledge concerning world problems. More 
significant is the handicap any senatorial leader faces in com- 
peting with the President in the field of foreign policy. 
DEMOCRATIC LEADERS DURING THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION 
The post of Democratic floor leader from 1947 through 1952 was 
held for successive two-year periods by Alben Barkley (as mi- 
nority leader) and Scott Lucas and Ernest McFarland (as 
majority leaders). Senate Democratic leadership during this 
period presents a paradox: The strength of party support for 
President Truman's foreign programs was much more impressive 
than the caliber of party leadership. Moreover, none of the three 
Democratic leaders appears to have engaged in extensive efforts 
to organize party support for the President; each played a role in 
foreign affairs subsidiary to that of Tom Connally, Democratic 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. 
Barkley, Lucas, and McFarland were all dependable inter- 
nationalists who were willing to follow the administration's 
lead with little question. This quality of Truman's lieutenants in 
the Senate was so characteristic that its value was often over- 
looked until it became scarce during the Eisenhower adminis- 
tration. Barkley and Lucas supported the administration on 
virtually every foreign policy rollcall during this period. Mc- 
Farland's record of support was not quite so consistent until he 
became floor leader in 1951. 
Senator Barkley is the only one of the three who gained a 
reputation as a skillful leader in the Senate. He brought certain 
obvious advantages to this task: long seniority, a Border-State 
background, a sense of humor, and an understanding of how to 
handle men. He was able to retain the respect of the more con- 
servative Democrats while pressing for the enactment of New 
Deal measures. Barkley had close personal friendships with both 
President Truman and Dean Acheson, especially important as- 
sets during his term as Vice President. Barkley's success as a 
leader seems to have rested particularly on those intangible and 
personal qualities that are highly valued in the Senate but are 
most difficult to describe on paper. 
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Despite his undoubted skill, there is little evidence that Alben 
Barkley played an active role in framing compromises or per- 
suading Democratic senators to vote for the administration's 
foreign program. Nor was Barkley a frequent speaker in foreign 
policy debates. He left most of the leadership in this field to 
Tom Connally, with whom he had a close working relationship. 
During the Republican Eightieth Congress, a greater share of 
responsibility for foreign policy leadership fell to Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. 
Vandenberg's steps to make foreign aid measures, for example, 
more palatable to Republican senators helped to solidify Demo- 
cratic support and reduced the need for persuasive efforts by 
either Connally or Barkley. This is not to say that it was never 
necessary to explain a foreign program to a Democratic senator, 
allay his doubts, or assure his attendance during rollcalls. By 
conviction, however, most Democratic senators were sympathetic 
to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan and welcomed 
firm measures to stem the Communist tide in Europe. Barkley's 
skill was not a significant factor in the Democratic record 
because it was so seldom needed when foreign issues were pend- 
ing in the Senate. 
During their brief terms, neither Scott Lucas nor Ernest Mc- 
Farland became strong majority leaders. Both were handi- 
capped by increasing divisions in the Democratic party and a 
steady decline in the rapport between President Truman and 
southern Democrats. Lucas' close identification with the Presi- 
dent and the northern wing of the party reduced his effectiveness 
in making accommodations with the southern senatom4 Senator 
McFarland, on the other hand, was too closely connected with 
the Southern Democrats to work most effectively with the Presi- 
dent. Lacking experience for the majority leadership, he ap- 
peared indecisive. 
The Democratic divisions on domestic issues did not extend 
to foreign policy, nor did antagonisms toward either Lucas or 
McFarland prevent the Democratic senators from maintaining 
a remarkably united front when international issues were at stake. 
4 Truman has shown, however, that Lucas' voting record indicated he tried to 
play the role of a middleman, particularly by abstaining on certain votes when 
southern Democrats opposed the President. Ibid., pp. 106-10. 
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Can Lucas and McFarland, ineffective generals in the battles 
for civil rights and welfare legislation, be credited with the vic- 
tories on foreign battlefields? Both men as majority leaders 
carried heavier responsibilities than Barkley, and both had to 
overcome increasing Republican opposition to Truman's foreign 
programs. Both worked closely and in almost perfect harmony 
with Chairman Connally of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
with Connally maintaining primary responsibility for enacting 
the administration's foreign programs under a mutually satisfac- 
tory division of labor. 
During the 1949 and 1950 debates on foreign aid, Lucas 
maneuvered adroitly to defeat crippling amendments by raising 
points of order, rallied the Democratic senators to prevent serious 
cuts in the aid program, and helped to develop compromises 
necessary to prevent defeat of the arms aid bill. When strong 
sentiment developed in support of a Spanish loan flatly opposed 
by the administration, Lucas negotiated a compromise (appar- 
ently without the President's backing) to assure that the funds 
for the loan would be in addition to those already scheduled for 
European aid. In 1949 Lucas held the party in line sufficiently 
to pass the reciprocal trade bill after defeating the Republican- 
sponsored "peril point" amendment. 
During Senator McFarland's tenure as majority leader, the 
Democrats maintained sufficient unity to pass foreign aid bills 
with minimum reductions on the Senate floor, approve a troops- 
for-Europe resolution largely acceptable to the administration, 
and defeat Republican efforts to revise the ground rules for the 
MacArthur hearings-all controversial issues. Only on some of 
the less critical amendments to the troops-for-Europe resolution 
did Democratic unity seriously falter. There is little direct evi- 
dence concerning the scope and effectiveness of McFarland's 
activities with regard to these issues. Democratic backing for 
the administration did remain surprisingly firm in the face of the 
Korean war, the growing unpopularity of both Truman and 
Acheson, and mounting Republican attacks on foreign policy. 
McFarland must share some of the credit for translating this 
basic unity into actual votes. 
The loyalty of Democratic leaders in the Senate to President 
Truman's foreign policy is a matter of record; their skill in 
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guiding this program through the Senate was seldom critically 
tested because of the depth of internationalist convictions held 
by Democratic senators. The observer must conclude that Bark- 
ley, Lucas, and McFarland made a contribution to the Demo- 
cratic record that was helpful but not of critical importance. 
Republican senatorial leadership during the Eisenhower admin- 
istration differed sharply from the Democratic leadership that 
had preceded it. The difference was most pronounced on foreign 
policy because this was the issue that caused least friction be- 
tween Truman and his leaders and most difficulty between Eisen- 
hower and his leaders. At the 1952 Republican convention 
Eisenhower had been the choice of the eastern, internationalist 
wing of the party, which was a minority among senatorial Re- 
publicans. He was committed to foreign programs that Robert 
Taft and many Republican senators had been criticizing with 
increasing vigor. Eisenhower's distrust of Taft's views on for- 
eign policy had been the strongest motivating factor in his deci- 
sion to seek the n~mination.~ Knowland had deep convictions 
on foreign policy, which were increasingly to separate him from 
the President. Everett Dirksen and Styles Bridges were among 
the other Republican leaders who had been considered outside 
the internationalist wing of the party. Those Republican lead- 
ers most loyal to Eisenhower's foreign policies, such as Alex- 
ander Wiley and Leverett Saltonstall, were outnumbered and 
often ineffective. 
It is intriguing to speculate on the kind of senatorial leader 
Taft would have become had he lived beyond the first six months 
of Eisenhower's administration. At the start, he showed a great 
sense of responsibility for the administration's success, willing- 
ness to employ his prestige and skill in behalf of the Eisenhower 
program, and determination to influence profoundly the shape 
of that program. Taft's biographer asserts that in this brief period 
"no President within twenty years-that is, neither Roosevelt 
nor Truman-had so effective a Senate leader as Eisenhower had 
5 George E. Allen, "My Friend the President," Saturday Euening Post, CCXXXII 
(April 9, 1960), 23-25, 50-54. 
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in Taft." He adds, however, that the President usually had to 
negotiate his programs with Taft substantially as a coequals6 By 
joining the Foreign Relations Committee in 1953, Senator Taft 
demonstrated his growing interest in foreign policy and his 
determination to influence the Republican record thereon be- 
fore measures reached the Senate floor. William S. White quotes 
Taft as saying, "We have got to get a little stronger conservative 
voice on that ~ommittee."~ 
The controversy over the nomination of Charles E. Bohlen as 
Ambassador to Moscow in 1953 illustrated both Taft's skillful 
service to the administration and his desire to influence its 
policies. Although Taft clearly disliked the nomination because 
of Bohlen's alleged influence at the Yalta conference, he sup- 
ported confirmation in the Foreign Relations Committee. When 
questions were raised about Bohlen's security clearance, Taft 
agreed to join Senator John J. Sparkman in reading an FBI file 
on Bohlen. Then, in a formidable speech on the Senate floor, 
he demolished the security argument and the opposition to con- 
firmation. White has reported that Taft then passed the word to 
the White House: "No more Bohlen~!"~ 
Taft took a firmer line on the Yalta resolution. President 
Eisenhower asked Congress to pass a resolution charging the 
Soviet Union with having perverted the wartime agreements 
and stating this country's unwillingness to acquiesce in the sub- 
jugation of free peoples. As Taft privately warned the President, 
most Republicans considered this totally inadequate and even 
an implied endorsement of the Yalta agreement. Taft took the 
lead in inserting a provision to make it clear that Congress was 
not passing judgment on the validity or invalidity of the war- 
time agreements. He headed the subcommittee that drafted the 
- 
provision, fought successfully for its acceptance by the Foreign 
Relations Committee, and gained endorsement from the Policy 
Committee. The result of the deadlock was that no resolution 
p a ~ s e d . ~  
6 William S. White, The Taft Story (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), 
p. 227. 
7 Ibid., pp. 211-12. 
8 Ibid., pp. 230-41. 
9 Ibid., pp. 242-48. Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), p. 49. 
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The level of spending for foreign commitments was the most 
serious issue in dispute between President Eisenhower and the 
Taft Republicans in the Senate. Early in the administration, 
Taft angrily criticized the President's budget, and particularly 
the high level of defense spending, at a private meeting with 
Eisenhower and top administration leaders.1° In public he 
warned the President that foreign aid spending must be dras- 
tically cut in the face of congressional hostility. Although Taft 
spoke in a party caucus and voted on the floor against foreign 
aid cuts, on this issue Republican senators were badly divided 
and Taft could not command the degree of party unity evident 
on the Bohlen and Yalta issues. Had he lived, it seems likely 
that foreign aid would have become an increasingly divisive issue 
between Taft and Eisenhower. 
William Knowland is remembered primarily in Washington 
as the Republican leader who so often challenged the policies 
of the Eisenhower administration. This does not necessarily 
mean that his concept of the floor leader's role differed radically 
from that of his predecessors. He was frequently an effective 
spokesman for President Eisenhower's programs in Congress, 
even though his responsibility for their passage was somewhat 
diminished when he became minority leader in 1955. When 
he differed with these programs, he sometimes sought to adjust 
the differences and on other occasions led the campaign for 
amendments unacceptable to the administration. Though his 
convictions occasionally led him to seek changes in bills, 
Knowland clearly recognized a degree of responsibility to the 
President on legislative questions. Knowland's most serious chal- 
lenges involved not legislation, but diplomacy: such issues as 
a summit conference, the Indochina crisis, and policy toward 
Communist China, where he saw less need to temper his criti- 
cisms, private or public. 
Knowland's interest in and convictions concerning foreign 
policy were more profound than those of any other party leader 
since the war. The term "isolationist," though often applied to 
Taft, could never be stretched to include Knowland. (Taft had 
chosen Knowland as his successor because he regarded Knowland 
as a safe, conservative Republican, not because of any identity 
10 Donovan, pp. 108-11. 
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of views on foreign policy.)ll Knowland supported the major 
foreign aid and collective security measures of the Truman 
administration (except for the Point Four Program). His frequent 
votes for limitations on spending programs seemed to reflect a 
growing distrust of the Truman administration rather than tinges 
of isolationism. He had greater respect for the President's 
authority in foreign affairs than Taft did. Knowland was best 
known during the Truman administration as a persistent advocate 
of firmer policies in Asia and critic of the administration's policies 
in that area. I t  was Knowland who repeatedly demanded steps 
to prevent Chiang Kai-shek's collapse on the mainland of China, 
an American commitment to defend Formosa, and later the 
adoption of policies in Korea urged by General Douglas Mac- 
Arthur. In these efforts Knowland had the support of a gradually 
increasing proportion of Republicans. At the start of Eisen- 
hower's administration this group was clearly a majority of the 
Republican senators, and Knowland was obviously its spokesman 
on Asian issues. 
The controversy over the Bricker amendment perhaps best il- 
lustrates the role Knowland sometimes played as an agent of 
compromise as well as the difficulties he faced when it proved 
impossible to serve two masters. Knowland personally believed 
in the necessity of limiting executive encroachment on congres- 
sional prerogatives in foreign affairs. In his extensive efforts to 
make such an amendment possible, Knowland was expressing 
not only his own beliefs but those of a majority of Republican 
senators. On the other hand, he did not want the President to 
suffer a crushing defeat on the issue nor did he want the party 
to become divided. As a consequence of these conflicting loyal- 
ties, Knowland worked persistently and almost successfully for 
a compromise that the administration could accept. 
Though he had been a cosponsor of the Bricker amendment, 
once the President's opposition had become clear, Knowland 
gave no public support to any version of the amendment unac- 
ceptable to the administration-that is, until the final rollcall. In 
July, 1953, Knowland introduced a compromise plan that had 
the President's public blessing. Early in the 1954 session he re- 
sumed the drafting of compromises and met frequently with 
11 White, The Taft Story, pp. 253-62, 
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Senator Bricker and administration leaders. Together with Sen- 
ator Homer Ferguson he sponsored revisions of the Bricker 
amendment on the Senate floor and gained their approval with 
nearly unanimous Republican assistance. When Senator George 
introduced a further revision unacceptable to the President, 
Knowland spoke against it in vain; only one-third of the Re- 
publicans joined him in voting against it. When the final vote 
came on the frequently amended proposal, Senator Knowland 
left the majority leader's desk to speak as an individual senator 
and announced that, despite grave misgivings about the George 
revision, he would vote for it in the hope that the House would 
improve it before final passage. Knowland's failure illustrates 
the dilemma any leader would have faced in a party still deeply 
divided on foreign policy in 1954. His compromises served to 
postpone but not to prevent a showdown, and it is doubtful that 
he could have come so close to successful compromise had he 
been more completely identified with the President's viewpoint. 
Knowland took a stand of outright opposition to only one major 
feature of Eisenhower's legislative program: aid to neutral and 
particularly Communist nations. On several occasions Knowland 
worked to reduce or place restrictions on aid to both India and 
Yugoslavia. In 1958 he succeeded in defeating Senator John F. 
Kennedy's amendment to the foreign aid bill, designed to give 
the President discretion to extend economic aid to Communist 
satellite countries. 
Senator Knowland's efforts to persuade the Eisenhower ad- 
ministration to take a firmer stand in Asia did not represent 
merely a personal crusade. On this issue as well as in his op- 
position to aid for neutrals he frequently spoke for many con- 
gressional Republicans. For this reason the administration could 
not ignore him, nor could it seek to replace him as floor leader 
without risking humiliating defeat.12 Some of his views on Asia 
were shared by Admiral Arthur W. Radford and by others on 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as by Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles. Knowland often expressed his opinions in public, 
12 Perhaps the breach between Eisenhower and Knowland was most serious 
in December, 1954, when Knowland voted against the censure of Senator Joseph 
McCarthy. At that time "Eisenhower Republicans" in the Senate were privately 
saying that Knowland should resign as floor leader but that an attempt to oust him 
would fail. New York Times, December 2, 1954, pp. 1, 23. 
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but there is little evidence that the President and Secretary of 
State consulted him except on those issues with legislative impli- 
cations. The assertions Knowland may have made in private are 
unknown, but in public he claimed to speak only for himself and 
not for the Senate Republicans. He did not use his position as 
floor leader in attempts to organize his colleagues in opposition 
to the policies of the administration. He was willing to support 
measures in the Senate much more moderate than what he had 
publicly advocated. 
In 1954 Knowland publicly threatened to resign as floor leader 
and devote his "full efforts" to canceling American membership 
in the United Nations if China were admitted. This incident 
offers insight into Knowland's views on the limits a leader might 
properly go in challenging the administration's policies. I t  can 
be said that Knowland's efforts helped to consolidate Republican 
opposition to American recognition or admission of Communist 
China to the U.N. and consequently established a major obstacle 
to any serious consideration of such policies by the President.13 
The crisis provoked by the Communist threat to the islands 
off the coast of China made clear both the extent and limits of 
Knowland's influence on the administration. The Communist 
shelling of Quemoy in September, 1954, brought about a pro- 
longed debate in the administration.14 There was little disagree- 
ment over the necessity of reaffirming the American intention to 
defend Formosa itself or over the value of requiring a commit- 
ment by Chiang Kai-shek not to attack the mainland without the 
agreement of the United States. The critical question was 
whether the United States should commit itself to defend the 
offshore islands, as Knowland along with Admiral Radford and 
some other military leaders believed, or should exclude these 
islands from the defense perimeter. The President finally decided 
to exclude any reference to Quemoy and Matsu in the Formosa 
resolution submitted for congressional approval, leaving the 
question of defending these islands to the President's judgment 
concerning the scope and intention of any attack. The strength 
13 Donovan, pp. 132-36. 
14 Stewart Alsop, "How We Drifted Close to War," Saturday Evening Post, 
CCXXXI (December 13, 1958), 26-27, 86-88. Chalmers M. Roberts, "Strong 
Man from the South," Saturday Evening Post, CCXXVII (June 25, 1955), 30, 
109-12. Donovan, pp. 300-10. 
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of the views represented by Knowland was one major reason why 
Quemoy and Matsu were not specifically excluded from the 
resolution, while the attitude of Democratic senators was a 
major reason preventing the specific inclusion of the islands.15 
Knowland was carefully consulted during the drafting of the 
resolution, though his proposal that the President appear before 
Congress in person was rejected. Knowland loyally defended the 
resolution on the Senate floor in January despite doubts about its 
limitations. Two months later he began insisting that the ad- 
ministration commit itself firmly and publicly to the defense of 
Quemoy and Matsu. He was unsuccessful in this effort, just as 
a number of Democrats-including Adlai Stevenson-failed to 
persuade the administration to abandon the offshore islands.*" 
Even at its height, Knowland's influence (and that of his sup- 
porters) on diplomacy was a negative factor; it placed certain 
limits on the administration's flexibility, but it was never power- 
ful enough to dictate a course of action. 
Because of his deep interest in foreign affairs, Senator Know- 
land played a more active role and particularly a greater public 
role in international questions, both legislative and diplomatic, 
than most other recent party leaders. He completely over- 
shadowed and appeared to virtually ignore Alexander Wiley, the 
ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee. Know- 
land had unusual opportunities to influence foreign policy as a 
member of the Appropriations Committee for a prolonged period, 
the Armed Services Committee until 1953, and thereafter the 
Foreign Relations Committee. Knowland, like Taft, commanded 
support in the party because his views were respected and not 
because of any special skill in legislative negotiations. His in- 
fluence would probably have been greater if he had been not 
only more flexible in his thinking but more adept at behind-the- 
scenes maneuvering. Knowland's greatest influence was over 
those Republicans who had been most critical of Truman's 
foreign policies. In the early Eisenhower years the President 
16 While the issue was being discussed, Knowland was making public speeches 
demanding a much firmer foreign policy and on one occasion calling for a con- 
gressional investigation of diplomatic and military policy. 
16 It has been reported, however, that at this time the administration failed in 
an effort to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to evacuate the islands. Alsop, Saturday 
Evening Post, CCXXXI, 88. 
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depended on Knowland to rally these senators behind the ad- 
ministration's program but paid a high price for this assistance 
because of Knowland's frequent revolts. Eisenhower was known 
to resent deeply Knowland's criticisms of his foreign policy. In 
later years Knowland's influence diminished for several reasons: 
a Democratic majority in Congress beginning in 1955, the de- 
clining popularity of the tough international policies he advo- 
cated, and (perhaps most important) Eisenhower's increasing 
ability to command Republican support in Congress for his for- 
eign policies simply because he was the party's President. Finally, 
it may be concluded from Knowland's record that strong sena- 
torial leadership may be a detriment and not automatically an 
asset to effective party unity on issues of foreign policy. 
Among the other Republican party leaders in the Senate, 
Styles Bridges was usually regarded as most influential on ques- 
tions of foreign policy during the Eisenhower administration. 
Throughout the period from 1947 through 1960 Senator Bridges 
was the ranking Republican on the Appropriations Committee 
and a member of the inner circle of party leadership, serving as 
floor leader in 1952 and becoming chairman of the Policy Com- 
mittee in 1955. Bridges' record closely paralleled Knowland's. 
He supported the principles of foreign aid, criticized its ad- 
ministration by the Democrats, and voted for most of Eisen- 
hower's aid requests. Like Knowland he was in the forefront 
of those demanding a firmer policy in Asia and criticizing aid to 
neutral and Communist satellite countries. Unlike Taft and 
Knowland, however, he voted against Ambassador Bohlen's con- 
firmation in 1953. Bridges played a less prominent part than 
Knowland in foreign policy debates during the Eisenhower ad- 
ministration, but he stood for nearly all the same policies and 
represented the same wing of the party as did Knowland. He 
never appeared to share fully Knowland's internationalism or 
enthusiasm for foreign aid; consequently, Bridges' support of 
the Eisenhower foreign policy appeared to be more reluctant 
than Knowland's. 
On those occasions when Bridges joined Knowland in op- 
position to some aspect of Eisenhower's foreign program, Bridges' 
stand was costly to the President. His opposition was less pub- 
licized and therefore less embarrassing to the President than 
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Knowland's, but Bridges' influence with conservative Republi- 
cans was just as great. On the other hand, Bridges' support of 
most foreign aid proposals was a major asset for the Eisenhower 
administration because of his strategic position as a senior party 
leader and ranking Republican on the Appropriations Com- 
mittee. On some occasions in the committee Bridges voted for 
lower aid funds than a majority of the committee's members did, 
but on the fioor he usually supported the committee's restoration 
of funds cut in the House. Because of his power, Bridges could 
have become a major obstacle to the foreign aid program; his 
support of it in most cases reflected his concept of the degree of 
loyalty owed by a party leader to the President. 
Senator Dirksen, who succeeded Knowland as floor leader 
after being the party whip, has never been burdened with the 
deep convictions concerning foreign affairs characteristic of 
Knowland. As a consequence, he was a much more dependable 
leader for the Eisenhower administration. Though a vocal op- 
ponent of foreign aid as a senator during the last years of Tru- 
man's administration, Dirksen supported Eisenhower's aid pro- 
gram (and other foreign policies) with remarkable consistency. 
Although a junior member of the Appropriations Committee, he 
was given considerable responsibility for defending foreign aid 
appropriations during senatorial debates even before becoming 
floor leader. Unlike Knowland and Bridges, Dirksen supported 
the President's requests for aid to neutrals and to Yugoslavia, 
although in 1958 he helped to scuttle the amendment to facili- 
tate aid to Communist satellites. Dirksen has never been as 
influential among conservative Republicans as Knowland or 
Bridges. 
Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts has been a relatively in- 
effective party leader precisely because his support of inter- 
nationalist policies has been too consistent for him to command 
respect among the less internationalist Republicans. Like Know- 
land and Bridges, Saltonstall has held high positions both in the 
party and on committees dealing with foreign affairs. He has 
been on the Policy Committee since 1947, was whip from 1949 
through 1956, and chairman of the Conference thereafter. He 
has long service on both the Appropriations and Armed Services 
committees. On questions of foreign aid (to allies or neutrals), 
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collective security, and the Bricker amendment, he supported 
most of Truman's proposals and virtually all of Eisenhower's. 
Such consistency by a man holding strategic posts was an obvious 
asset to the Eisenhower administration, but did not impress 
those Republicans who followed the lead of Knowland and 
Bridges, those who most needed conversion to the administra- 
tion's viewpoint. Close observers of the Senate also think that 
though he is a competent senator, Saltonstall has lacked the 
political skill and ambition necessary to wrest the party leader- 
ship away from Knowland, Bridges, and Dirksen.17 
REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP: TAFT & CO. 
A leader of the opposition party in the Senate has more inde- 
pendence than the administration leader and consequently more 
opportunity to shape his party's policy. The two outstanding op- 
position leaders of recent years, Robert A. Taft and Lyndon B. 
Johnson, had a greater impact on domestic affairs, however, than 
on foreign policy. The term "Mr. Republican" so often applied 
to Taft was a measure of the respect he commanded from his 
party colleagues and of his ability to represent their viewpoints 
on a wide variety of domestic issues; the title was deceptive be- 
cause it had limited application to international issues. From 
1947 through 1952 Taft dominated the Republican leadership 
coalition from his post as chairman of the Policy Committee. He 
overshadowed the three floor leaders of that period: the aging 
Wallace H. White (in 1947 and 1948), Kenneth S. Wherry (1949 
through 1951), and Styles Bridges (in 1952). With respect to 
foreign affairs, the scope of Taft's activity and influence varied 
not because of changes in the floor leader but because of Senator 
Vandenberg's role as Republican leader on the Foreign Relations 
Committee. When illness forced Vandenberg from the senatorial 
scene in 1950, Taft's role in foreign affairs began to change. 
As long as Vandenberg was active in the Senate, he and Taft 
divided the de facto leadership of the party. Taft concentrated 
on domestic affairs, and Vandenberg devoted almost all of his 
attention to foreign policy. Vandenberg's son has described this 
17 When Saltonstall, the party whip since 1949, was promoted to conference 
chairman in 1957 and replaced by Wheny, some observers felt that he was being 
'licked upstairs" and removed from the line of succession to the floor leadership. 
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as "a tacit and informal understanding" in which both "consci- 
entiously sought to avoid direct conflict."18 Only rarely did Taft 
directly challenge Vandenberg on international issues; when he 
was in disagreement, he usually avoided any open opposition. 
This tacitly recognized division of responsibility was a curious 
one not only because Taft disagreed with Vandenberg on certain 
important international questions but because he was deeply 
scornful of Vandenberg's conversion to internationalism and 
suspicious of the bipartisan approach to foreign policy. William 
S. White felt that Taft had "the greatest misgivings in letting 
Vandenberg have his h e a d  in foreign policy and that it was 
"only by iron self-restraint" that Taft avoided public harassment 
of Vandenberg.lg 
There were at least four reasons why Taft was willing to leave 
leadership in foreign affairs to Vandenberg. The first was po- 
litical: Vandenberg was potentially a powerful contender for 
the 1948 presidential nomination whom Taft, as another candi- 
date, did not want to challenge. Second, Taft did not want 
to exacerbate intraparty differences on foreign policy by leading 
the opposition to Vandenberg in the Eightieth Congress, where 
the Republicans had finally achieved a majority. Third, Taft 
was trying to expand his alliance with southern Democrats on 
domestic issues and felt it prudent to avoid sweeping attacks 
on the Truman foreign policies accepted by most of them. The 
fourth reason, and perhaps the most important, was that Taft 
was not interested in, experienced with, or even well informed 
about international affairsSz0 
During this period Taft occupied a curious position. While 
the Republican internationalists looked upon him as an iso- 
lationist, the diehard isolationists felt he had abandoned their 
cause to further his own presidential ambitions. His greatest in- 
fluence was on the sizable middle group of Republicans, who 
were often suspicious of Vandenberg's assurances regarding 
policy but felt it politically safe to vote for those programs en- 
dorsed by Taft. 
The ambiguities of Taft's position can be illustrated in the 
18 Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, pp. 318-19. 
19 White, The Taft Stoq, pp. 146-47. 
20 See Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, p. 271; White, The 
Tuft Story, pp. 59-60. 
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case of foreign aid. Taft avoided assuming the leadership of 
those Republicans who wanted to defeat or cripple the aid pro- 
grams, but on the floor of the Senate he provided the most 
reasoned and persuasive criticism of foreign aid. Taft argued 
fervently for reductions in the aid program, yet during the 
Vandenberg period he seldom had the support of a Republican 
majority in voting for cuts. On the other hand, his opposition 
to several large reductions may have helped minimize the num- 
ber of Republican votes cast for them. Senator Taft felt that 
the aid program was justifiable only as a temporary measure to 
prevent Communist expansion; he criticized what he called the 
balance-of-payments approach to foreign aid, the long-term effort 
to close the dollar gap of recipient nations. He warned above all 
of the dangers resulting from the tax burden required to support 
foreign aid. 
During this period Taft never used his authority as a party 
leader in an effort to delay or cripple foreign aid measures, but 
used this authority once to support Vandenberg. In 1948 Taft 
had introduced unsuccessfully an amendment to cut $1.3 billion 
from the Marshall Plan authorization. When the House sought 
to reduce the appropriation below the authorization figure, Taft 
supported the full amount and argued that the authorization 
represented a moral commitment that should be kept. When a 
Senate-House conference committee became deadlocked over 
the appropriation on the eve of the Republican national con- 
vention, Taft broke the deadlock by announcing that he would 
hold the Senate in session until a "satisfactory" total was agreed 
upon. 
During 1948 Taft also yielded to Vandenberg on the issue of 
reciprocal trade. Vandenberg devised a compromise plan, which 
Taft criticized because of the discretion given to the President 
in accepting or rejecting recommendations of the Tariff Com- 
mission. Yet Taft voted for the Vandenberg plan in committee 
and endorsed it in the Senate, providing support that was prob- 
ably essential in view of the closeness of the vote. 
During the period of Vandenberg's leadership in foreign 
policy, the only major issues on which Taft actively opposed him 
were ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty and its implemen- 
tation by military assistance. Taft opposed the NATO pact pri- 
marily because he felt it contained a firm moral obligation for 
PARTY LEADERS 71 
arms aid to our European allies. He opposed such aid for two 
reasons: He believed it would seriously increase the danger of 
war by dividing the world into two armed camps, and he thought 
the United States could not afford large programs for both eco- 
nomic and military aid. Basic to Taft's attitude toward NATO, 
as his biographer has pointed out, were his abhorrence of war, 
his lack of familiarity with and understanding of military policy, 
and his habit of "putting price tags on military ~ecuri ty."~~ His
opposition also stemmed from his belief that this country must 
avoid any commitment to fight a land war in Europe, a belief 
that underlay his opposition to sending troops to Europe in 1951. 
Taft proposed a reservation to the treaty stating that the pro- 
visions in Article 3 for "effective self-help and mutual aid" would 
not commit any nation to furnish others with arms. 
Despite Taft's stand, only one-quarter of the Republican sen- 
ators voted against ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty and 
less than half supported his reservation to the treaty. Observers 
at the time expressed doubts that Taft had changed many votes, 
since most of the opposing votes were cast by diehard isolation- 
ists. Senator Vandenberg took a different view: "The Taft speech 
will lengthen the battle because it lends a certain respectability 
to the opposition, and some of those who wouldn't have dared 
stand up on their own will now join the anti parade. But I don't 
believe it will be serious. . . . I cannot ignore the fact that if Taft 
thought his negative vote would divide the Party, he would 
never have taken that re~ponsibility."~~ Taft felt uncertain about 
his decision to oppose NATO, probably in deference to Vanden- 
berg's leadership. He said he took that step "with the greatest 
discomfort" and "with great regret." Despite his speeches against 
NATO, Taft avoided leading any organized opposition to the pact. 
He avoided participation in the controversy over the military 
assistance bill until the last day of debate. Taft was not pri- 
marily responsible for the fact that a large minority of Republi- 
cans voted against the arms bill and over two-thirds voted for 
cuts in the program; numerous senatorial leaders in both parties 
criticized the scope and nature of the administration's program. 
In the last three years of the Truman administration, Senator 
Taft played a more active role in international issues and was 
21 White, The Tuft Stoy,  pp. 149-50. 
22 Vandenberg, p. 498. 
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increasingly critical of the administration's policies. He was 
quoted as saying, "I am charged with moving in on foreign 
policy; the truth is that foreign policy has moved in on me."23 
One reason for Taft's increased interest was his decision to seek 
the Presidency in 1952 and his feeling that he must consequently 
become more prominent in foreign affairs. Moreover, Taft felt 
that the Truman administration had made a mockery of bi- 
partisanship in foreign policy. The Korean war, the dismissal of 
General Douglas MacArthur, and the partisan controversy over 
Dean Acheson intensified Taft's hostility to the administration's 
policies. Probably the most important reason for Taft's increased 
activity and independence was Senator Vandenberg's illness in 
1950 and death in April, 1951. Senator Alexander Wiley, who 
succeeded Vandenberg as ranking Republican on the Foreign 
Relations Committee, had no comparable following among Re- 
publican senators. Consequently, Taft did not have to defer to 
Wiley's views and in fact almost completely ignored Wiley while 
moving to fill the vacuum of foreign policy leadership left by 
Vandenberg's departure. 
The "great debate" in 1951 over sending troops to Europe in 
support of the American commitment to NATO is the most sig- 
nificant example of Senator Taft's emergence in the area of foreign 
policy. More than any other Republican, Taft was responsible for 
launching the debate, and he greatly influenced its course and 
outcome. He presented the strongest arguments against sending 
any forces to Europe and in favor of congressional limitations on 
the President's authority to dispatch troops. Yet, in typical 
fashion, he finally compromised to support a resolution that 
endorsed four American divisions for Europe and that excluded 
most of the strict limitations on future presidential action that 
he had favored. Although a majority of Republicans voted with 
Taft on all but one of the long series of rollcalls on the issues, 
he could only count on the votes of a middle group of senators 
in the seriously divided party. A group of internationalist Re- 
publicans, varying in number from eight to fourteen on most 
rollcalls, repeatedly voted against Taft and (together with the 
Democrats) prevented the passage of a joint resolution that would 
have been binding on the President. There were nineteen Re- 
23 White, The Taft Story, p. 148. 
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publicans who opposed final passage of the Senate resolution 
either because they opposed sending any troops or because the 
resolution did not have binding effect. On the other hand, some 
of the twenty-seven Republicans who voted for final passage 
were willing to bury serious doubts about the resolution because 
of Taft's strong insistence that this was a necessary step in as- 
serting congressional authority. In a seriously divided party, 
Taft's personal ambivalence helped to prolong a controversy that 
was damaging this country's prestige and effectiveness abroad. 
Nevertheless, Taft's willingness to compromise and his ability 
to lead at least some Republicans in that direction helped to 
prevent any Senate action that would have been more damaging 
to American foreign policy. 
There is no evidence that Taft used the powers of his party 
office or applied personal pressure on Republicans in order to 
gain votes. Had he been a more skillful compromiser, Taft 
might have been able to draft a resolution commanding wider 
Republican support. In fact, Taft as usual won votes primarily 
from those Republicans who respected his views. His influence 
in this controversy resulted from the fact that the criticisms he 
voiced were representative of many Republicans' views, though 
his eventual compromise was less widely supported. 
Senator Taft became a frequent critic of the Truman admin- 
istration's policies in Asia. He shared the view of many Repub- 
licans that greater emphasis should be placed on resisting the 
spread of Communism in Asia, though he was neither so aggres- 
sive nor so consistent as Senator Knowland in advocating bold 
policies to implement these principles. When President Truman 
dismissed General MacArthur as commander of the U.N. forces 
in Korea, Taft gave MacArthur his full personal support and 
that of the Republican party. He helped to direct the party 
strategy that led to MacArthur's address before Congress and a 
congressional investigation of Far Eastern policy. He served, 
along with Knowland and Bridges, as an adviser to MacArthur 
in the preparation of testimony for the hearings. He gave com- 
plete backing to the policies advocated by MacArthur, urged 
all-out war in Korea, and suggested that Congress go on record 
in opposition to any negotiated "appeasement peace" in Korea. 
Yet Taft never tried to bring about any further congressional 
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action on Korea, perhaps because he realized that the admin-. 
istration could not be forced to act and perhaps because a num- 
ber of Republican senators were less hostile to the growing 
possibilities of truce in Korea than Taft and Knowland were. 
Taft's frequently ambiguous position on one occasion led to 
virtual abdication of his responsibilities. While John Foster 
Dulles was negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty, he frequently 
consulted Taft. But Taft avoided speaking for the treaty and 
left the Senate floor on a campaign trip during the ratification 
debate, leaving behind the typical announcement that he favored 
the treaty as well as most of the proposed reservations. Senators 
William Knowland and Alexander Smith shouldered the burden 
of defending the treaty during the debate.24 
The Republican party that Taft led in the Senate was seriously 
divided on foreign policy. Taft's knowledge and experience, 
impressive in domestic affairs, were not great enough in foreign 
affairs to command broad support. Taft did not sway many 
internationalist Republicans until late in the Truman adminis- 
tration, when disillusion with Asian policies was profound, nor 
did he often speak for the small, diehard isolationist wing of the 
party. Taft's support, though grudging, of the administration's 
policies on frequent occasions probably had the net effect of 
increasing the votes cast for these policies by the middle group 
of Republicans. Taft's distrust of the bipartisan principle and 
of Truman and Acheson was too deep to permit him to play 
Vandenberg's role as a partner of the administration. Although, 
had he challenged Vandenberg's leadership, he might have 
divided the party and reshaped its postwar record on foreign 
policy, Taft lacked the qualities necessary to provide a focal 
point for Republican unity. Taft was not the master of personal 
negotiations designed to produce compromise; those senators 
who respected his intellectual position simply cast their votes 
with him. Taft held great political power in the Senate and 
carefully controlled party and committee assignments. The evi- 
dence does not suggest, however, that he used this power in 
significant efforts to create Republican support for his stands on 
foreign policy, except for his use of the Policy Committee, 
described in the next chapter. 
24 Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign Policy, pp. 240-44. 
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The dilemma Senator Taft would have faced had he been a 
consistent opponent of the Truman administration's foreign policy 
is illustrated by the example of Kenneth S. Wherry. Wherry was 
party whip and at times acting majority leader in 1947 and 1948 
and minority leader from 1949 until his death late in 1951. 
Wherry was the strongest and most effective leader of the small 
Republican isolationist wing. He opposed the major foreign 
aid programs and collective security measures and was a leader in 
the attempt to prevent the sending of troops to Europe. While 
Wherry lacked Taft's stature in Republican ranks, he was a 
genial, popular senator, skilled in the informal practices of give- 
and-take that produce compromise. Wherry was not influential 
in foreign policy debates (outside the band of isolationists he 
led) for two reasons: his lack of knowledge and experience in 
foreign affairs and the rigidity of his extreme position on inter- 
national questions. The leader who occupies middle ground in 
his party is the most likely to be effective. The most skillful, 
experienced, and popular man in the Senate will win few con- 
verts when he takes a rigid stand against the tides of events and 
opinion. 
There is no evidence that Wheny used his power as minority 
leader to attempt to delay action on foreign measures or that 
he used this authority to pressure Republican senators into 
supporting him. Republican leadership was too widely dispersed, 
the tools of the floor leader were too ineffective, and Vandenberg's 
prestige was too great for Wherry to succeed in such an effort 
had he attempted it. During the period when the postwar for- 
eign programs were being established, the isolationist group and 
Wherry, its de facto leader, seem to have felt rather fatalistically 
that they could do little to stem the tide of internationalism. 
LYNDON JOHNSON: LEADER OF THE LOYAL OPPOSITION 
Lyndon B. Johnson held the reins of Democratic leadership in the 
Senate throughout the Eisenhower administration. His participa- 
tion in foreign affairs went through a cycle similar to Taft's. 
In his early years as floor leader he took a relatively small part 
in foreign policy questions. Like Taft, Johnson played a greater 
role in foreign affairs as he became a more experienced party 
leader with presidential ambitions. Unlike Taft, Johnson did 
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not become more antagonistic to the administration's policies as 
he became more active, both because Johnson is an internation- 
alist who could support the Eisenhower policies and because 
Johnson believes strongly in the President's primary responsi- 
bility for the direction of foreign policy. 
Like Taft, too, Johnson began to play an active part in foreign 
policy only after the retirement of a powerful Democratic leader 
of the Foreign Relations Committee, Walter F. George. In 1953 
and 1954 George was ranking Democrat on the committee, and 
in 1955 and 1956, as the committee chairman, George was the 
Democratic party's recognized leader in foreign policy. While 
Johnson remained in the background and let George speak for 
the party, the two held frequent consultations on policy and 
tactics. Because of his vastly greater experience in foreign 
affairs, George was the dominant member of this partnership. 
There was apparently little conflict between the two, and John- 
son usually followed George's lead. It may be that Johnson de- 
rived some of his views on foreign policy and bipartisanship 
from his experience with George. An example of their coopera- 
tion was the foreign aid program; while George was speaking 
earnestly on the Senate floor in defense of a full-scale aid pro- 
gram, Johnson was reported by his aides to be working effectively 
behind the scenes to win Democratic votes for the program.25 
The controversy over the Bricker amendment in 1953 and 
1954 illustrates Johnson's lack of strong convictions on foreign 
policy and his techniques of compromise. Johnson opposed any 
amendment that he felt would seriously limit the President's 
authority. He was not an original sponsor of the Bricker amend- 
ment and never voted for its more stringent versions. On the 
other hand, he was not one of those senators who believed that 
any amendment would be dangerous. Johnson became con- 
vinced that the Bricker amendment could not be defeated in 
open combat but must be outflanked through a compromise, 
one which would also provide relief to Democrats under pres- 
sure to vote for some such measure. Though the Republican 
leaders had prepared a compromise acceptable to the Presi- 
dent, Johnson worked with George to develop a Democratic 
compromise, one that proved unacceptable to the President. 
25 Based on interviews with members of Johnson's staff. 
PARTY LEADERS 77 
Johnson gave the George version of the Bricker amendment his 
full support, though he did not apply pressure on the Democrats 
to vote for it. In this case Johnson's approach was the anti- 
thesis of Taft's; what mattered was finding a solution to the 
Bricker controversy that would satisfy the most Democrats, what- 
ever the substantive results.26 
Lyndon Johnson first emerged as a prominent Democratic 
spokesman on foreign policy after George's retirement early in 
1957, when the Middle East resolution came before the Senate. 
He was primarily responsible for remolding the administration's 
resolution to conform to the views of prominent Democrats and 
for guiding it through the Senate despite considerable Demo- 
cratic opposition. At the same time, he urged the administration 
to block United Nations economic sanctions against Israel con- 
templated as an aftermath of the Suez invasion. There were 
- 
press allegations that he delayed Senate approval until a com- 
promise on the Israeli question had been achieved. Johnson 
was unable to serve as a foreign policy spokesman in the sense 
that George had, but he made it clear that if the party must 
speak with several voices, none would be more prominent than 
his. Johnson sympathized with, if he did not fully share, a wide 
variety of Democratic doubts about the administration's Middle 
Eastern policies and the proposed resolution. He persuaded the 
administration to accept changes in the resolution that were not 
crippling and then secured its passage. The effect of his ac- 
tions was to serve notice that he must be consulted by the ad- 
ministration and that the Democratic party would not be so 
pliable on foreign policy as it had been in George's day.27 
The other major foreign policy issues during the second Eisen- 
hower administration involved the renewal of reciprocal trade 
and foreign aid programs. Johnson was credited by observers 
at the time with major responsibility for the passage of a four- 
year reciprocal trade bill in 1958 that was satisfactory to the 
administration. On this and other reciprocal trade measures 
- 
he supported the administration more consistently than the 
26 This account of Johnson's role in the Bricker amendment controversy is based 
largely on interviews with senators and senatorial staff. 
27 See the comments of William S. White, New York Times, March 10, 1957, 
sec. iv, p. 3; Robert Albright, Washington Post and Times Herald, March 12, 
1957; Roscoe Drummond, New York Herald Tribune, March 11, 1957. See also 
Newsweek, XLIX (March 11, 1957), 28-29. 
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Republican leaders. He likewise backed the administration 
during the annual battles over renewing the foreign aid pro- 
gram, while unsuccessfully helping the efforts of Democratic 
senators like William Fulbright and John Kennedy to make the 
aid program more flexible, strengthen its long-term developmental 
features, and permit aid to Communist satellite countries. In 
the fields of aid and trade, Johnson was seldom a prominent 
spokesman or an initiator of change but rather a tactician and 
floor manager. 
The growing split in Democratic ranks on both the aid and 
trade issues raises questions about the effectiveness of Johnson's 
efforts. Some observers have argued that if Johnson had deeper 
convictions about these policies, he could and would have 
worked to produce greater unity in Democratic ranks. Such an 
assertion is difficult to substantiate. Democratic dissension came 
not only from neoisolationists but from internationalist senators 
deeply concerned about the Eisenhower administration's em- 
phasis on military aid at the expense of developmental aid. On 
occasion, serious contradictions and vacillations in the adminis- 
tration's policy further handicapped Johnson. It can be said 
that, whenever possible, on issues of trade and aid Johnson was 
an agent of unity in the Democratic party and between the 
party and the Eisenhower administration. 
Johnson differed from other floor leaders in recent years be- 
cause of his skill in personal leadership, particularly in behind- 
the-scenes activities. Johnson roamed the Senate cloakrooms, 
seeking out Democrats with conflicting views and negotiating 
compromises with patience and persistence. He sometimes used 
intermediaries to approach senators at odds with him. In his role 
as mediator, he was seldom handicapped, as Knowland was, by 
dogmatic adherence to a personal viewpoint. As his personal 
prestige and assurance grew, Johnson became increasingly willing 
to use the powers of his office to compel support for the com- 
promises he had fathered. These powers were informal and 
often hidden from view, but they certainly included the ability 
to promote or retard the favorite bills of senators. A skillful 
floor leader, as Johnson demonstrated, has considerable ad- 
vantages over other senators. He has the initiative in legislative 
maneuvers and the right to be recognized first on the floor, he is 
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able to make binding promises and threats, and he controls the 
party machinery and staff.28 Accounts of Johnson's political 
brilliance often ignored the role of his staff, described by Stewart 
Alsop as "the biggest, the most efficient, the most ruthlessly 
overworked and the most loyal personal staff in the history of 
the Senate."29 Whether designated secretary of the Senate, ma- 
jority secretary, or members of the staff of the Policy Committee, 
Conference, or Democratic Campaign Committee, they were all 
in fact Johnson's personal staff. 
Johnson also picked deputy leaders who were skilled in the 
arts of tactics and compromise and whose views were com- 
patible enough with his to permit a close working relationship. 
Until his defeat in the 1956 election, Earle Clements was the 
deputy leader; for several years thereafter he served on Johnson's 
staff. Clements was succeeded as deputy by Mike Mansfield, 
who was adept at backstage negotiations and who commanded 
broad senatorial respect, particularly in foreign policy matters. 
Johnson often belittled his own power, insisting that he could 
not force any senator to change his vote and that he was sub- 
ject to the control of a majority in the party. He said that his 
only power was "the power to persuade." His failure to achieve 
greater Democratic unity on foreign aid bills illustrates this limi- 
tation; Johnson's greatest skill was his ability to find the formula 
for maximum agreement rather than a talent for bold leader- 
ship in new directions. But within these limitations, Johnson 
proved that a strong majority leader can assume greater con- 
trol over the legislative process than most of his predecessors 
had thought possible. 
THE MEANING OF PARTY LEADERSHIP 
When is a leader in fact leading, and when is he merely reflect- 
ing and articulating the views of his party? I t  is difficult to 
28 Donald R. Matthews has pointed out the wide range of assistance that a party 
leader can provide for a senator, ranging from better office accommodations and 
information about legislation to better committee assignments and assistance in the 
passage of pet bills. A skillful leader is constantly placing other senators in debt 
to him through such favors, large and small. U. S .  Senators and Their World 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 127. 
29 Stewart Alsop, "Lyndon Johnson: How Does He Do It?" Saturday Evening 
Post, CCXXXI (Jan. 24, 1959), 13, 38. 
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judge and impossible to prove whether a leader is responsible 
for high party unity on one rollcall or to blame for disunity on 
the next. I t  is true that, on the foreign policy questicns, Demo- 
cratic unity was greater under Barkley, Lucas, and McFarland 
than under Lyndon Johnson, generally recognized as the most 
skillful Senate leader in recent years. Senator Taft's greatest suc- 
cesses occurred when circumstances had minimized the sharp 
divisions in the party and when his views coincided with the 
emerging consensus. If there are indeed times when the party 
leader's skill and influence make a difference, these occur when 
the party is neither deeply divided nor firmly united. The party 
leader is more likely to control tactical decisions, the timing of 
measures, the choice and wording of amendments, than to in- 
fluence decisions on the basic issues. His tactics and persuasion 
may change a handful of votes rather than a majority. But the 
tactical decisions may have great influence on the final out- 
come, and a handful of votes may be the decisive ones on closely 
contested issues. 
As long as the positions of party leadership are not insti- 
tutionalized and the prerogatives of office remain vague, the 
sources of a leader's authority must lie primarily in his own 
experience and skill. The contrast between Taft and Wherry 
suggests that the effective party leader is one who takes a mod- 
erate position. A leader must not, by reason of his own dogmas, 
destroy his rapport with other senators. If the tide of opinion in 
his party is running in any visible direction, the most successful 
leader is the one who is moving with or ahead of the tide. Taft 
and Knowland were increasingly able to represent Republican 
opinion late in the Truman administration, but as the Eisen- 
hower administration progressed, Knowland became gradually 
more isolated from his party in the Senate as well as from the 
President and thus no longer able to exert active leadership 
of his party. 
Because the Senate respects the man whose interests, knowl- 
edge, and committee experience have equipped him to speak with 
some authority on a subject, party leaders gain an added meas- 
ure of influence when dealing with subjects on which they are 
authorities, as Taft did on domestic economic issues. But, except 
for Knowland and Mansfield, no party leader has been an author- 
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ity on foreign affairs, and for this reason, several of the leaders 
have often shared authority with the chairman or ranking party 
member on the Foreign Relations Committee. When the leader 
of the committee has been a powerful figure in his own right 
and when there has been basic agreement on issues, the working 
relationship has often been remarkably close, as in the case of 
Democratic leaders dealing with Connally and George. John- 
son's role was heightened when there was no clearly recognized 
Democratic leader on the Foreign Relations Committee, and 
Republican party leaders have magnified their roles both be- 
cause of Senator Wiley's weakness on the committee and be- 
cause of their policy differences with him. The two administra- 
tions, though bound to recognize the power realties in Congress, 
exercised some discretion in consulting Vandenberg, George, 
Knowland, and Johnson, while ignoring Taft occasionally and 
Wiley often. 
The leaders of an administration party have an opportunity, 
usually denied to the opposition, of influencing foreign programs 
in the early stages of formulation. Once those programs have 
been presented to Congress, however, the administration party 
generally has less freedom to criticize than the opposition does. 
The Democratic leaders accepted Truman's foreign programs 
with a minimum of advance participation and without criticism 
in the Senate. Republican leaders, notably Taft and Knowland, 
sought to have a much greater influence on the Eisenhower pro- 
grams both before and after these reached the Senate. In a 
party as united as the Democrats were on foreign policy during 
Truman's administration, the senatorial leaders faced no con- 
flict in determining their proper role. In a divided party, this 
conflict may become acute. At one extreme, both Leverett 
Saltonstall and Alexander Wiley were handicapped because many 
Republicans considered them mere puppets of the Eisenhower 
administration, while at the other, Senator Knowland began to 
discover that his influence was least when he challenged the 
President openly and forcefully on major questions of foreign 
policy. 
The thin line that a successful administration leader must 
follow, particularly in a divided party, has been well described 
by David Truman: "The fundamental complexity and subtlety 
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of the role lie in the fact that the elective leaders are, and 
probably must be, both the President's leaders and the party's 
leaders. However, . . . to be fully effective as leaders of the 
Congressional parties, they must above all be effective spokes- 
men for the President; or at least, excepting the most unusual 
circumstances, they must appear to be his spokesmen." These 
two roles "are not always cleanly compatible. At the same time 
it seems clear that they are generally interdependent, in the 
sense that representing the President provides a focus and part 
of the leverage for leadership of the Congressional party, and 
sympathetic reflection of the problems of legislative colleagues 
is an essential in advancing the President's program."30 
The opposition leader in the Senate undertakes the problem 
of achieving unity in a frequently divided party uninhibited 
by political allegiance to the President, but confronted by the 
fact of presidential initiative and preeminence in foreign policy. 
In recommending a party policy, the opposition leader must 
choose among three courses: accepting the President's policy, 
modifying it, or proposing an alternative; but he must always 
contend with the fact that the President's authority is great in 
foreign policy, almost irresistible in a time of crisis. In recent 
years, the President has generally commanded at least a strong 
minority of support from the opposition party for his programs 
-particularly those presented with greatest urgency. As a re- 
sult, the opposition leader finds himself in the anomalous posi- 
tion of commanding the greatest party unity on occasions when 
the party supports the President. A leader such as Taft, often 
deeply at variance with the Truman administration, usually 
sought to modify rather than negate the Truman policies; his 
choice was often dictated partly by the desire to maximize 
Republican unity. 
Neither Robert Taft nor Lyndon Johnson were recognized as 
specialists in foreign policy. The question arises whether an 
opposition leader who combined the skills of Johnson with the 
experience in foreign policy possessed by Vandenberg or George 
could unite his party behind a policy boldly different from the 
administration's foreign policy. The answer must be negative. 
Senator Taft showed how this could be done on a domestic 
30 Truman, pp. 298, 302-303. 
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issue with the passage of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Labor Act; 
but foreign policy is a vastly different field. The opposition 
party leader has no hand in the making of diplomacy, no re- 
sponsibility for the movement of troops, no sources of foreign 
intelligence. It is difficult to conceive of the American people 
turning to him for guidance in a crisis. 
Lyndon Johnson described the problem in realistic terms: 
"We recognize clearly that the President has a special role to 
play in the field of foreign policy. . . . In the ultimate analysis, 
he is the man who must speak for our country in its dealings 
with other countries. This does not mean, however, that the 
sole role of the Senate is acquiescence or rejection of policies 
announced by the President. . . . 
"The Congress has a responsibility to examine the facts; to 
weigh them in the light of past experience; to determine whether 
a policy is justified; to decide whether there are constructive 
alternatives; to unify the country by selecting alternatives if 
they are j~stified."~~ 
Lyndon Johnson's term as party leader was less notable for 
its impact on the party's record in foreign policy than for the 
techniques he developed. Although many of Johnson's tech- 
niques were purely personal, some of the methods that he and 
other recent leaders have used set a precedent for others to fol- 
low. Johnson's greater use of staff assistance and his modifica- 
tion of the seniority principle in making committee appoint- 
ments are practices likely to be continued because they pro- 
vide improved tools for party leadership. There are not yet 
many such techniques that can become traditions. Those search- 
ing for evidence of institutionalization turn inevitably to the 
policy committees. 
31 New York Times, Jan. 30, 1957, p. 10. 
At the outset, the conclusion is inescapable that the policy 
committees are misnamed. They have never been "policy" 
bodies, in the sense of considering and investigating alter- 
natives of public policy, and they have never put forth an 
overall congressional party program.-HUGH A. BONE 
THE POLICY COMMITTEES 
THE POLICY COMMITTEE AND THE CAUCUS ( O R  CONFERENCE) 
of all members are the organs through which party leadership 
has been institutionalized in the Senate. The Democratic Con- 
ference has rarely met in recent years, while the Republican 
Conference has, in effect, become merged with the Policy Com- 
mittee. Consequently, we can focus attention on the policy com- 
mittees, created by the Senate in 1947 after the House had de- 
leted a provision for committees in both branches from the 1946 
Legislative Reorganization Act. Though the committees have 
a statutory base and have staffs financed by the federal budget, 
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they are not uniform in size, functions, or philosophy. There 
have always been fundamental dfierences between the Repub- 
lican and Democratic committees, and further differences are 
occasioned by the leaders' tactics and by the contrast between 
committees of the administration and opposition parties.' 
The policy committee represents only a limited institutional- 
ization of party leadership. It is largely a creature of its chair- 
man, who decides how often it will meet, how broad its func- 
tions will be, and how extensively it will be used as an instru- 
ment of leadership. A strong leader may use it to further his 
purposes or may scorn it as a restriction on his freedom. A weak 
leader may rely on the committee for assistance without being 
skillful or powerful enough to make maximum use of it. Since 
the chairman of the Democratic Policy Committee is also the 
floor leader, he has greater opportunity but perhaps less in- 
centive than the Republican chairman to make it into a strong 
institution. Democratic chairmen have been particularly sen- 
sitive to the danger that the committee might become a strong 
enough institution to limit their independence. Republican lead- 
ership posts are divided among several senators. During the 
Truman administration, Senator Taft chose to serve as chairman 
of the Policy Committee; he was influential enough to over- 
shadow the successive floor leaders while developing the poten- 
tial of the committee. His successors as chairman have been 
less prominent than the floor leader and have failed to make the 
- 
committee a tool of personal leadership-in part because of the 
different requirements of an administration party. 
As Taft said, when he resigned as chairman of the Policy 
Committee in 1953, "When our party controls the White House, 
most of the Republican policy is made there anyh~w."~  The 
policy committee, like the floor leader, may find some difficulty 
in retaining the confidence of both the President and the ad- 
ministration party in the Senate. I t  can function most effectively 
in a liaison capacity to overcome the differences between the two. 
1 The most comprehensive study of the committees to date is Hugh A. Bone, "An 
Introduction to the Senate Policy Committees," American Political Science Review, 
L (June, 1956), 339-59. Bone describes the service and research functions of 
the committees' staffs in addition to discussing the policy and liaison functions 
dealt with in the present chapter. The research functions, particularly of the 
Republican Committee staff, have continued to grow. 
2 White, The Taft Story, p. 215. 
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When the party is in opposition, the committee has greater 
independence and more opportunity to formulate policy. This 
opportunity is limited, however, by the frequent divisions in 
the party and the lack of means to impose discipline on even a 
small minority of senators. 
Whether representing the administration or opposition party, 
the policy committees have never sought to formulate an over- 
all legislative policy, have seldom taken formal public stands on 
issues, and have played no disciplinary role. As a consequence 
they have not become the vehicle that many political scientists 
consider necessary to increase party unity, center responsibility, 
and bridge the gap between the President and his party in the 
Senate, partly because they have never included the chairmen 
or ranking minority members of all the standing committees. 
Moreover, they have seldom met with House leaders and almost 
never with the President to coordinate legislative plans. The 
major reason that the policy committees have never fulfilled 
the political scientists' ambitious expectations as instruments of 
party responsibility is that the senators-leaders and the rank- 
and-file-have never shared these expectations. The senators 
have not been willing to give the committees a chance to make 
any major change in the tradition of individualism and the 
multicentered power structure that characterize the upper 
chamber. While the committees have never been truly "policy" 
bodies, still they have had an impact on the formation of policy 
in the Senate.3 
SENATOR TAFT AND THE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE 
From 1947 through 1952, as William S. White has said, "It be- 
came, and pretty correctly so, the custom to consider Taft as 
the policy ~ommittee."~ Taft was largely responsible for develop- 
3 Much of the information on the policy committees in this chapter is based 
on interviews with senators and several staff members of the committees. These 
sources are not cited individually in footnotes. Although the minutes of the 
policy committees and caucuses are not open to scholars, Republican staff mem- 
bers checked the files to determine whether either group had discussed certain 
foreign policy issues of interest to the writer and also made available r6surnbs of 
the 1953 and 1954 policy committee meetings, which were prepared for distri- 
bution to all Republican senators. 
4 White, The Taft Stay, p. 61. 
THE POLICY COMMITTEES 87 
ing the committee into an institution of some significance more 
quickly than the Democrats developed their counterpart. When 
the Republicans gained a Senate majority in 1947, Taft recog- 
nized that the party needed an organized program with which 
to confront the Truman administration. He decided that the 
Policy Committee could provide the leadership and staff to 
achieve this goal.5 Taft frequently dominated the committee 
by sheer intellectual weight. Appearing at a meeting armed with 
detailed reports on pending legislation, he would solicit opin- 
ions of the membership and then frequently win support for his 
views because he alone was thoroughly familiar with the facts. 
Moreover, a majority of the senators on the committee were 
conservatives, like Taft, although liberal elements in 1949 suc- 
ceeded in having the committee enlarged and thereby secured 
a better reflection of their views.' 
Taft's influence over the Policy Committee was least, particu- 
larly in the early years, in the field of foreign policy. Acknowl- 
edging Arthur Vandenberg's preeminence in this field, Taft fre- 
quently invited him to discuss foreign policy with the commit- 
tee.7 Vandenberg used the committee effectively as a forum 
in which to explain the administration's proposals and his own 
views on international affairs. The group was particularly rep- 
resentative of those Republicans (like Taft) who were cautious 
about Truman's foreign programs but were open to persuasion. 
Vandenberg also used the Republican Conference as a broader 
forum for presenting his views. 
Vandenberg's meetings with the Policy Committee and Re- 
publican Conference may have helped to generate support for 
the foreign aid programs of 1947 and 1948, but these groups 
took no formal stand on the issues. The Policy Committee was 
divided and silent on the North Atlantic Treaty, though Senator 
5 Bone, p. 356. The Policy Committee replaced an informal steering committee, 
which Senator Taft, as chairman, had already used for several years as a device 
for tactical and policy planning. It is described in Organization of Congress, 
Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, pursuant 
to H. Con. Res. 18, 79th Cong., 1st sess., p. 361. 
6 The Committee had five ex officio members: the chairman and the secretary 
of the Conference, the floor leader, the whip, and the chairman of the Policy 
Committee. The elected members increased from four in 1947 to six in 1949. 
7 Vandenberg was often a guest at meetings in 1947 and 1948; the next two 
years he was a member, although unable to attend after 1949 because of illness. 
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Wherry sought in vain to have it take a stand against ratifica- 
tion. Taft announced that the committee was skeptical of the 
1949 military assistance bill and hoped it could be financed from 
the existing military budget. In this case, the skepticism was 
shared by Vandenberg. 
After Vandenberg's retirement, Taft played a larger role in 
foreign policy and consequently used the Policy Committee in- 
creasingly as a vehicle to organize Republican opposition to some 
of the administration's foreign programs. Often the Republicans 
needed little urging from Taft or the committee to attack the 
administration, but the committee's recommendations appear to 
have facilitated a more unified party stand. A good example 
is the Point Four measure, which reached the Senate in 1950. 
Two members of the Policy Committee, Eugene D. Millikin and 
Leverett Saltonstall, introduced a substitute plan for a com- 
mission to study assistance for underdeveloped-areas. The plan, 
apparently endorsed by the Policy Committee and explained at 
a meeting of the Conference, received all but five Republican 
votes on the Senate floor. After the substitute was defeated, only 
eight Republicans voted for the Point Four bill. When a con- 
ference committee added new provisions to the measure, Taft 
pointed out in criticism that these had never been discussed in 
the Policy Committee-an indication of the importance he at- 
tached to the committee's consideration of major measures. The 
Policy Committee then discussed the new version of Point Four- 
after it had passed.' 
There are other examples of the Policy Committee's making 
recommendations on foreign aid that gained nearly unanimous 
party support. In 1951 its decision to oppose any restoration of 
cuts made by the Foreign Relations and the Armed Services 
committees was backed by all but one Republican in the floor 
vote. A discussion in the Policy Committee of a jurisdictional 
dispute over the 1952 foreign aid bill apparently led to a Re- 
publican vote of 37-2 in favor of letting the Armed Services 
8 Congressional Record, May 25, 1950, pp. 7714-16. Another occasion on which 
Taft complained that there had not been an opportunity for discussion in the 
Republican Policy Committee was in June, 1950, when congressional leaders were 
notified of the President's decision to send forces to Korea. Ibid., June 28, 1950, 
p. 9320. (All references to the Congressional Record are to the bound volumes.) 
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Committee consider the bill after the Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee had reported it. The members of the committee usually 
took a stand only when they judged there to be a strong con- 
sensus of opinion among their Republican colleagues; their 
decision appears to have caused a further closing of the ranks 
and usually a nearly unanimous vote. Occasionally the com- 
mittee misjudged Republican views; often it avoided any stand 
because of a belief that at least a sizable Republican minority 
did not accept Taft's judgment on foreign aid. 
During the controversy over the dismissal of General Douglas 
MacArthur in 1951, the Republican Policy Committee and Con- 
ference served to focus and publicize the virtually unanimous 
demands of the party for a sweeping congressional investigation 
of American policy in the Far East. The Conference, meeting 
first, unanimously recommended a full-scale investigation and 
delegated to the Policy Committee the task of drawing up an 
appropriate resolution. The Policy Committee proposed a some- 
what more comprehensive investigation than the Democratic 
majority decided on. The Republicans sought in vain to include 
a House committee in the investigation or to add the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, which included two Republican 
leaders-Kenneth S. Wherry and Homer Ferguson. The Policy 
Committee also urged that the investigation be carried out 
through open hearings. The Democratic majority of the joint 
standing committee ignored the demand for expansion, how- 
ever, and also voted for closed hearings, though it agreed to the 
Republican demand that other senators might attend as visitors. 
In a series of nearly straight party votes, the Democrats suc- 
ceeded in postponing the secrecy issue for some time on the 
Senate floor and then defeated the proposal for open hearings 
despite its unanimous Republican support. While the Republican 
Policy Committee was unable to force its demands on the 
Democratic Senate leadership, it did intensify the pressure on 
Senator Russell's committee to conduct an impartial and com- 
prehensive investigation. I t  may incidentally have minimized 
the impact of more extreme demands by individual Republicans 
-such as those for President Truman's impeachment. 
The Policy Committee's indecisiveness in the face of strong 
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demands for Dean Acheson's resignation as Secretary of State 
in December, 1950, shows that it may be unable to act even on 
highly partisan issues if there is a substantial amount of dis- 
agreement in the party. Senator Taft convened the committee 
on December 5 to determine whether there should be a formal 
party endorsement of these demands, and Senator Irving M. 
Ives was assigned to draw up a resolution calling for Acheson's 
resignation. At a second meeting two days later, the committee 
was so divided on the question that it turned the burden of deci- 
sion over to the Conference. While the senators hesitated, on 
December 15 the House Republican Conference almost unani- 
mously supported a resolution calling for Acheson's resignation. 
Later in the day, the Senate Conference adopted the resolution 
by a vote of 23-5 but added Taft's amendment pledging full co- 
operation with the administration. One member of the Policy 
Committee, Senator Margaret Chase Smith, was among the five 
dissenters. 
During the 1951 controversy over sending troops to Europe, 
the Policy Committee was too divided to take a stand on Sen- 
ator Wherry's resolution providing that no ground troops should 
be assigned to NATO until Congress established a policy on the 
question. The committee was able to engage in tactical plan- 
ning designed to assure that Congress had the maximum op- 
portunity to consider the problem and express its views. Senator 
Taft announced that the Republicans might agree to send 
Wherry's resolution to the Foreign Relations Committee if there 
were assurance that some resolution would be reported. The 
Policy Committee debated the issue further both during and 
immediately after consideration of Senator Tom Connally's reso- 
lution by the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees. 
I t  discussed without any apparent agreement a compromise 
clause drafted by the two standing committees to require con- 
gressional approval for the future assignment of troops abroad. 
The Policy Committee did decide to seek consideration of a 
concurrent resolution immediately after passage of the Senate 
resolution. Only two of the Republicans who voted against a 
concurrent resolution in the Senate wanted to prevent House 
action that might further curb the President; the other seven 
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Republican opponents disapproved the sending of troops in 
principle.' 
THE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE DURTNG 
THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION 
The election of a Republican President for the first time in twenty 
years after a divisive contest for the nomination presented the 
party in the Senate, dominated by the Taft wing, with a serious 
challenge involving the maintenance of unity. Without sacri- 
ficing their own viewpoints, the Republican senators wanted to 
minimize friction with the Republican administration. One of 
the important devices for maintaining cooperation with Presi- 
dent Eisenhower was a regular report to the Policy Committee 
by the Republican Senate leaders, usually on the day of their 
weekly meeting with the President. While this improvement in 
the channels of communication did not guarantee that Repub- 
lican senators would agree with the President, it increased the 
- 
possibilities of closer understanding, better information, and 
agreement. A meeting between the Policy Committee itself and 
the President, as advocated in the past, occurred only once, but 
the committee met occasionally with Vice President Nixon or 
with cabinet members. 
The changing functions of the Republican Policy Committee 
led to pressure for its expansion. In 1953 Senator Homer E. 
Capehart urged unsuccessfully that the committee be reorganized 
to include all committee chairmen as well as the formal party 
- 
leaders. This change would have been in keeping with many 
of the proposals of political scientists concerning policy com- 
mittees. At the time, however, the proposal was viewed as a 
challenge to the Republican Senate leadership and a potential 
obstacle to close liaison between the Policy Committee and the 
9 Senator Taft, who stood in the center of his party during the troons contro- 
versy, favored sendinq four divisions under a joint resolution that would bind the 
President to consult Congress before sending any additional forces. Four members 
of the committee (Eugene D. Millikin, Milton R. Young, Owen Brewster, and 
Edward Martin) voted with Taft. Two members (Kenneth S. Wherry and Homer 
Ferguson) opposed sending troops, while four others (Leverett Saltonstall, H. 
Alexander Smith, Edward J. Thye, and William F .  Knowland) opposed such 
rigid restrictions on the President. CQA, 1951, pp. 257-58. 
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White House. In 1955 the Committee was increased from twelve 
to twenty-three members to make it more representative, and all 
Republicans facing reelection were made committee members in 
order to give them added prestige. In 1957 the committee was 
cut to fourteen members, eight ex officio and six elected.1° 
The most important change in the committee's procedures 
occurred in 1956, when all Republican senators were invited to 
attend its meetings. This practice continued throughout the 
Eisenhower administration. The new plan was inaugurated in 
response to the demands of rank-and-file Senators, particularly 
the more liberal ones, for a chance to hear the reports of the 
leaders' meetings with the President. In practice, while attend- 
ance was not complete and varied with the issues under con- 
sideration, a sizable majority of Republican senators generally 
were present-including most of the ranking members of stand- 
ing committees. 
This innovation in procedure was indicative of the committee's 
changed functions during the Eisenhower administration. Re- 
publican policy was now made in the White House, and in the 
absence of any Republican senatorial leader frequently able and 
willing to challenge the President, the Policy Committee did 
not seek to compete.ll The senators learned what the President 
wanted and what arguments he was presenting to defend his 
position; they discussed the issues, often extensively enough to 
give the leaders a consensus of opinion; they sometimes voted 
informally; but they avoided formal stands for or against meas- 
ures or amendments. On some occasions when there were serious 
divisions among Republican senators or major differences be- 
tween them and the White House, the Policy Committee sought 
to facilitate formation of a compromise. 
In practice the Republican Policy Committee appeared to have 
taken over the functions of the Conference. During most of the 
1956 session, the Conference did not hold meetings.12 There- 
10 The three new ex officio members are the chairmen of the party's Campaign 
Committee, Committee on Committees, and Personnel Committee. In March, 
1953, the Republicans decided to make the President pro tem of the Senate, 
when a Republican, also an ex officio member. 
11 Knowland served as chairman of the Policy Committee until July, 1953, 
when he became floor leader upon Taft's death. H e  was succeeded by Homer 
Ferguson, who served through 1954 and was succeeded by Styles Bridges. 
12 This was due in part to Conference Chairman Eugene D. Millikin's illness. 
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after the Conference met occasionally, and while it seemed to 
have a slightly more formal status than the Policy Committee, 
there was little practical distinction between the two bodies. 
Since the Policy Committee had been opened to all Republican 
senators and had duplicated the Conference, a new group with 
smaller membership became necessary to perform the tactical 
functions of the Policy Committee. I t  frequently became the 
practice, after important legislation was discussed in an open 
meeting of the committee, for a closed meeting to be held to 
plan floor tactics such as the introduction of amendments and 
the schedule of speakers. These informal meetings were gen- 
erally attended by the top party leaders, those other members 
of the Policy Committee most interested in the bill, and a few 
other Republican senators particularly concerned with the meas- 
ure-for example, members of the standing committee that had 
reported it. 
The Policy Committee's role as an agent of compromise is 
well illustrated by its handling of the Bricker amendment, which 
was a center of controversy in 1953 and early 1954. The com- 
mittee played an important part in the long and patient efforts 
of Republican Senate leaders-notably William F. Knowland- 
to negotiate a compromise between the Bricker forces and the 
administration. Although only a small group of Re~ublican 
leaders conducted the negotiations, the committee often dis- 
cussed the question, offered some suggestions for a compromise, 
served as a forum for the negotiations on occasion, and was con- 
stantly informed of talks held outside the committee. The 
committee held twelve meetings on the Bricker amendment in 
June and July, 1953. and in January and February, 1954. 
On June 2, 1953, the Republican Conference directed the 
party's leaders to inform the President that sentiment among 
Senate Republicans was favorable to the amendment. This de- 
velopment emphasized the need for steps to prevent a serious 
split in the ranks of Republican senators and between a maiority 
of them and the President. The Policy Committee invited Sen- 
ator John W. Bricker and Attorney General Herbert Brownell 
to discussions, which convinced the committee that further 
negotiations were warranted. As the talks continued, Bricker 
charged that the administration was pressuring the Policy Com- 
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mittee to delay his amendment. At a three-hour meeting on 
July 21, attended by Bricker, Brownell, and Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles, a major attempt was made to reach agree- 
ment. A compromise was offered that appears to have been 
partially based on the committee's suggestions and that had the 
administration's support, but it was rejected by Bricker. With 
the negotiations stalemated, the Policy Committee ~ostponed 
action until the next session of Congress. In January, 1954, the 
Policy Committee agreed to give the Bricker amendment high 
priority instead of sidetracking it but decided to take no stand 
on the issue. The committee was kept regularly informed of 
the negotiations with Senator Bricker that continued without 
success, 
Two provisions of the compromise plan which was drafted 
under committee auspices in July, 1953, came to a vote in the 
Senate in February, 1954, and gained nearly unanimous Re- 
publican approval; no members of the Policy Committee opposed 
them. The members of the committee were badly divided, how- 
ever, on whether or not to add more restrictive provisions to 
the compromise. When Senator Walter F. George proposed a 
substitute that required an act of Congress to make executive 
agreements effective as internal law, a substitute opposed by the 
administration, half of the Policy Committee members and al- 
most two-thirds of the Republican senators voted for it. It is 
interesting that only three senators voted against the George 
substitute but for the final constitutional amendment as revised 
by George: William F. Knowland, Eugene D. Millikin, and 
Robert C. Hendrickson, all members of the Republican Policy 
Committee. They evidently felt committed to the Republican 
compromise instead of the George substitute but wanted some 
type of constitutional amendment to pass. The effect of the 
Policy Committee's actions was to increase the pressure on the 
administration to seek a compromise. The committee was un- 
able, however, to devise or promote a compromise on which 
most Republicans could agree. Some Republicans wanted no 
amendment, while a larger number wanted a more far-reaching 
one. 
Another measure on which the Policy Committee sought- 
with more success-to close the gap between the administration 
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and Republican senators was the Status of Forces Treaty, which 
defined the legal position of American military forces stationed 
in Europe. In May, 1953, the Policy Committee postponed action 
on the treaty, apparently in response to the opposition of a num- 
ber of Republicans. The next month it persuaded the Foreign 
Relations Committee to give Senator John Bricker a hearing on 
a reservation providing for exclusive American jurisdiction in 
all cases involving American military personnel accused of com- 
mitting criminal offenses abroad. Senator Knowland discussed 
with the Policy Committee a compromise finally adopted by the 
Foreign Relations Committee, an interpretation designed to re- 
move certain objections to the treaty without undermining it. 
In July the Policy Committee, apparently acting under pressure 
from the administration, agreed to schedule prompt senatorial 
consideration of the treaty. 
The Policy Committee took a stand directly contrary to the 
administration's on another controversial issue, the Yalta reso- 
lution. After the Foreign Relations Committee by a straight 
party vote had added an amendment proposed by Senator Taft 
that had the effect of challenging the validity of wartime agree- 
ments, the Policy Committee unanimously supported the Taft 
version despite the known objections of President Eisenhower. 
As the Eisenhower administration progressed, there were fewer 
examples of serious differences on foreign policy between the 
administration and Republican senators. The Policy Committee 
frequently discussed foreign aid and reciprocal trade, the issues 
most often reaching the Senate, but its activities were little 
publicized and were much less extensive than during the Bricker 
amendment controversy. The early success of the Policy Com- 
mittee as a liaison agent was apparently one reason why the 
chasm to be bridged grew steadily less deep. During the first 
year of Eisenhower's term, when Republican differences on 
foreign aid were greatest, the Policy Committee held several 
discussions on the issue. One of the most important functions of 
the Policy Committee, particularly after all Republicans were 
invited to attend meetings, was to hear and discuss the Presi- 
dent's requests and proposals relayed by congressional leaders 
who attended the weekly White House meetings. Since foreign 
aid was an issue on which President Eisenhower's views were 
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strong and consistent, it seems probable that he used this channel 
effectively to impress on both Republican leaders and rank-and- 
file senators the need for large-scale aid programs. 
The experience of the Republican Policy Committee during 
both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations suggests that 
this instrument must be flexible if it is to be at all effective, given 
its limitations. The committee is certain to reflect the personality, 
operating methods, and political strength of its chairman and 
perhaps other Republican leaders. Though it is more formal and 
in a sense more institutionalized than its Democratic counterpart, 
it is still difficult to conceive of the committee acting independ- 
ently of its chairman or serving functions not initiated by him. 
Since the Policy Committee and the Republican leadership lack 
the sanctions necessary to compel party unity, the committee's 
most useful function during a Republican administration would 
seem to be that of compromise and communication with the 
White House. On the occasions when Senator Knowland as 
floor leader or Senator Bridges as chairman disagreed with aspects 
of the President's foreign programs, there is no evidence that 
they sought to induce the Policy Committee to endorse their 
views. On the other hand, the Policy Committee did not for- 
mally take the President's side in these disputes. During the Eisen- 
hower administration the Policy Committee largely avoided 
taking public stands, particularly on issues dividing the party. 
The Policy Committee under Taft from 1947 through 1952 came 
closer to being a policy body than it has been since or than the 
Democratic Policy Committee has ever been. The primary in- 
gredient necessary for such a recipe of action was a chairman 
determined to use the committee as a tool for translating his own 
policies into Republican policies. He succeeded only when a 
second ingredient was present: a high degree of Republican 
agreement, at least in general terms, on the issue at stake. 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMMITTEE 
"The Democratic Policy Committee will meet-perhaps-once a 
week, and when it does the thing seems simply to happen and 
members will stroll in, usually late, with the air of a man drop- 
ping into another's office to have a drink and, having nothing 
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better to do at the moment, to pass the time of day."13 William 
S. White's graphic description highlights an important aspect of 
the Democratic Policy Committee: It lacks the formality and 
institutionalization that have characterized the Republican Policy 
Committee. The Democratic committee is smaller and more 
wary of publicity; it has a smaller professional staff, which is 
less concerned with producing political studies. As Professor 
Bone has pointed out, the Democratic Senate leadership is more 
experienced, contains more "old pros," has led a majority for 
most of the last quarter century, and therefore has preferred to 
rely on proven techniques to guide the party rather than to de- 
velop a highly institutionalized Policy Committee.14 
While both policy committees are creatures of their chairmen, 
this seems especially true of the Democratic one. The slowness 
with which the Democratic Policy Committee developed after 
its establishment in 1947 resulted largely from Alben Barkley's 
belief that it would inhibit his leadership rather than become a 
valuable tool. Scott Lucas and Ernest McFarland held meetings 
more regularly, partly in an effort to strengthen their sometimes 
precarious leadership in the Senate; neither dominated the com- 
mittee in the sense that Senator Taft dominated the Republican 
committee. Lyndon Johnson reshaped the Policy Committee to 
make it part of his farflung empire. 
The Democratic Policy Committee has generally consisted of 
nine members: the floor leader (who serves as chairman), the 
deputy leader, the Conference secretary, and six others chosen 
by the floor leader.15 The members serve on the committee as 
long as they are in the Senate, instead of rotating as do the 
senators on the Republican committee. As a result, its members 
- 
are usually men with long experience in the Senate, who have 
gained the respect of their colleagues. In 1960 the committee 
contained five of the eight Democrats with the longest seniority 
in the Senate. When Senator Barkley first chose the Policy Com- 
mittee in 1947, however, he deliberately omitted some of the 
older party leaders and committee chairmen, who would be dif- 
ficult to control. He set a precedent followed by successors of 
13 White, Citadel, p. 210. 
14 Bone, pp. 356-58. 
15 Since 1959 the Calendar Committee has met with the Democratic Policy 
Committee. 
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picking only those men who suited his choice.16 From 1953 
through 1960, eight of the nine members came from the South, 
the Border States, or the Mountain States; Theodore Francis 
Green of Rhode Island was the only member from the industrial 
section of the country. Because of its smaller size, lack of ro- 
tation, and geographic imbalance, the committee has been much 
less representative than the Republican one. Its membership has 
included liberal or centrist senators from these more conservative 
sections of the party, however, giving the committee a member- 
ship corresponding rather closely to the centers of power and 
influence in the Senate Democratic party.'? 
The student who tries to extract the Democratic Policy 
Committee's ground rules and list them in precise and orderly 
fashion runs the risk of distorting the true picture. The Demo- 
cratic leaders have adapted the institution to fit their needs 
under changing conditions and to fit the rather aristocratic tra- 
ditions of the party in the Senate. This aristocratic pattern has 
been heightened by the scarcity of caucuses. During the Truman 
administration, caucuses were seldom held, and during the 
Eisenhower administration, an annual cacus for organizational 
purposes became the rule. Both the limited size and functions 
of the Policy Committee and the absence of caucuses became the 
targets of liberal Democratic critics late in the Eisenhower ad- 
ministration. 
During the Truman administration the Democratic Policy 
Committee did not fulfill the role of a liaison body with the 
President. Truman met with the committee only once, in Jan- 
uary, 1951, in that case seeking to heal the wounds left by the 
struggle over Ernest McFarland's election as majority leader. 
Although the Democratic leaders did not regularly brief the 
Policy Committee on their meetings with President Truman, 
Senator McFarland occasionally made such a formal report. 
More often, he would mention the President's views while dis- 
IsRalph K. Huitt, "Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate," American 
Political Science Reuiew, LV ( 1961), 341-42. 
17 Lister Hill, Richard B. Russell, and (until his retirement in 1960) Theodore 
Francis Green have served on the committee since its origin in 1947. Lyndon B. 
Johnson and Robert S. Kerr joined in 1951. Thomas C. Hennings and James E. 
Murray served from 1953 to 1960. Carl Hayden joined in 1955 and Mike Mans- 
field in 1957. 
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cussing issues. He occasionally invited cabinet members or other 
government officials to the meetings. The liaison function may 
have been less necessary, at least in foreign policy matters, be- 
cause of the wider measure of agreement between the admini- 
stration and administration senators than Eisenhower subse- 
quently enjoyed. 
During 1947 and 1948 Senator Barkley did not hold regular 
sessions of the Policy Committee, partly because, as minority 
leader, he had no responsibility for scheduling legislation. The 
committee did consider the Greek-Turkish aid program and 
probably took the decision to schedule one of the rare party 
caucuses to permit discussion of the issue. The caucus, at which 
no vote was taken, revealed widespread support for the measure. 
The Policy Committee took the unusual step of endorsing the 
interim foreign aid bill preceding enactment of the Marshall 
Plan and at the same time complimented the Republicans on 
their cooperation. When the Marshall Plan itself came before 
the Senate, Barkley avoided any endorsement by the committee 
because, as he told the press, it was "a bipartisan matter and we 
didn't want to give it a partisan tinge."ls This attitude may have 
caused Barkley and perhaps his successors to avoid endorsement 
by the committee of certain other foreign programs. Any type 
of formal party endorsement does carry the risk of alienating the 
support of the other party and undermining the bipartisanship 
so often necessary to enact foreign policy legislation. 
From 1949 through 1952, while Senators Lucas and McFarland 
served successively as majority leaders, the Policy Committee 
met nearly every week. Since the party had a majority in the 
Senate, the Policy Committee asumed its role of advising the 
leader on the scheduling of legislation. This has become a 
function of the Democratic Committee more often than of the 
Republican one because of the usual Democratic majorities in 
the Senate. Though the Policy Committee has seldom adopted 
the House Rules Committee's practice of blocking important 
pieces of legislation, the priorities assigned to bills may be a 
matter of great consequence. In 1950, for example, the Policy 
Committee acceded to the President's request to postpone the 
18New York Times, Feb. 5, 1948, pp. 1, 12. 
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contentious civil rights program until passage of the foreign aid 
bills. The previous year the question of priority had been re- 
ferred to a caucus, and the Democrats had overruled Lucas by 
deciding to postpone a reciprocal trade bill until after an attempt 
had been made to revise the cloture rule, an attempt which led 
to a filibuster. Both Lucas and McFarland appear to have been 
guided considerably by the committee's advice in scheduling 
legislation. Since there was wide recognition among Democrats 
that the administration's foreign programs must be adopted, 
there was a minimum of controversy over scheduling these meas- 
ures. On one occasion, in 1949, the Policy Committee settled a 
jurisdictional dispute over the military assistance bill by recom- 
mending that both the Foreign Relations and Armed Services 
committees consider it. 
Lucas and McFarland relied heavily on the Policy Committee 
for tactical planning. This often involved seeking the members' 
judgment on senatorial sentiment and the prospects for passing 
administration measures without change. In 1949, for example, 
the committee agreed to accept certain cuts in foreign aid in 
order to concentrate on defeating various crippling amendments. 
The next year the committee unanimously concluded that there 
were enough votes to pass an amendment to the aid bill granting 
Spain a loan of $100 million despite the administration's op- 
position. The committee supported Lucas' compromise proposal 
to grant the loan from funds over and above those already sched- 
uled for European aid. During McFarland's term the Policy 
Committee discussed foreign aid bills that were still being con- 
sidered by the Foreign Relations or Appropriations committees 
and often gave those committees an estimate of the total amount 
likely to gain senatorial approval. After the bill had been re- 
ported, the Policy Committee would decide on the total which 
could be sought on the Senate floor without risk of defeat. The 
Policy Committee handled strategy during the troops-for-Europe 
controversy. It agreed to let the Senate debate the question, to 
send the restrictive Wherry resolution to a standing committee, 
and there to substitute the Connally resolution, which was un- 
restrictive and advisory. It also decided to give the Connally 
resolution highest priority on the Senate floor. The Policy Com- 
mittee was able to plan tactics on these issues because its mem- 
THE POLICY COMMITTBES 101 
bers and the Democratic senators as a whole were largely in 
agreement. Presumably the members could gauge the views of 
their senatorial colleagues better than the floor leader could 
alone; consequently the Policy Committee seems to have served 
a useful purpose during this period and contributed to the sub- 
stantial Democratic majorities in support of the Truman program. 
Under Lucas and McFarland the Policy Committee seldom 
took formal votes or announced a public stand on an issue. The 
tactical decisions, sometimes revealed in the press, served as a 
partial substitute. On several occasions the Democratic Policy 
Committee or the caucus served a more political purpose of 
countering Republican attacks on the administration's foreign 
policy. In response to Republican demands that the admini- 
stration commit this country to the defense of Formosa, a Demo- 
cratic caucus was convened in January, 1950, to demonstrate 
support for the President. While no public pronouncement was 
issued, Senator Lucas announced that the consensus of the 
caucus had been to support fully the President's policy of non- 
intervention in Formosa. It was the Policy Committee that de- 
cided, with caucus approval, that Senator Joseph McCarthy's 
charges of Communist infiltration of the State Department should 
be investigated by a subcommittee of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, the Democratic members of which should be those 
also on the Policy Committee.19 During the dispute over the 
MacArthur hearings in 1951, the Policy Committee planned 
tactics to counter the Republican demands for a joint Senate- 
House committee investigation. The Democratic Policy Com- 
mittee's activities with regard to these most highly partisan 
questions were primarily tactical but implied united support for 
the President. In the absence of this unity, tactical planning 
would have been impossible. 
LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMMITTEE 
The Democratic Policy Committee changed less in 1953 when it 
became the organ of the opposition party than its Republican 
counterpart did at the beginning of the Eisenhower administra- 
tion. It continued to be a body concerned with tactics and the 
19 Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, p. 374. 
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measuring of Democratic sentiment. Though Lyndon Johnson 
could have used the committee to formulate a Democratic pro- 
gram, he chose instead to make it an agent of compromise to 
assist him in discovering which policies could win maximum sup- 
port in the party and in winning votes for such policies. Unlike 
Taft, Johnson rarely announced the committee's stand on an 
issue. One exception was in 1953, when the Policy Committee 
formally and publicly endorsed President Eisenhower's resolution 
on the Yalta agreements and, thereby, accentuated the admini- 
stration's differences with Republican senators seeking to revise 
the resolution. During the debate over the Middle East reso- 
lution, when Johnson was beginning to assume an increased role 
in international affairs, he gained unanimous public endorsement 
by the Policy Committee of a letter he had sent to the Secretary 
of State urging that this country oppose the imposition of U.N. 
economic sanctions on Israel. These were exceptions, however, 
to a Johnson policy of avoiding public stands by the committee. 
During the last six years of the Eisenhower administration, 
Democratic control of the Senate meant responsibility for sched- 
uling legislation. As in the past, the committee refrained from 
using its authority to keep legislation from reaching the floor, 
though in the closing days of a session it did have to choose 
which bills could be considered before adjournment. This latter 
situation, incidentally, was the only occasion on which votes 
were normally taken in the Policy Committee. Though it is dif- 
ficult for the outsider to draw conclusions, Johnson appears to 
have assumed greater responsibility than his predecessors for 
scheduling legislation and to have given the committee a smaller 
role than before. 
Senator Johnson exercised an authority over the Democratic 
Policy Committee equivalent to that of Taft over the Republican 
committee. He seldom used it to gain endorsement for a pro- 
gram, as Taft did, largely because Johnson was not often com- 
mitted to specific policies. Johnson was also particularly con- 
scious of the risk that bipartisan support might be lost through 
endorsement of a measure by the Policy Committee. Under 
Johnson, the Policy Committee held formal meetings nearly every 
week, but he frequently convened it informally or contacted its 
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members individually for advice. The committee sometimes 
prepared compromises itself or mediated differences among other 
Democratic senators. 
The Policy Committee's usefulness for Lyndon Johnson's pur- 
poses depended, of course, on the degree of unity in the party. 
The committee could not be expected to devise a compromise 
- 
on civil rights, for example, acceptable to members with views 
as divergent as those of Thomas C. Hennings and Richard B. 
Russell. Though a large majority of the members favored the 
administration's aid and trade policies, Senator Russell became a 
bitter opponent of both. The controversy over the Bricker amend- 
ment illustrated both the committee's potentialities for fostering 
compromise and its limitations. The committee discussed the 
issue at considerable length and appears to have played a role 
in the genesis of Senator George's compromise, but it was too 
sharply divided on the plan for formal endorsement. Four mem- 
bers opposed any amendment, four favored the George amend- 
ment, and one-Senator Russell-was a vigorous supporter of the 
original Bricker amendment.20 
Lyndon Johnson adapted the Policy Committee to serve his 
purposes as ~emocra t ic  leader. ~ i k e  his staff, the committee 
- - 
was a useful tool in developing Democratic support for Johnson's 
~ompromises.~~ A more formal Policy Committee issuing official 
party pronouncements might have been less valuable to Johnson 
or even a handicap. Yet by becoming merely a part of the 
Johnson organization, the Policy Committee failed to develop as 
a Democratic institution in the Senate comparable in stature to 
the Republican committee. Johnson's tactics, in fact, seemed 
deliberately designed to avoid such institutionalization. Johnson, 
like Alben Barkley before him, seemed to fear that the Policy 
Committee might become a threat to his authority as floor leader. 
The proper role of the Policy Committee-as well as the Con- 
20 In 1955, when Johnson was seeking to convince the administration that the 
reciprocal trade program needed modification if it were to pass Congress, he held 
two meetings of the Policy Committee, after both of which he reported the com- 
mittee's judgment that there was substantial pressure in the Senate for changes 
in the bill. - 
- 
21 AS Bone, p. 344, has pointed out: "In Democratic circles on the Hill the 
Democratic Policy Committee is often spoken of as the 'personal staff of Senator 
Johnson.' " 
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ference-was called into question in 1960 by those liberal Demo- 
crats who tried to make Johnson more responsible to the sena- 
torial party. 
PROPOSALS FOR REVISING THE 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY MACHINERY 
The liberal Democrats who challenged Johnson's leadership un- 
successfully during the 1960 session believed that in a period of 
huge Democratic majorities in Congress, Johnson was making too 
many compromises in an effort to maintain party unity and avoid 
vetoes. The differences centered on domestic rather than foreign 
issues, but the implications of the controversy for party leader- 
ship are significant enough to deserve consideration here. The 
liberal Democrats were trying to eliminate a situation where, in 
Senator William Proxmire's words, "the initiative as well as the 
final decision is almost always resolved by the majority leader 
himself on the basis of his own judgment of what is desirable and 
what is p~ssible."'~ There is a contradiction between the re- 
sponsibility of the party leader to the party and the desire of 
liberal Democrats to see the party take a more definite stand on 
issues. Greater party democracy might lead to party disunity; 
and a divided party is in no position to take a clear and forceful 
public stand on any issue. 
The liberals were not agreed on whether their objectives could 
be better sought through reviving the conference or revitalizing 
the Policy Committee. Early in January, when a group of liberals 
succeeded in generating considerable support at a Democratic 
caucus for regularly scheduled conference meetings, Johnson 
headed off the challenge by promising to hold them whenever 
any senator requested. A few days later when Senator Albert 
Gore sought to increase the membership and functions of the 
Policy Committee, he was defeated by a 51-12 vote in the con- 
ference. 
Senator Gore wanted the Policy Committee to be given re- 
sponsibility for formulating an overall legislative program, which 
he emphasized was the intention of the LaFollette-Monroney 
committee that first proposed policy committees in 1946. Mike 
22 Congressional Record, March 9, 1959, p. 3559. 
THE POLICY COMMITTEES 105 
Mansfield argued that the Policy Committee could not interfere 
with the functions of standing committees; Proxmire, one of the 
first and most vocal rebels, replied that the Policy Committee 
should provide general guidance to the Democratic members of 
committees. There is no doubt that strengthened policy com- 
mittees would threaten the independence of standing committee 
chairmen as well as party leaders.23 
Gore also sought to make the Policy Committee more repre- 
sentative by increasing its membership from nine to fifteen and 
by having members elected by the conference rather than ap- 
pointed by Johnson. Senator Mansfield has argued that the Policy 
Committee is limited to seven members (plus two ex officio) by 
the original appropriations act establishing the committees; yet 
the Republicans have enlarged their committee on several oc- 
casions, and if legislation is actually needed, it could be easily 
passed.24 Actually an increase in membership is important only 
if the committee's functions are increased. Beginning in 1959, 
Senator Johnson invited the three-man Calendar Committee to 
meet regularly with the Policy Committee, and its members par- 
ticipated in the meetings on an equal footing with regular mem- 
bers. The fact that the three members were all freshman senators 
was proof that the majority leader did not consider the Policy 
Committee an important policy body.25 
The conference is probably a less effective vehicle for creating 
party policy than the Policy Committee. There is considerable 
validity to Senator Mansfield's description of caucuses as "a 
23 A full account of the sporadic Democratic debate on the Policy Committee 
and Conference may be found in the Congressional Record, Feb. 23, 1959, pp. 
2814-21; March 9, 1959, pp. 3559-85. 
24 A letter to the writer from Senator Mansfield, March 24, 1959. Mansfield 
said that only the deputy leader and secretary of the Conference are technically 
ex officio members. They have "advisory functions," while the floor leader serves 
as chairman. 
25 At the start of the 1961 session the Democrats agreed to a compromise plan 
under which the Policy and Steering committee members would be nominated by 
the floor leader and approved by the Conference. The agreement provided that 
the committee should be representative of geography and varying political view- 
points. Liberal Democrats who wanted a voice in filling two vacancies on the 
Policy Committee were critical because Johnson, in a fait accompli, had picked 
Senators John Pastore and Warren Magnuson in June, 1960, to replace Senators 
Green and Murray, who conveniently resigned early. In January, 1961, Senator 
Edmund Muskie was added to the Calendar Review Committee, making it a 
four-man group, and at that time some questions were raised about how large 
a role it should play in the deliberations of the Policy Committee. 
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waste of time." Mike Monroney, an author of the 1946 Legis- 
lative Reorganization Act which led to the establishment of 
policy committees, has pointed out that caucuses in the past 
have more often led to diffusion than unity in party policy. They 
have offered too much opportunity for impassioned oratory and 
bitter debate, which help to heighten party dis~ord. '~ There is 
a constant fear that the substance of discussions will leak to the 
press. The conference is much too large for negotiation and the 
development of party strategy. I t  is one way of informing the 
floor leader about party viewpoints and perhaps even a way of 
putting pressure on the leader, but it is not a method of holding 
the leader responsible to the party. Senator Proxmire has sug- 
gested that the conference vote on major issues, not to bind the 
members but to bind the floor leader. Such a procedure might 
increase the rigidity of party divisions while seriously handi- 
capping the party leader's maneuverability. The conference is 
an unwieldly body, too large and formal for adaptability to the 
changing needs of the party and likely to impose either too little 
or too much control over the party leader~hip.'~ 
THE ROLE OF POLICY COMMITTEES 
The crucial question that must be answered in regard to the 
policy committees is whether they have been able to bring greater 
unity to the parties in the Senate. The policy committees have 
never been able to unite either of the parties on deeply divisive 
issues and have never sought to impose conformity on a minority 
in a party. The greatest doubts about the committees' usefulness 
arise from the suspicion that they can lead only when the party 
is so united that leadership is unnecessary. Professor Truman 
concluded from a study of voting records in the Eighty-first 
Congress that "though the Committee may be providing voting 
cues, this is a minimal function and typically it is mirroring 
26 Huitt, p. 341, has pointed out the risks of a caucus: "Party members fre- 
quently stand together for different reasons, but talking about those reasons 
may open old wounds and drive them apart. Floor debate may do the same, 
but it is not so likely, since many members are usually absent and arguments 
are not made directly to each other." 
27 After Senator Johnson had agreed to schedule caucuses on request, only two 
were held on legislative issues during the 1960 session of Congress. 
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tendencies within the party."28 He found that voting cohesion 
in the committees was about as great as that in the parties, that 
committee members would be in full agreement only when most 
of the party was in agreement, and that "agreement within the 
Committee reflected at least as often as it influenced the co- 
hesion of the party."29 
When a political party is seriously divided on an issue, the 
policy committee probably can play no useful role unless it is 
able to devise or assist in preparing a compromise measure, as 
the Republican Policy Committee nearly succeeded in doing in 
the case of the Bricker amendment. When there is a high level 
of party unity, the policy committee's opportunity is greater; it 
can reinforce this unity by acting as party spokesman and imple- 
ment it by serving as the party's tactician. In the process it may 
change a few votes, and when the political balance in the Senate 
is close, a few votes may be decisive. The record of the two 
policy committees in foreign policy, as reviewed in this chapter, 
shows a number of such examples. When the policy committee, 
recognizing considerable party agreement on an issue, publicly 
or privately endorses a bill or an amendment and nearly all the 
party's senators vote accordingly, it seems likely (though not 
provable) that the committee's action has contributed to party 
unity. Even when the party is split over some aspects of an 
issue, it is possible that the policy committee can engender unity 
on other aspects of it, as the Republican committee did during 
the troops-for-Europe dispute. When it is not trying to overcome 
profound differences in the party, the policy committee can 
change some votes for several reasons: because its members are 
influential in the Senate, because senators usually prefer if pos- 
sible to remain loyal to the party, and because on some occasions 
its actions may fill a vacuum in leadership. 
There remains one vital question with regard to the policy 
committees: Are they to be the instrument of the party or the 
leader? When there are tactical decisions to be made, does the 
leader accept the policy committee's judgment or call upon it 
only to endorse his own views? In the administration party this 
is a less crucial question because serious conflicts over tactics 
28 Truman, The Congressional Party, p. 129. 
29 Ibid. 
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may be referred to the White House. The President's judgment 
on foreign issues will normally carry particular weight with his 
party in the Senate. Though the committee has sometimes sur- 
veyed the views of the Senate and decided that a compromise 
unwelcome to the White House was necessary, the committee 
has never been used by the leadership of an administration party 
to challenge a major feature of the President's foreign program.30 
Controversies over the proper role of the opposition policy 
committee stem from the lack of any clear responsibility for 
leadership of the opposition in the nation as a whole. The effort 
in 1960 to make Senator Johnson more responsible to the Policy 
Committee or the Conference was undertaken by liberals sympa- 
thetic to those national leaders in the party who disputed John- 
son's claim to speak for the party. It is possible that in the 
Senate Republican party, with its formally divided leadership, 
the Policy Committee might be used by its chairman as a weapon 
in a power struggle with the floor leader. This has never hap- 
pened, nor is it likely that the committee would be united in 
support of only one leader in a factional dispute. It would be 
possible to change the rules of the Democratic party, as Senator 
Gore attempted, to make the floor leader responsible to the Policy 
Committee. It is doubtful that the committee could serve ef- 
fectively both as a check on the floor leader and as a vehicle for 
party unity. Successful legislative leadership demands a high 
degree of flexibility and finesse, qualities not likely to be present 
in the collective leadership of a divided party. In Professor Bone's 
judgment, the Democratic Policy Committee has greater potential 
than the Republican one because it is better adapted to the 
system of personal negotiation that characterizes senatorial lead- 
e r ~ h i p . ~ ~  The most intimate observers of the Senate seem to be 
unanimous in emphasizing the importance of personal contacts 
and the difficulty of institutionalizing leadership in the Senate. 
Yet in the last analysis a senatorial leader cannot unite the 
party singlehandedly. To succeed, he must keep in touch with 
the views of fellow senators and also give them a sense of par- 
ticipation in making party decisions. The staff may serve as an 
30 Bone, p. 351, has reported, however, that some Democrats felt the Demo- 
cratic Policy Committee was occasionally used late in the Truman administration 
to strengthen Democratic opposition to certain of the President's domestic policies. 
31 Ibid., p. 357. 
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intelligence system, but the policy committee is better suited to 
serving both functions. A stronger policy committee, for the 
opposition party in particular, could distribute more broadly the 
responsibility for deciding what kinds of compromises are nec- 
essary and desirable. It would be better able than the floor 
leader both to judge what fellow senators would accept and to 
convince them to go along with an agreed position. The policy 
committee's potential for strengthening party unity has yet to 
be fully explored by leaders of the Senate. 
More effective policy committees probably cannot be imposed 
on the Senate leadership. To be useful, they must be employed 
by the leaders rather than against them. Like other institutions 
of the Senate, they are more likely to develop informally through 
practice than formally through party resolutions. To be fully 
effective, the committees would have to represent in rough pro- 
portions the major geographic sections of the party and would 
have to include the senators who were most powerful either by 
virtue of personal strength or of major party or committee assign- 
ments. In the past the Democratic party has been handicapped 
in dealing with foreign policy, for example, by the fact that 
Foreign Relations Committee chairmen (except for Senator 
Green) were never members. 
Fortunately for recent American foreign policy, the Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations stands high before the Senate, 
well able to look out for itself, in contrast to its counterpart 
in the House of Representatives. 
-H. BRADFORD WESTERFIELD 
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
COMMITTEE 
POLITICAL POWER IS DECENTRALIZED IN CONGRESS LARGELY 
because of the strength of standing committees. In recent years 
perhaps the most powerful of these in the Senate has been the 
Foreign Relations Committee. Though the committee has been 
remarkably free from partisan conflict, its decisions have been 
instrumental in setting the record of both parties in the Senate 
on foreign policy. Most of the senators who have significantly 
influenced the Senate's deliberations on foreign policy have been 
leaders, not of the parties, but of this committee. The limitations 
of the party leaders and the institutions described earlier have 
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frequently resulted partly from the influence of the Foreign Re- 
lations Committee and its leadership. 
Since personalities so often are the key to explaning power 
relationships in the Senate, an examination of the Foreign Re- 
lations Committee may well start with its recent leaders. Though 
these men have not been elected party leaders, they have exer- 
cised political power as well as personal influence in the Senate. 
This power derives not only from personal skill and experience 
but also from the ability to speak for the party and for the For- 
eign Relations Committee. The records of men like Arthur 
Vandenberg and Walter George are a rich source of information 
on the meaning of political leadership in the Senate. Since the 
chairman's influence rests in part on the authority of the com- 
mittee, it is important to probe the sources of that authority, the 
role of partisanship in the committee's decisions, and the relation- 
ship of the committee to other committees in the Senate that 
deal with foreign affairs.' 
ADMINISTRATION LEADERS ON THE COMMITTEE 
During the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the ranking 
member of the Foreign Relations Committee from the admini- 
stration party-whether chairman or not-was usually less in- 
fluential than the opposition leader on the committee. Partly 
this was an accident of personality. In addition, the administra- 
tion leader on the committee, like the administration floor leader, 
is under pressure to accept the President's program with a mini- 
mum of complaint. During the postwar period the chairmen of 
the Foreign Relations Committee have proved consistently will- 
ing to cooperate with the President; yet those chairmen who 
represented the opposition party have been able and willing to 
demand greater policy concessions than those bound to the 
President by ties of party loyalty. Consistent support of the 
President has sometimes reduced the influence of administration 
leaders on senators who respect independent judgment more 
than party loyalty. 
We should not overstate the case. I t  would be rash to suggest 
1 For an excellent description of the sources of committee chairmen's power, 
see Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World, pp. 159-62. 
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that Senator William Knowland would have given complete 
support to President Eisenhower's foreign policy had he been 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. A member of the 
President's party who leads the Foreign Relations Committee 
faces the same problem as one who leads the party in the Senate: 
To attain maximum effectiveness he must represent faithfully 
both the President and the senatorial party. Democrat Tom 
Connally was a more successful chairman than Republican 
Alexander Wiley largely because Connally had much less dif- 
ficulty than Wiley in serving two masters; the Democrats in 
1949 were far more united on international issues than the Re- 
publicans in 1953. 
Senator Tom Connally was a devoted internationalist and a 
loyal supporter of President Truman's foreign policies. From 
1947 through 1952, first as ranking Democrat and then for four 
years as chairman of the committee, Connally had a record of 
complete support for Truman's foreign programs except for a 
few compromises that he felt were based on a more realistic 
appraisal of senatorial views. He sometimes criticized various 
aspects of bills without seeking revisions and on other occasions 
urged changes in details to make them more acceptable to the 
Senate. He was less inclined than Senator Vandenberg to seek 
revisions and occasionally criticized those sought by Vandenberg. 
Connally's success is in large measure due to his close rela- 
tions with his associates. His attitude toward the State Depart- 
ment has been well described as that of "a gruff old watchdog, 
snipping here and there at his State Department wards when 
he thought they were going astray, but all the while having 
their best interests at heart."2 Connally was on close, though 
not intimate, terms with President Truman and the various men 
who served as Secretary of State, notably Dean Acheson. He 
had a close working relationship with the various Democratic 
floor leaders, who almost always agreed with him on the handling 
of foreign policy measures. We have previously described the 
arrangement giving him primary Democratic responsibility for 
management of foreign programs as a division of labor rather 
than the consequence of a struggle for power. Connally's 
2 Merle L. Gulick, "Tom Connally as a Founder of the United Nations" 
( Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1955), p. 151. 
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greatest talent lay in gauging the temper of the Senate and adapt- 
ing the administration's program to senatorial views. Though 
the internationalist thinking among Democrats minimized the 
need for such adjustments, it did not eliminate the need for a 
man who knew when to be firm and when to seek compromise. 
When Connally reassumed the chairmanship of the Foreign 
Relations Committee in 1949, succeeding Vandenberg, his ma- 
jor responsibility was to secure approval of the North Atlantic 
Treaty and of its implementation through military aid. His 
handling of these measures illustrates his techniques as chair- 
man. While the North Atlantic Treaty was being drafted, Con- 
nally participated with Vandenberg in talks with Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson in order to make sure that the treaty did 
not infringe on the congressional right to declare war and to 
remove any language from the treaty which might obstruct rati- 
fication. Though for a time it appeared that the senators' efforts 
might seriously damage the treaty, the draft that emerged was 
satisfactory to the administration. Having secured a satisfac- 
tory draft, Connally then resisted successfully every effort to 
attach reservations to the treaty in the Senate. 
Connally correctly foresaw that opposition to the treaty would 
center on the military aid program to implement it. He tried 
to postpone discussion of the aid program and the release of 
information about its cost until after ratification of the treaty. 
This tactic conflicted with the administration's plan to bolster 
support for military aid by publicizing it in advance as an in- 
tegral part of NATO and, thus, persuading the supporters of the 
treaty that they were also committed to vote for the aid bill. 
Connally yielded to the administration and announced his sup- 
port for prompt passage of the aid program three weeks before 
Senate debate on the treaty. In his opening floor speech on the 
treaty he endorsed the aid measure and declared that the two 
programs were interrelated but not inseparable. 
When the military aid program reached the Senate, Connally 
left to the Republican leaders primary responsibility for negoti- 
ating substantial revision with the administration. Nevertheless, 
he deferred hearings on the original bill, apparently advised 
the administration to change it, and agreed to certain cuts and 
postponements in spending in order to prevent more serious 
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reductions. On the floor of the Senate he spoke vigorously and 
successfully against further cuts in arms aid beyond those already 
made in committee. Connally has testified, "I buttonholed the 
membership continually in an effort to change votes." He 
described the arms aid debate as the hardest fight since the 
passage of the Lend-Lease AcL3 He was able to produce 36 
Democratic votes for the arms assistance bill with only 10 op- 
posed and to forge a similar Democratic majority against reduc- 
tions in the program. 
Connally was foremost among the Senate Democrats who 
supported the Truman administration in its opposition to supply- 
ing large-scale military aid to Nationalist China and later to 
Formosa. In 1949 he prevented hearings in the committee on 
a $1.5 billion economic and military aid bill for China sponsored 
by Senator Pat McCarran and flatly opposed by the administra- 
tion; he refused to ~ i e l d  to an appeal by 50 senators, half of 
them Democrats, for hearings on the bill. Later in the year he 
delayed consideration of a $175 million military aid bill for 
China offered by Senator Knowland, held Democrats on the 
committee firmly in line against the proposal when it came to 
a vote, and then worked out a compromise with Senator Van- 
denberg giving the President authority to spend the funds in 
the "general area" of China. When the Truman administration 
decided in January, 1950, not to help Chiang Kai-shek defend 
Formosa, Connally publicly supported the decision and kept 
up a barrage of criticism against Republicans who sought to 
'6 plunge this country into war." Whatever the wisdom of the 
administration's policy, Connally's tactics saved the President 
- 
from the embarrassment of serious Democratic di~sension.~ 
Connally's firm support helped the President to avoid a de- 
feat in the Senate on the troops-for-Europe issue in 1951. He 
proposed an advisory resolution in which the Senate could state 
its support for sending troops and its belief that future assign- 
ments of forces should be made in consultation with various 
congressional committees. This formed the basis for the reso- 
lution approved by the Senate after the addition of further re- 
3 Tom Connally, My Name is Tom Connally (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell 
Co., 1954), p. 339. 
4 Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, pp. 347-50, 356-59, 365. 
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strictions on the President. Connally disliked the recommenda- 
tion of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees 
to require congressional approval for future troop assignments 
to Europe. Nevertheless, he accepted it as the best compromise 
attainable and opposed with considerable success attempts on 
the Senate floor to add further restrictions. Though he was in- 
consistent and in one case out of step with Majority Leader 
McFarland on two amendments to remove restrictions on the 
President, his vacillation did no real damage because these 
amendments had no chance of success. Connally shares with 
McFarland some of the credit for the unusually large Demo- 
cratic majorities in support of Truman on this issue. 
In presenting foreign policy legislation to the Senate, Con- 
nally was always careful to emphasize that it had bipartisan 
endorsement by the Foreign Relations Committee, and he fully 
recognized the necessity of maintaining unity in the committee 
whenever possible. Nevertheless, in Senate debates and to a 
lesser extent in committee, Connally's attitude was sharply par- 
tisan. He was not only a partisan speaker but often a blunt and 
sarcastic one whose personal criticisms of other members stood 
out in sharp contrast to the Senate's traditional elaborate cour- 
tesy. This ingrained characteristic considerably limited Con- 
nally's influence in Republican ranks but did not prevent his 
extensive cooperation with Republican senators in shaping legis- 
lation on foreign affairs. As a veteran internationalist, Connally 
looked upon Vandenberg's comparatively recent conversion with 
some scorn; this feeling did not, however, undermine the close 
working relationship of the two senators on most  issue^.^ 
How should Connally's influence be  evaluated, and what were 
its sources? One observer has concluded that "whatever leader- 
ship he was able to exercise in the Senate on foreign affairs 
derived from his personality and his long association with the 
work of that committee-not, as did Vandenberg's, from his 
standing as a fullfledged leader of his  part^."^ Such authority 
as Connally's does not come automatically to a committee chair- 
5 The Connally-Vandenberg rivalry is mentioned in Vandenberg, The Private 
Papers of Senator Vandenberg, pp. 379, 505-506. It is also evident in a number 
of references to Vandenberg in Connally's autobiography. 
6 Westerfield, p. 119. 
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man. Connally was a veteran senator, a forceful personality, 
a chairman who exercised the full prerogatives of that office and 
commanded respect in the committee. It is true that he never 
achieved the stature in the senatorial party of southerners like 
Walter F. George and Richard B. Russell. The Democratic 
administration, however, worked closely with him, and since 
most Democratic senators respected the administration's views 
in this field, they were willing to follow his lead. 
Tom Connally is generally not credited with playing a decisive 
role in the success of the Truman administration's programs in 
the Senate. This assessment is true in the sense that he faced 
relatively few obstacles in implementing the President's policies. 
His record indicates that a successful administration leader on 
the Foreign Relations Committee needs personal ability, support 
from the committee, acceptance by the administration, and sub- 
stantial unity in the party. 
As Republican leader of the Foreign Relations Committee 
during the Eisenhower administration, Alexander Wiley lacked 
each of the assets that Connally possessed and consequently 
lacked authority in the United States Senate. Wiley had been 
the ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee 
since Vandenberg's death in April, 1951, and served as chair- 
man in 1953 and 1954. He inherited from Vandenberg a firm 
belief in the principles and programs of internationalism. Despite 
criticism of some aspects of the Truman foreign policies, he 
voted for all the major economic and military measures of that 
administration, and he gave unswerving support to President 
Eisenhower on issues ranging from the Bricker amendment and 
the Yalta resolution to the Middle East resolution. 
Wiley owed his position to seniority and lacked the talent 
for leadership, the parliamentary skills, industry, and persua- 
siveness that more influential senators have. These shortcomings 
are serious in a legislative body where an individual's talents 
are shrewdly appraised. The contrast in personal abilities of 
Connally and Wiley is not great enough, however, to explain 
the wide difference in influence. Wiley became chairman in 
1953 at a time when the Republicans in the Senate were seri- 
ously divided on foreign policy. Those whose votes the President 
most needed were suspicious of Wiley's consistent internation- 
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alism; they looked instead to Knowland, Bridges, or Taft for 
leadership. 
Wiley lacked iduence also because he never held a place in 
the Republican hierarchy. His absence from the Policy Com- 
mittee until 1955 was indicative of his standing in the party.? 
Perhaps most damaging to Wiley was the Eisenhower adminis- 
tration's failure to accord him the recognition normally due the 
ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee. In 
this regard Eisenhower notably did not give Wiley the slightest 
encouragement or assistance in his 1956 Wisconsin primary con- 
test against opponents who were sharply critical of the admin- 
istration's foreign policy. The apparent magnitude of the political 
opposition to Wiley in Wisconsin was itself one of the factors 
- 
undermining his senatorial authority. In the last years of the 
Eisenhower administration a broad measure of party unity was 
achieved on foreign policy, but Wiley remained a neglected 
figure and the administration lacked an authoritative senatorial 
spokesman in this field. 
The controversy over the Bricker amendment best illustrates 
Wiley's peculiar role as chairman of the Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee during the first two years of the Eisenhower administra- 
tion. Wiley was the only Republican leader who flatly opposed 
every version of the Bricker amendment and firmly supported 
the President. Yet because this unequivocal position made him 
unrepresentative of most Republican senators, the administra- 
tion ignored him during most of its prolonged negotiations with 
those senators who were seeking a compromise. He was not con- 
sulted on the Ferguson-Knowland compromise and, although 
absent during rollcalls, made clear his opposition. At a press 
conference the President refused to choose between the com- 
promise efforts of Ferguson and Knowland and Wiley's position 
of flat opposition to compr~mise.~ Wiley's lack of influence 
7 During the debate on the foreign aid bill in 1954, Senator Paul H. Douglas 
asked Wiley if the Republican Policy Committee was opposed to a reduction 
of one billion dollars proposed by Senator Russell B. Long. Wiley answered 
that he assumed it was but that he was not a member. Congressional Record, 
August 3, 1954, p. 13027. 
8 After Wiley told the Wisconsin Republican convention that the Bricker 
amendment was "the most dangerous thing that has ever been brought before 
Congress," the convention censured him for refusing to support the amendment. 
New York Times, June 14. 1953, p. 75. His stand greatly increased his difficulties 
in winning renomination in 1956. 
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on this issue resulted fundamentally from his want of stature 
and his previous failures to assert leadership. An important 
additional factor, however, was the administration's decision to 
accept the judgment of other Senate Republican leaders that the 
Bricker amendment could be defeated only through a compro- 
mise. In the process of reaching that decision, Wiley was not 
consulted; once it was reached, his stand against compromise 
destroyed his potential senatorial iduence on the issue. 
A MODEL OPPOSITION LEADER: SENATOR VANDENBERG 
The two senators with the greatest influence on foreign policy 
in recent years, Arthur H. Vandenberg and Walter F. George, 
had much in common. Both were opposition leaders and con- 
sequently could bargain with the administration at times and 
not merely follow it. Both were picked by the administration 
as bipartisan collaborators because their parties had won con- 
gressional majorities at a time when the enactment of major 
foreign programs was essential. Both were needed because 
their backgrounds and sympathies gave them rapport with the 
various factions within their parties. Vandenberg and George, 
as internationalists, represented the majority wings of their 
respective parties. Yet each owed part of his influence to a 
reputation for independence and fiscal conservatism and even 
to an early history of isolationism that commanded respect among 
senators who dreaded the heavy burdens of this country's inter- 
national responsibilities. Both men were prominent party leaders 
as well as senators commanding respect on both sides of the aisle. 
Dean Acheson has summarized some of the reasons for Van- 
denberg's success as the Republican leader in foreign policy: 
"He had ability of the highest order. He was a master of ad- 
vocacy and maneuver. He had the full respect and admiration 
of the Senate and the added strength of having been a severe 
critic of 'foreign entanglements.' But he did not have a par- 
ticularly original or creative mind. His instincts were toward 
caution-to hold back, to examine the difficulties of the course 
proposed, and to restrain the enthusiasts. 
"These were good qualities. They were ideal qualities for a 
leader of an opposition which had for a part of the time control 
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of the Congress. . . . He was free to do what he could do best- 
criticize, question, examine-until he became convinced of the 
necessity for a proposed program. He would then put his un- 
mistakable mark on it, and finally give it the essential help of 
his incomparable advocacy and fervor, the shrewd guidance 
of his knowledge of the Congres~."~ 
Vandenberg's publicized conversion from a leading isolation- 
ist to the foremost Republican internationalist in the Senate 
made it easier for othe; Republicans to change their stand on 
foreign policy. This fact and the caution with which he ap- 
proached all proposed legislation strengthened his influence 
among most Republican senators. Vandenberg was always care- 
ful to add Republican trademarks to the administration's pro- 
grams. This tactic served to show that bipartisanship was not a 
policy of "me too," while it also led to the removal or revision 
of those sections of a bill most vulnerable to criticism. Like 
any skillful leader in the Senate, Vandenberg could gauge the 
temper of that body with great accuracy. More than most leaders, 
he was skillful in devising compromises that were adapted to 
the views of the Senate but did little damage to the substance 
of the measure. James Reston has suggested that one of Van- 
denberg's greatest talents was his "capacity to anticipate op- 
position" in Congress in time to remove its causes.1° 
Vandenberg's first opportunity to display his skill as chair- 
man of the Foreign Relations Committee came in March, 1947, 
just two months after he had assumed the post, when President 
Truman introduced his program for aid to Greece and Turkey. 
After he had attended a White House briefing, Vandenberg 
explained the program on two occasions to the Republican 
Conference and took the unusual step of inviting all senators 
to submit questions about the program for transmittal to the 
State Department. He received some 400 questions, which were 
consolidated into a document of 111 questions and answers.ll 
Vandenberg felt that the administration had made a "colossal 
9 Acheson, A Democrat Looks at His Party, pp. 104-105. 
10 James Reston, "The Case for Vandenberg," Life, XXIV (May 24, 1948), 101. 
See also Richard H. Rovere, "The Unassailable Vandenberg," Harper's, CXCVI 
(May, 1948), 394-403. Rovere suggests as a moral that "it is better to be wrong 
before you are right than to be right all along." 
11 Vandenberg, p. 344. The Private Papers provide by far the best informa- 
tion on Vandenberg's role in the foreign policy issues under study. 
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blunder" by ignoring the United Nations in the Greek-Turkish 
aid measure. He recognized that this failure had caused serious 
misgivings among some internationalist senators while provid- 
ing a powerful argument for isolationist opponents. He recog- 
nized further that this obstacle could be overcome without 
significant danger to the purposes of the aid measure. He re- 
wrote the preamble of the bill to state that the U.N. had recog- 
nized the political and economic problems of Greece but was 
unable to provide aid to either Greece or Turkey. More im- 
portant was his amendment stating that the program would end 
if the U.N. General Assembly or Security Council concluded 
that U.N. action made the program unnecessary or undesirable 
and stating further that in this event the United States would 
waive its veto power in the Security Council.12 
These additions, though accepted unenthusiastically by Senator 
Connally and the administration, served their purpose. Vanden- 
berg succeeded in defeating crippling amendments, and he 
gained passage of the bill with the support of over two-thirds 
of the Republicans as well as most of the Democrats. While he 
made it clear that support for the Greek-Turkish aid program 
involved no commitment to the broader aspects of the Truman 
Doctrine, Vandenberg emphasized his support for the principles 
enunciated by the President. He said that when free govern- 
ments are facing threats of totalitarian aggression, "we do not 
necessarily react in the same way each time, but we propose 
to act."13 
Vandenberg's experience in guiding the Greek-Turkish pro- 
gram through the Senate was a dress rehearsal for his perform- 
ance in behalf of the European Recovery Program (ERP), 
launched by Secretary of State George C. Marshall in June, 1947. 
Vandenberg's initial reaction was cautious; he endorsed the 
principle of an overall rather than a piecemeal approach to for- 
eign aid but did not commit himself to the program. Rather, he 
took the first in a series of steps to facilitate congressional ap- 
proval: the calling for a bipartisan study of the required foreign 
assistance and the resources of the United States available for 
12 Ibid., pp. 345-46. 
13 Assistance to Greece and Turkey, Hearings before the Committee on For- 
eign Relations, U.S. Senate, 80th Cong., 1st sess., on S. 938, pp. 13, 30-31. 
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the task. The three study groups which President Truman 
created prepared impressive documentation in support of the 
Marshall Plan.14 
When legislation for ERP itself was introduced, Vandenberg 
took further steps to undermine opposition. A complicated dis- 
pute developed over the administration of the program. The 
State Department wanted to have direct control, many Republi- 
cans desired an independent agency, and the Appropriations 
committees of both houses feared that the independent board 
suggested by the Herter Committee would bypass them. Van- 
denberg solved this tangled question neatly by turning it over 
to the Brookings Institution; that widely respected research or- 
ganization proposed a compromise acceptable to all sides. In 
his attempt to maintain maximum congressional support for 
ERP, Vandenberg rejected Truman's suggestion for an adminis- 
trator, selected Paul Hoffman for the post, and then persuaded 
both Truman and Hoffman to accept the idea.15 
- 
Vandenberg recognized that the administration's request for 
a specific four-year authorization of $17 billion was an invita- 
- 
tion to controv&rsy and would probably be reduced by Congress. 
He considered any fixed four-year figure useless because it 
would not determine future congressional appropriations and 
could be only an "educated guess of highly doubtful validity." 
He persuaded the administration to remove the specific dollar 
request before congressional opponents were able to center their 
attack on that figure.16 
A group of senators critical of ERP, who became known as 
 revisionist^," held several meetings to draft changes and limita- 
tions to be inserted in the measure. Vandenberg's foresight in 
eliminating several sources of controversy enabled him to re- 
ject all but a few innocuous proposals. He realized that it was 
important to make minor changes in language in order to win 
broader support for the measure. On one occasion, when some- 
one in the Foreign Relations Committee objected that the words 
"impact on our domestic economy7' in the bill were too vague, 
Vandenberg replied, "I can tell nineteen different Senators on 
14 Vandenberg, pp. 37677 
15 Ibid., pp. 393-94. 
1 6  Ibid., p. 385. 
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the floor of the Senate who are worried about something-your 
problem is taken care of by that clause in the bill."17 
Vandenberg used the Foreign Relations Committee as a forum 
for a galaxy of distinguished witnesses to defend the Marshall 
Plan. On the floor of the Senate, he spoke effectively for the 
bill, answered criticisms, defeated objectionable amendments, 
and accepted those he considered innocuous. He devised an 
ingenious solution to the demands for economy. By reducing 
the term for the initial authorization from fifteen months to 
twelve, he was able to make a corresponding reduction in funds 
without any loss to the program and could argue that this would 
give the new Congress an earlier chance at reassessment in 1949. 
By this means he defeated Taft's amendment for a cut of ap- 
proximately $1.3 billion in the authorization. When the House 
voted to stretch the appropriations to fifteen months without 
increasing the total, Vandenberg appeared before the Senate 
Appropriations Committee to denounce reductions achieved by 
" 
meat axe techniques" as a "cynical reversal" of congressional 
policies. After a long struggle between the two houses and with 
Taft's help, Vandenberg won his point. 
Although it is difficult to believe that the Senate would have 
defeated ERP under any circumstances, it is easy to imagine that 
the scope of the measure might have been drastically curtailed 
either in 1948 or in succeeding years. Sentiment for such limi- 
tations was strong in 1948 and grew stronger each year that fol- 
lowed. Vandenberg's great accomplishment was enactment of 
the program substantially as requested by the administration 
with such firm support that it withstood most proposed reduc- 
tions, especially in the Senate, for several years. His technique 
of accommodation in detail and form but defense of the essential 
was not unique in the Senate, but he used this technique with 
unusual skill and success. 
The third major achievement of. Senator Vandenberg during 
his two years as chairman was passage of the Vandenberg 
resolution in 1948. The resolution expressed the Senate's sup- 
port for strengthening the United Nations by restricting use of 
the veto and for association of the United States by constitu- 
17 Ibid., pp. 388-89. 
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tional processes in mutual security arrangements. I t  was no 
small achievement to win passage for this resolution with only 
four dissenting votes after a day of debate. Vandenberg had laid 
the groundwork by prolonged consultation on the text of the 
resolution with Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett. He 
had been careful to link the endorsement of collective security 
arrangements-the major purpose of the resolution-to the pop- 
ular concept of strengthening the United Nations. He denied 
that his resolution represented a moral commitment to support 
any future regional pact or program of arms aid, and he avoided 
any debate on its probable consequences. The resolution was 
hurried through in the last days of the congressional session. 
The only disadvantage of these tactics was that they minimized 
the impact of the resolution and somewhat limited its utility 
as a stepping stone to the North Atlantic Treaty.18 
Much of Vandenberg's success was due to personal character- 
istics: his legislative skill, his intelligent use of the tactics of 
compromise, and his cautious conversion to internationalist prin- 
ciples. Beyond this, he derived his power from his authority 
as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and recognized 
- 
leader of the Republican party on matters of foreiqn policy. 
Vandenberg had served on the committee since 1929. He ap- 
preciated the importance of maintaining unity on the committee 
and sought with notable success to continue that practice.'' 
He ran the committee, not arbitrarily, but with firmness and 
skill. Even more important. he was recognized by both his fel- 
low Republicans and the administration as the Republican leader 
on foreign policy at a time when the support of the maiority 
Republican party was essential to enact President Truman's hold 
new programs abroad. Vandenberg's understanding with Taft 
on a division of authority between the two of them has already 
been described; it reflected the views of a maiority of Repub- 
lican senators, who followed Taft on domestic questions and 
Vandenberg on international matters.20 The Truman administra- 
18 Ibid., pp. 404-408. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: 
Viking Press, 1951), pp. 422-24, 434. 
19 Senator Vandenberg stated proudly that during the Eightieth Congress the 
committee gave unanimous support to the administration's policies on "47 critical 
occasions." Congressional Record, January 5, 1949, p. 61. 
20 See chapter 4. 
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tion was willing and even eager to consult Vandenberg in ad- 
vance on some foreign policy legislation. This enabled Vanden- 
berg to speak with greater authority in the Senate and to in- 
fluence the content of legislation at an earlier stage. Clearly 
Vandenberg enjoyed the role of a world statesman and was 
flattered by the attention given to him by the administration. 
Some critics felt that by making Vandenberg a well-publicized 
partner in bipartisan policymaking, the administration was dam- 
aging his influence among the less internationalist Republicans. 
There is no doubt that a man in Vandenberg's position walks a 
political tightrope; he was skillful enough and retained enough 
independence to avoid falling. 
The China question, which eventually became a bitterly par- 
tisan issue, was the greatest ~otential threat to Vandenberg's 
position. He handled the issue cautiously and followed a tactic 
of disassociation and even ambivalence that enabled him to re- 
tain the confidence of both the administration and his fellow 
Republicans. Vandenberg repeatedly emphasized that the Re- 
publicans were not being consulted on policy toward China and 
bore no responsibility for it. Though he had doubts about the 
policy of trying to encourage a Chinese coalition government 
that included the Communists, Vandenberg did not want to 
challenge Secretary Marshall's judgment on the matter. When 
Chiang Kai-shek's military plight began to grow desperate, 
Vandenberg accepted the administration's judgment that Chiang 
could not be saved without massive military intervention by the 
United States and agreed that this would be unwise. He did not 
join Republicans, like Senator William Knowland and Congress- 
man Walter Judd, who demanded large-scale American aid for 
China and who later insisted on military intervention to defend 
Formosa. His legislative role was one of devising compromises 
that provided for more aid than the administration wanted and 
less than many Republicans wanted. Had other Republican lead- 
ers pressed their demands for a different policy in China earlier 
and more urgently, Vandenberg might have found his middle 
position untenable. Likewise, had he lived to play an active role 
in the Senate during the MacArthur controversy, Vandenberg 
would have been forced to choose sides. Critics can argue that 
Vandenberg failed in his role as an opposition leader because 
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he did not lead the fight for a policy capable of stemming the 
tide of Communism in China. But policymaking was not Van- 
denberg's forte; he had no answer for the Chinese problem 
and considered it of secondary importance. Vandenberg's pur- 
pose was twofold: to prevent partisan controversy over China 
from damaging bipartisan support for the economic and mili- 
tary programs in Europe and to disassociate the Republican 
party from the administration's China policy. In these efforts 
he was wholly succe~sful .~~ 
When the Democrats regained control of Congress in 1949, 
there was a perceptible drop in Senator Vandenberg's influence. 
He no longer was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
nor did he command the strategic position of foreign policy 
leader for a majority party. The administration recognized, 
however, the value of continued collaboration with Vanden- 
berg, but it became a matter of less importance and less fre- 
quency. Vandenberg lost the chairmanship at the same time 
that Secretary of State Marshall and Under Secretary Lovett 
were resigning. Vandenberg never achieved the close, personal 
relationship with Dean Acheson that he had enjoyed with Mar- 
shall and L o ~ e t t . ~ ~  
The change in Vandenberg's relationship to the administra- 
tion had no effect on the ratification of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, the groundwork for which had already been laid. The 
military assistance measure posed more difficult problems, which 
were aggravated by the administration's failure to work closely 
with Vandenberg. There was little bipartisan consultation on the 
terms or timing of the arms aid measure. Vandenberg was dis- 
turbed by this. "He seemed to feel that liaison between the 
State Department and Congress was breaking down and that 
legislators were being rushed into important  decision^."^^ He 
took the lead in negotiating major changes in the arms assistance 
bill, changes he considered essential to prevent the bill's emas- 
culation or defeat at the hands of reluctant senators. Vanden- 
berg's own criticisms probably increased Republican opposi- 
tion, but in large part he was here simply reflecting Republican 
21 Westerfield, pp. 247-50, 256-59, 262-66, 346-50, 356-59, 364, 372. Van- 
denberg, pp. 519-45. 
22 Vandenberg, pp. 500-506. 
23 Ibid., p. 503. 
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thinking. Vandenberg felt the controversy over military assist- 
ance was useful in demonstrating his independence not only 
to an administration that had neglected bipartisan consultation 
but to Republican senators who had sometimes been suspicious 
of his participation in such consultation. 
The arms assistance bill was the last important measure in 
which Vandenberg played a significant part. He was ill through- 
out the 1950 session and died in April, 1951, leaving a gap in 
Republican leadership that has never been filled. During the 
period from 1947 through 1949 he was more responsible than 
any other man for the degree of Republican support given to 
the major new foreign programs being introduced by the Tru- 
man administration. In a period when Republican isolationism 
was still strong and when partisan feeling on domestic issues 
ran high, Vandenberg's accomplishment was a massive one. 
Vandenberg is famous as one of the leading architects of a 
successful bipartisan foreign policy. He recognized more fully 
than men U e  Connally and Taft the necessity of bipartisan con- 
sultation and cooperation, particularly in a period of divided 
government. Yet Vandenberg's power rested on a political base. 
His greatest influence was on Republican senators. The White 
House recognized him and worked with him primarily not be- 
cause of his ability and his viewpoints but because he could 
command Republican votes. He never attained the breadth of 
Republican support in the Senate that Taft enjoyed, and his 
authority would have been endangered if Taft had chosen to 
challenge his right to be a party spokesman on foreign affairs. 
Yet Vandenberg drew strength in the Senate because of Re- 
publican support for him throughout the country. In 1947 and 
1948 Vandenberg was frequently mentioned as a candidate 
for President. He was not an active candidate and believed that 
his vigorous advocacy of internationalism had destroyed his 
chances for the nomination. His position as an inactive candi- 
date gave him maximum effectiveness in the Senate. He avoided 
the legislative traps that might have been set for an active 
candidate; yet many Republican senators were reluctant to dis- 
agree with the man who might become their party's candidate. 
The apostle of bipartisanship was able to achieve what he did 
because he was a skillful party leader, 
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SENATOR GEORGE AND DEMOCRATIC 
LEADERSHIP ON THE COMMITTEE 
Senator Walter F. George, chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee in 1955 and 1956, had a reputation in the Senate as 
a conservative, independent thinker-a reputation that increased 
his influence in the field of foreign affairs. As William S. White 
expressed it, "Few public men feel, in principle, a deeper pain 
at the size of the public debt. In a word he is suitably 'safe' 
in the fiscal sense-a circumstance that greatly forwards his in- 
fluence in the Senate."24 George had the respect of senators with 
widely differing opinions, but particularly the southern con- 
servatives, whose votes were most in doubt during the period of 
George's chairmanship. Southern senators felt it politically safe 
to support measures when George did, just as Taft's endorse- 
ment of a bill made many Republicans feel safe in voting for it. 
George's internationalism was less firmly rooted than that of 
most Democratic senators active in foreign policy roles in the 
postwar period. He arrived in the Senate in 1922 as a vigorous 
opponent of the League of Nations, and it required World War 
I1 to convert him to internationalism. George's record from 
1947 through 1954 was not uniform. He supported all major 
foreign assistance measures except arms aid in 1949 and Point 
Four in 1950. In both cases he was opposing, not the principle 
of the programs, but their cost or the speed with which they 
were being undertaken. He was an earnest and vocal supporter 
of economy in the aid programs and one of those who urged 
a speedy termination in the programs. Yet more often than not 
he voted against amendments to reduce the amount of foreign 
aid spending. His frequent indecisiveness probably reflected a 
struggle between his own deep convictions about the need for 
economy and his sense of responsibility for the success of our 
foreign aid program. 
Despite doubts about some aspects of the Vandenberg reso- 
lution and the North Atlantic Treaty, he voted for both. The 
compromising stand that he took on collective security issues 
seemed to reflect another conflict in his mind: that between the 
24 William S. White, "Senator George-Monumental, Determined," New York 
Times Magazine, March 13, 1955, p. 42. 
128 SENATORIAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
foreign responsibilities of the United States and the constitutional 
responsibilities of Congress. Senator George's most serious chal- 
lenge to a policy of internationalism was likewise designed to 
prevent encroachments on the authority of Congress. His com- 
promise substitute for the Bricker amendment had the primary 
purpose of requiring congressional approval to make executive 
agreements effective as internal law. While his proposal was 
designed to block the original Bricker amendment, which he 
considered dangerous, as the debate wore on, George developed 
a fatherly pride in his proposal, which embodied principles he 
believed important, and he began to fight for it. His plan was 
narrowly defeated. 
This was the background of the man who, for two years as 
chairman, worked skillfully to enact the foreign programs of the 
Eisenhower administration. What made this cautious independ- 
ent such a vigorous champion of foreign economic and military 
commitments? Any man who becomes chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee is subjected to influences that tend to make 
him a supporter of the administration. He comes into regular 
contact with officials of the administration and with the com- 
mittee's staff, and he becomes responsible for presenting and 
defending foreign programs in the Senate. Moreover, the Eisen- 
hower administration deliberately and earnestly sought to win 
George's loyalty. When the Democrats won control of the Eighty- 
fourth Congress, President Eisenhower was instrumental in per- 
suading George to become chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee instead of the Finance Committee. Secretary of State 
Dulles developed the habit of visiting George's apartment for 
breakfast about once a week to discuss international problems, 
and Eisenhower telephoned George more often than he con- 
tacted other senators.25 Since the administration lacked a Re- 
publican senator who was both powerful and completely depend- 
able on issues of foreign policy, it was natural that it turned to 
George. But this did not occur until the Democrats had won a 
majority in Congress. The parallel with the Truman administra- 
tion and Senator Vandenberg is obvious. Like Vandenberg, 
George was a powerful leader in foreign affairs because of his 
ability and experience, because his views were widely respected 
26 Ibid., pp. 12, 47. 
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in the Senate, because he was acknowledgd by members of his 
party as their spokesman, and because the administration rec- 
ognized that it needed his assistance and consequently worked 
closely with him. 
During his two years as chairman, Senator George gave the 
foreign aid program more consistent support than he had in 
the past. In 1955 the great economizer told the Senate, "This 
is no time for us to begin to trim a little here and a little there," 
as he fought back attempts to reduce either military or economic 
aid.26 In 1956 Senator George gave one of his most eloquent 
speeches in the Senate on behalf of the full foreign aid bill in 
order to prevent the destruction of this country's position as a 
world leader. During these two years the only reductions in 
foreign aid were made in committees or in the House, but not 
on the Senate floor. 
The best example of George's skill in winning Democratic 
support for Eisenhower's program was his success in securing 
prompt and almost unanimous Senate adoption of the Formosa 
resolution and the Chinese Mutual Defense Treaty in 1955. 
Although both were measures that aroused deep misgivings 
among many Democrats, George made effective opposition im- 
possible by skillfully presenting the issues and the risks involved 
in challenging the President during a time of crisis. 
After three conferences with high administration officials, 
George called a meeting of the Democratic members of the For- 
eign Relations Committee on January 23, 1955, to discuss the 
Formosa resolution. The meeting revealed that many Democrats 
disliked the President's attempt to gain an advance political 
commitment of support for any action he might take to defend 
the offshore islands. Yet although George did not try to force 
the Democratic senators to give this support, the group agreed 
to do so. When Admiral Arthur W. Radford's testimony in com- 
mittee alarmed a number of senators and led Wayne Morse to 
charge that the resolution would authorize "preventive war," 
George secured Eisenhower's commitment that only the Presi- 
dent would order the armed forces into action in the area of the 
offshore islands. Making use of this statement, Senator George 
took the Senate floor, brushed aside all criticism of the President 
26 New York Times, June 1, 1955, p. 16. 
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for seeking congressional authority to act, asked what alternative 
there was to approval of the presidential request, and demanded 
a prompt vote for the resolution without amendments. Although 
twelve Democrats voted for substitutes offered by Estes Kefauver 
and Herbert H. Lehman, the Formosa resolution was passed by a 
vote of 85-3 on January 28, 1955-just eight days after the ad- 
ministration had first discussed it with congressional leaders. 
On October 19, 1954, before the Chinese Mutual Defense 
Treaty was signed, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sent 
Assistant Secretary Walter S. Robertson, who had negotiated the 
treaty, to Georgia to consult with Senator George. Robertson 
gained George's approval and thereby made him a charter sub- 
scriber to the principles of the treaty and effectively foreclosed 
Democratic opposition. The Senate consented to ratification 
of the treaty by a vote of 65-6 after a minimum of debate.27 
With a threatened attack by Communist China in the offing, 
one would not expect the Senate to reject the President's re- 
quests. George's major accomplishment lay in gaining the Sen- 
ate's endorsement of both measures with speed and near unanim- 
ity. When the President asked for a somewhat similar broad 
grant of power in the Middle East two years later, Senate ap- 
proval came much more slowly and with greater Democratic 
opposition. Only then did the full extent of George's achieve- 
ment in 1955 become apparent. 
Critics of Senator George charged that he became a mere pup- 
pet of the Eisenhower administration, which was able to use him 
effectively in stifling Democratic criticism of its foreign policy. 
The charge was made particularly with regard to the Formosan 
issue, where it had the greatest force. Douglass Cater, in an 
analysis of the Formosan debate in the Senate, concluded that 
George "must bear singular responsibility for failing to achieve 
that balance between advocacy and criticism which Vanden- 
berg always sought. In these first endeavors, George, though 
reputedly a stubborn independent thinker, appeared amazingly 
amenable to Administration guidance." In contrast, "Vandenberg 
would not have allowed bipartisanship to serve as an excuse for 
27 This summary of George's role is based largely on a detailed account by the 
well-informed Washington correspondent Chalmers M. Roberts, in "Strong Man 
from the South," Saturday Evening Post, CCXXVII (June 25, 1955), 30, 109-12, 
and on a column by James Reston in the New York Times, April 5, 1955, p. 4. 
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restraining criticism by the 'loyal opposition,' which once more 
happened to be the Congressional majority."28 
Senator George did not always yield to the administration so 
willingly. When he did resist, however, he revealed a regional 
bias toward financial conservatism and protectionist trade policy 
that was characteristic of many southern senators. For example, 
he resisted the administration's attempts to gain a long-term 
legislative commitment to foreign aid, arguing that insistence 
on this goal would damage bipartisan foreign policy. He also 
opposed the use of American funds on the Aswan Dam in Egypt 
because of the threat to cotton involved; his opposition con- 
tributed to the ultimate abandonment of American support for 
the dam. Though earlier he had usually supported reciprocal 
trade, in 1955 he insisted on including in the program a measure 
to protect textile manufacturers despite the objections of many 
Democrats in both houses. The influence of a regional bias 
upon George not only put him out of step with many of his 
Democratic colleagues both on the floor and in the Foreign 
Relations Committee but also revealed a deficiency in his crea- 
tion of a responsible opposition policy. 
The one occasion on which Senator George took the initiative 
to offer a constructive alternative in foreign affairs was his pro- 
posal in 1955 for a summit meeting. George's initiative reflected 
his own deep concern about growing international tension; it also 
represented Democratic thinking, though it did not result from 
any prolonged consultation between George and other Demo- 
cratic senators. Senator George gave President Eisenhower 
greater flexibility to negotiate with both the Russian and Chinese 
Communists by taking a stand contrary to that of Senator Know- 
land and other Republican leaders. Though the administration 
reacted cautiously to George's suggestions, his initiative helped 
to pave the way for the de facto cease-fire in the Formosa Straits 
and the Geneva summit conference in 
The sources of George's authority in the Senate are not ob- 
scure. Though less effective than some leaders in behind-the- 
28 Douglass Cater, "Foreign Policy: Default of the Democrats," Reporter, XI1 
(March 10, 1955), 21-23. 
29For a description of George's activity in encouraging summit talks, see a 
column by Chalmers M. Roberts in the Washington Post and Times Herald, 
March 23, 1955. 
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scenes negotiations, George was preeminent as a debater in an 
age of vanishing oratory and spoke with judicious infrequency 
at crucial moments. More important, his vast experience and his 
conservative views commanded respect particularly among those 
senators less inclined to embrace internationalism. Furthermore, 
he was one of the most prominent leaders of the southern bloc, 
which has always been iduential in the Senate. His influence, 
though greatest among southern Democrats, extended in some 
degree to most members of the Senate. He had a close working 
relationship with Lyndon Johnson, and he could speak for the 
Democratic party because no other Democrat in Congress seri- 
ously challenged his role as spokesman. 
Despite his experience and the respect he commanded, it is 
noteworthy that George did not become recognized as the chief 
Democratic spokesman in foreign policy until Democratic control 
of Congress made him the chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee and precipitated the White House effort to make 
George a partner in bipartisanship. It would be a mistake to 
exaggerate George's influence in the Senate. His fervent speeches 
in behalf of foreign aid in 1955 and 1956 attracted the votes of 
fewer Democrats than had supported previous aid measures. It 
is difficult to determine whether he stemmed the tide of southern 
economic isolationism, but despite his unique qualifications as 
a southern leader, he did not succeed in reversing the tide. He 
could speak with greatest authority, as when he was urging a 
summit conference, on issues that would not come to a rollcall 
vote. He swung the greatest number of votes on the occasion, 
involving Formosa, when he was allied with a President demand- 
ing emergency support in a moment of crisis. George did not 
represent, but rather thwarted, those Democrats versed in for- 
eign affairs who were both able and willing to provide con- 
structive criticism of both the collective security and foreign aid 
programs presented by the administration. George, like Vanden- 
berg, had the greatest success when he was rallying opposition 
party support for the President's program. He showed less skill 
than Vandenberg in the far more difficult task of developing a 
responsible challenge to those administration policies that caused 
misgivings in his party. 
George's retirement at the end of the 1956 session left the 
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Democratic leadership of the Foreign Relations Committee in 
the hands of a small group of senators, no single one of whom 
was able to replace George as spokesman for the party. Theodore 
Francis Green, who was 89 when he succeeded George as chair- 
man, was a veteran Democrat and an unswerving internationalist 
with years of personal experience in foreign affairs. Yet he 
labored under an obvious handicap of age and stepped down 
from the chairmanship after two years. An equally important 
liability was his failure over the years to seek a place of leader- 
ship, to speak out forcefully on international issues, and to carry 
the burden of defending measures through days of debate. 
William Fulbright, a thoughtful and articulate senator, is ex- 
perienced in foreign affairs and respected in the chamber for his 
knowledge of that field. There are several reasons why he did 
not immediately become the Democratic foreign policy leader. 
He has been an independent, somewhat aloof figure in the Senate, 
not particularly amenable to Lyndon Johnson's influence and not 
a part of the "inner circle" of party leadership. Perhaps because 
of Fulbright's critical attitude toward the Eisenhower admini- 
stration, the President did not extend to him the full measure of 
recognition given to George through frequent personal consul- 
ta t i~n.~ '  
Senator Fulbright had to share Democratic leadership in for- 
eign affairs with several colleagues. Mike Mansfield, equally re- 
spected in the Senate, was a more skillful manipulator of votes 
and enjoyed a much closer working relationship with Lyndon 
Johnson, who chose him as party whip in 1957. Among the other 
Democrats on the committee were John F. Kennedy and Hubert 
Humphrey, both intelligent and articulate, both conscious of the 
need to make a record on foreign policy to assist their campaigns 
for the Presidency. These senators did not always speak with 
one voice, and even when they were in agreement, they did not 
speak for the whole party, which was becoming increasingly di- 
vided on foreign policy issues. Though the Democrats on the 
Foreign Relations Committee agreed, for example, on the need 
for shifting the emphasis of foreign aid away from military as- 
sistance and toward longrun development aid, they could not 
30See Charles B. Seib and Alan L. Otten, "Fullbright: Arkansas Paradox," 
Harper's, CCXII (June, 1956), 60-66. 
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command unified Democratic support for this position, par- 
ticularly in the HouseS3l 
THE COMMITTEE AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 
The most effective leaders of the Foreign Relations Committee 
have been those who held a place of power and respect in their 
party; yet a chairman draws his authority in part from the com- 
mittee itself. The Foreign Relations Committee has great pres- 
tige in the Senate. Membership on it has become increasingly 
popular, and consequently the caliber of its membership, par- 
ticularly Democratic, is high.32 In the postwar period the com- 
mittee has been characterized by unusually united support for 
programs offered by both Democratic and Republican admini- 
s t r a t i o n ~ . ~ ~  Largely this unity has resulted from the members' 
particularly close familiarity with foreign affairs and the de- 
liberate efforts of the committee's various chairmen. 
The importance of unanimous reports by the committee was 
greatest in the early days of the Truman administration, when 
isolationist sentiment was stronger in the Senate. The committee 
unanimously approved Greek-Turkish aid, the European Re- 
covery Program, the Vandenberg resolution, the North Atlantic 
Treaty, the Point Four Program, and-in a joint session with the 
Armed Services Committee-a compromise resolution on sending 
31 On September 10, 1958, for example, all of the Democratic members on the 
committee except Russell Long issued a statement, signed also by William 
Langer, urging the President to put greater stress on long-term economic aid to 
underdeveloped areas and less emphasis on military assistance programs. For an 
account of a more successful Democratic initiative in the field of foreign aid, the 
Monroney resolution urging that the administration study the creation of an In- 
ternational Developmental Association, see James A. Robinson, The Monroney 
Resolution: Congressional Initiative in Foreign Policy Making (Case Studies 
in Practical Politics; New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1959). For a thorough 
analysis of congressional initiatives in foreign policy, see James A. Robinson, 
Congress and Foreign Policy-Making (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1962), 
Chs. 1-4. 
32 Donald R. Matthews, pp. 149-50, has analyzed the change of senators from 
one committee assignment to another during the 1947-1957 period and has con- 
cluded from his figures that the Foreign Relations Committee was the most pop- 
ular, having net gains from nearly all others and net losses to none. 
33 Matthews, pp. 166-69, concluded that during the eighty-fourth Congress 
the Foreign Relations Committee was the most united because its members had 
a higher degree of cohesion in floor votes on foreign policy matters than mem- 
bers of any other committee on matters in their field of specialization. 
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troops to Europe. Only one member of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, Senator George, opposed the military assistance bill 
in 1949, the only other major program of the Truman admini- 
stration. The committee's unanimous approval of Point Four in 
1950 was especially significant because this highly partisan meas- 
ure passed the Senate by only one vote with the support of only 
eight Republicans, including three members of the committee. 
Measures to extend the foreign aid program during the Truman 
and Eisenhower administrations passed the committee either 
unanimously or, in later years, with only two or three dissenters. 
During the Eisenhower administration, the unanimous vote by 
the committee to confirm Charles Bohlen's nomination as am- 
bassador to Moscow was a major factor in destroying the op- 
position to him. Walter George's success in winning the com- 
mittee's approval of the Formosa resolution with only two dis- 
senters helps to explain why that measure cleared the Senate 
so quickly. 
The importance of united support by the committee for the 
administration's measures extended beyond voting by the mem- 
bers. Witnesses at hearings in behalf of administration programs 
were treated sympathetically by nearly all members of the com- 
mittee, whose questions were usually designed to clarify a pro- 
gram, emphasize its advantages, or provide the witness with a 
chance to answer criticisms most effectively. Members of the 
committee were so sympathetic to the North Atlantic Treaty that 
two of its most vigorous opponents, Republican Senators Arthur 
V. Watkins and Forrest C. Donnell, sought and received reluc- 
tant permission from Chairman Connally to attend the meetings 
and question witnesses. Though Connally later felt that he had 
been mistaken in permitting Watkins and Donnell to sit with 
the committee, the conclusions of H. Bradford Westerfield seem 
to be more accurate: "Their unfriendly, probing questions helped 
to elucidate obscure sections of the pact and created greater con- 
fidence in the Senate that the Foreign Relations Committee was 
not simply rubber-stamping a project to which it had long since 
become committed by direct parti~ipation."~~ During the second 
Eisenhower administration, the Democratic committee members 
34 Westerfield, p. 332. 
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began to play a more critical role in hearings, even on occasions 
when they were w i lhg  to support the measures under consid- 
eration. 
In his study of the Japanese Peace Treaty, Bernard C. Cohen 
has emphasized the importance of united support by the For- 
eign Relations Committee. A bipartisan subcommittee carried 
the burden of the treaty, consulting regularly with John Foster 
Dulles (who was negotiating it),  traveling widely throughout the 
Far East, and handling defense of the treaty on the Senate floor. 
Its members even negotiated with the Japanese premier on one 
occasion. The Foreign Relations Committee always acted as if 
the treaty was noncontroversial. The hearings were brief and 
little-publicized meetings at which members provided maximum 
assistance to the administration witnesses. When Senator Wat- 
kins offered a reservation that would have damaged the treaty, 
it was the subcommittee that negotiated an innocuous resolution 
on the subject.35 
Not surprisingly, the committee was divided more often over 
the details of legislation than it was in voting on measures as a 
whole. Even so, there were relatively few questions on which 
the committee was sharply split; when this did occur, a partisan 
division often took place. 
During the Truman administration there were several party 
votes in the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees 
on Far Eastern issues, an area almost untouched by bipartisan 
experience. These votes included the earmarking of foreign aid 
funds for China in 1949 and the holding of secret hearings on 
General MacArthur's dismissal in 1951. Some aspects of the 
1951 troops-for-Europe controversy produced party splits in the 
two committees, although there was unanimous agreement on a 
compromise resolution. 
There were some partisan splits during the Eisenhower ad- 
ministration. An unusual one occurred when Eisenhower dis- 
agreed with Republican leaders in Congress on the terms of a 
resolution on the Yalta agreements. All but one Democrat on the 
Foreign Relations Committee voted to support the President, 
while all the Republicans voted against him. The Republicans 
on the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees sup- 
36 Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign Policy, pp. 146-69. 
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 137 
ported the President on the Formosa resolution in 1955, but the 
Democrats were badly divided. The most serious partisan di- 
visions in the committees during Eisenhower's term concerned 
the 1957 Middle East resolution. The Republicans stood solidly 
behind the President, while a majority of Democrats sought, 
with little success, to amend the resolution, and a narrow majority 
of Democrats voted against reporting it to the Senate. 
What is the significance of unity or partisan conflict in the 
Foreign Relations C ~ m r n i t t e e ? ~ ~  Do its members lead their col- 
leagues in the Senate or simply reflect their views? A unified 
stand by the committee does appear to carry weight in the 
Senate. For senators recognize the claims of the specialist and 
therefore respect the opinions of committees-particularly when 
those committees have been able to reach agreement. From a 
partisan standpoint, since the senators normally look upon the 
members of their party on the Foreign Relations Committee as 
their party's leaders in this area, they are likely to provide voting 
support for the decisions taken by those leaders. The lines of 
party leadership may, however, lead outside the committee, 
especially in the case of the opposition party, which cannot look 
to the President for political leadership. At any rate, a division 
in the committee along party lines-notable since it is rare-in- 
creases the possibility of partisan conflict on the Senate floor.37 
As a rule, then, the stand of the Foreign Relations Committee on 
an issue is indicative of the stand of the whole Senate. 
During the Truman administration the Republican contingent 
on the Foreign Relations Committee not only was ovewhelm- 
ingly internationalist but included two senators in addition to 
Vandenberg who commanded wide respect in this field: H. 
Alexander Smith and Henry Cabot Lodge. Vandenberg had been 
instrumental in gaining committee seats for both when a re- 
alignment of committees occurred in 1947.38 The views and 
36 In a study of all Senate committees during the eighty-fourth Congress, 
Matthews, pp. 168-70, found a close correlation between the amount of agree- 
ment in a committee on a bill and its chances of passage in the Senate. Every 
motion which had the support of 80 percent or more members of the committee 
concerned passed the Senate. 
37 Cohen, pp. 203-204, has pointed out that during floor consideration of the 
Japanese Treaty, Democratic senators generally let Democrats on the Foreign 
Relations Committee speak for them in debate, but Republicans did not have 
such complete respect for their colleagues on the committee. 
38 Vandenberg, p. 333. 
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votes of Republicans on the committee had little influence on 
the shrinking band of Republican isolationists but did win some- 
times a few and often many votes among the growing number of 
converts to internationalism. The 1950 election, which made 
another seat on the committee available to Republicans, touched 
off a struggle between old-guard and liberal goups in the party, 
which illustrates how the seniority principle can be manipulated 
by contending forces. Each side proposed a series of candidates 
of increasing seniority, until the liberal wing won with Charles 
H. Tobey, who was outranked in seniority only by senators who 
already were on the committee or did not desire to be.39 At the 
start of the Eisenhower administration there was an influx of 
Republican party leaders-Taft, Ferguson, and Knowland-into 
the committee. As they left the Senate, one by one, the com- 
mittee's influence among Republicans declined, since no senators 
of equal party stature replaced them. Hence, the unity among 
Republicans on the committee and the growing unity among 
Senate Republicans were not factors of cause and effect but were 
coincident results of a Republican administration and the near 
disappearance of isolationists from the Senate chamber.40 
During the Truman administration the Democrats on the com- 
mittee were internationalists, who maintained a nearly unanimous 
record of support for the President's program. The presence of 
a few Democratic isolationists on the committee would have 
been an obvious embarrassment and possibly a significant handi- 
cap to the President. Nevertheless, Democratic unity in the 
Senate resulted primarily from a combination of conviction and 
loyalty to the administration. The example set by Democrats 
on the committee was of lesser importance. 
Until the Eisenhower administration, Democratic members of 
the committee were chosen largely on the basis of seniority. In 
1949, for example, the Democrats were able to add five members 
to the committee, and the leadership chose-out of twelve who 
applied-the five with the greatest seniority. The year 1953 
39 Willard Shelton, "Civil War in the G.O.P.," Nation, CLXXII (Jan. 27, 
1951 ), 75-76. 
40For a more detailed account of personnel changes on the committee, see 
David N. Famsworth, The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Illinois Studies 
in the Social Sciences, Vol. 49; Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), pp. 
16-31. This is a useful account of the committee and its role in major foreign 
policy issues during the period 1947-1956. 
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marked the beginning of Lyndon Johnson's policy of subord- 
inating seniority to other factors in the choice of all committee 
members. At that time the Democrats selected two junior sen- 
ators who were vigorous and independent internationalists- 
Hubert Humphrey and Mike Mansfield. Humphrey was chosen 
at the request of President Truman and Secretary of State 
A~heson.~'  Senator Johnson's new technique strengthened his 
hand as party leader, and he used it to provide the committee 
with Democratic membership of the highest caliber.42 The Demo- 
cratic contingent on the committee continued to be strongly 
internationalist, but the party showed no hesitancy in picking 
Russell Long in 1956, despite his record of opposition to foreign 
aid. 
Although the internationalist Democrats on the committee 
held the line against reductions in President Eisenhower's for- 
eign aid program, in the Senate itself there were significant de- 
fections among Democrats. In this respect the leadership of 
of committee Democrats appeared weaker. Most of the Demo- 
crats on the Foreign Relations Committee worked to revise the 
aid program in order to put more emphasis on long-term eco- 
nomic development, and several of them led the criticism of the 
"blank check" military authority that the President sought in 
the Far East and the Middle East. In these cases also, the Demo- 
crats in the Senate failed to follow those on the committee with 
consistent unity. After Senator George's departure, Democratic 
leadership on the Foreign Relations Committee proved unable 
to unite the party either in support of those administration pro- 
posals it favored or of the alternatives it offered to other ad- 
ministration programs. 
OTHER COMMITTEES DEALING WITH FOREIGN POLICY 
Two other committees that have frequently shared the responsi- 
bility for acting on international legislation are the Appropri- 
ations and the Armed Services committees. The former has had 
4lCharles E. Gilbert, "Problems of a Senator: A Study of Legislative Be- 
havior" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1955), pp. 
288-89. 
42 During the eightieth through the eighty-fourth Congresses the average new 
member of the Foreign Relations Committee, from either party, had a little 
over eight years seniority. Matthews, pp. 152-53. 
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to approve the annual appropriations for foreign aid after author- 
ization of funds by the Foreign Relations Committee and the 
Senate. From 1949 through 1954 the Armed Services Committee 
studied and approved foreign assistance measures either in con- 
cert with the Foreign Relations Committee or immediately after 
its deliberations. It has also met jointly with the Foreign Re- 
lations Committee to consider collective security measures. 
While the members of these committees tended to follow the 
lead of the Foreign Relations Committee, they usually supported 
foreign military and economic programs in the Senate with less 
unity and consistency than did members of the Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee. Powerful leaders in both parties played im- 
portant roles on both committees, and their influence helps to 
explain the degree of support provided by the committees for 
both administrations as well as the support given by the Senate 
to the committees' decisions. 
On questions of foreign aid the Senate Appropriations Com- 
mittee has usually taken a quite different stand from the House 
committee. During the early years of the Truman administration 
and throughout the Eisenhower administration, the Senate com- 
mittee repeatedly restored large proportions of funds cut by the 
House committee, cuts far below the levels already authorized 
by Congress. Only in the later Truman years did the Senate 
committee make cuts equal to or exceeding those made in the 
House. Since information about voting in the Senate Appropri- 
ations Committee is scarce, any explanation of the committee's 
position must rest on speculation. A comparison of voting in 
the Senate by members serving on the committee during both 
administrations does not suggest that turnover in membership 
or changes in views increased the support for appropriation re- 
quests during the Eisenhower administration as compared with 
the later years of Truman. The proportion of senators devoted to 
economy remained rather consistent during both administrations. 
The leadership of the Appropriations Committee seems to have 
been particularly decisive in creating its record on foreign aid.43 
During the Truman administration the ranking Democrat and 
43 The chairman and ranking members of the committee have a greater op- 
portunity to influence foreign aid appropriations because these are considered 
by the whole committee rather than by a subcommittee as most appropriations are. 
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later chairman was Kenneth D. McKellar. McKellar was initially 
hostile to the Greek-Turkish aid program and the Marshall Plan. 
Though he subsequently voted consistently for foreign aid meas- 
ures on the floor, he generally spoke and voted in the committee 
for reductions in funds. Because of his age and illness and per- 
haps because he represented a minority viewpoint among Demo- 
crats, McKellar did not seek to use his authority as chairman to 
curtail drastically foreign aid programs. Yet his reluctance may 
have been one reason why the committee's support for Truman's 
aid measures diminished. Senator Carl Hayden became ranking 
Democrat in 1953 and chairman in 1955. He consistently voted 
in the Senate to supply the funds requested for foreign aid by 
both Truman and Eisenhower. Since Hayden was regarded as 
one of the most influential men in the Senate, particularly in its 
inner councils, it seems accurate to give him some credit for the 
growing support provided by the committee to the Eisenhower 
administration. During both administrations, Hayden's steadfast 
endorsement of massive appropriations was a factor in providing 
Democratic votes in the Senate for foreign aid. In addition, 
Lyndon Johnson joined the committee in 1956 to provide an im- 
portant link between it and the party leadership. 
The Appropriations Committee in recent years has included 
an unusually high proportion of Republican party leaders. Styles 
Bridges was the ranking Republican and occasionally chairman 
throughout the period under study. Leverett Saltonstall was a 
member during the whole period, and Kenneth Wherry, Homer 
Ferguson, and William Knowland served until they left the 
Senate. During the Truman administration, particularly its later 
years, these leaders frequently criticized the administration of 
foreign aid and often voted for reductions in aid spending 
(though less frequently in the case of Saltonstall). Bridges, 
Saltonstall, Ferguson, and Knowland, all of whom served after 
1952, together with Everett Dirksen who was on the committee 
from 1953 through 1958, provided strong support for most or all 
aspects of Eisenhower's aid program. Their efforts seem to have 
been largely responsible for the increasing generosity of the Ap- 
propriations Committee. In addition, they were in an excellent 
position to encourage Republican votes in the Senate for the 
appropriations agreed upon in the committee. As ranking Re- 
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publican and as chairman of the committee in 1953-1954, Senator 
Bridges held a particularly crucial post. He was also a veteran 
party leader and became chairman of the Policy Committee in 
1955.44 
For several years after the addition of military assistance to 
the foreign aid program, the Armed Services Committee zeal- 
ously guarded its right to share in consideration of the measure 
before floor action. I t  seldom made any changes in the foreign 
aid authorization and abandoned its claim in 1955. In the case 
of collective security commitments jointly reviewed by the For- 
eign Relations and the Armed Services committees, there was 
little difference in voting patterns of the two groups. Leadership 
again appears to be the key to understanding this committee. 
Senator Bridges and (from 1951) Senator Saltonstall were its 
ranking Republicans, and their consistent support of Eisen- 
hower's collective security programs contributed to the unity 
of Republicans on the committee. 
Democratic leadership on the committee was divided. Millard 
Tydings, ranking Democrat and then chairman through 1950, 
had a consistently internationalist record and shared responsi- 
bility with Tom Connally for managing the first two annual mili- 
tary assistance bills. Richard Russell, who succeeded Tydings as 
chairman, supported President Truman's collective security meas- 
ures, worked closely with Connally on the troops-for-Europe 
resolution, and performed a major service as chairman of the 
MacArthur hearings. He voted for most of Truman's foreign aid 
programs but frequently backed amendments to reduce the cost. 
During the Eisenhower administration he became a strong critic 
of foreign aid on grounds of economy and voted against most of 
the aid measures. As long as his colleague from Georgia, Senator 
George, was in the Senate, Russell seemed unwilling to assume 
the leadership of the economy bloc. He did not try to use his 
position as chairman of the committee to delay or drastically cur- 
tail military assistance measures; in fact it was under his chair- 
manship in 1955 that the committee stopped reviewing such 
legislation. After George's retirement, Russell began to play a 
more important role, being most prominent during Senate con- 
44 See chapter 4 for a further analysis of Bridges' role, 
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sideration of the Middle East resolution. Russell strongly criti- 
cized this measure, and after his amendment to eliminate the 
economic and military aid section of the measure was defeated, 
he voted against the entire resolution. His opposition probably 
had something to do with the fact that fourteen southerners voted 
for his amendment and ten voted against the resolution. Russell's 
power and prestige in the Senate made him a natural leader for 
the growing tide of southern opposition to foreign economic pro- 
g r a m ~ . ~ ~  The second-ranking Democratic member, Harry Byrd, 
who supported economy and opposed foreign aid, provided pow- 
erful support for Russell. On the other hand during the Eisen- 
hower administration, Senator Lyndon Johnson provided leader- 
ship on the committee for those Democrats who supported Re- 
publican as well as Democratic foreign programs. 
One further aspect of foreign policy, reciprocal trade legis- 
lation, comes under the jurisdiction of the Finance Committee. 
Democratic members of this committee during the period were 
almost entirely sympathetic to reciprocal trade legislation. Dur- 
ing the Truman administration two veterans in foreign affairs, 
Walter George and Tom Connally, served as the top-ranking 
Democrats on the committee and led the defense of the Presi- 
dent's trade urogram. The Republicans on the committee, led 
by Eugene Millikin and Robert A. Taft, consistently sought ex- 
tensive revisions to provide more protection for American in- 
dustry. Voting in the committee therefore closely followed party 
lines, and there was a similar voting pattern in the Senate. Dur- 
ing the Eisenhower administration, Harry Byrd, who became 
chairman in 1955, continued to support reciprocal trade legis- 
lation, with only limited wavering among Democratic committee 
members; however, the Democratic support for the committee's 
decisions declined. Although there were no Republican leaders 
on the committee after 1956, there was growing support among 
Republicans on and off the committee for the Eisenhower re- 
ciprocal trade program. Throughout the period the Finance 
Committee lacked the unity characteristic of the Foreign Re- 
lations Committee. When leadership was most evident on the 
Finance Committee, it was sharply partisan. 
45 Russell is also the second-ranking Democrat on the Appropriations Committee. 
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The Senate Judiciary Committee, which seldom has a chance 
to exert any influence on foreign policy, did so in 1953 when it 
favorably reported the Bricker amendment by a vote of 9-5. In 
contrast to the membership of other committees involved with 
foreign affairs, a minority of the Judiciary Committee's members 
had records of support for American economic and military pro- 
grams abroad.46 Moreover, the small extreme-isolationist wing 
of the Republican party was strongly represented by William E. 
Jenner, Herman Welker, and William Langer, while there was 
only one member-Alexander Wiley-who was well versed in 
international affairs.47 At that time the committee did not con- 
tain a single Democratic or Republican leader, nor is there any 
evidence that party leaders sought to prevent the committee's 
endorsement of the Bricker amendment. The Republican chair- 
man and the ranking Democrat on the Judiciary Committee were 
William Langer and Pat McCarran, respectively, two senators 
notably unsusceptible to guidance and frequently out of step 
with a majority of their parties. Nevertheless, Senator Langer, 
a proponent of the ~r icker  amendment, voted in committee 
against reporting it because he thought further attempts should 
be made to draft a version acceptable to the administration. 
Instead the committee voted to revise the Bricker amendment 
and made it even more unacceptable to the administration. Had 
the committee defeated the entire amendment, it would never 
have reached the Senate floor. Had the committee softened the 
Bricker amendment or at least not made it stronger, the measure 
might have passed the Senate in the absence of the determined 
opposition that developed to the committee's version.48 
46These were Democrats Thomas C. Hennings, Harley M. Kilgore, Estes 
Kefauver, and Republican Alexander Wiley, all of whom voted against the 
Bricker amendment, and Democrats Pat McCarran, James 0 .  Eastland, and 
Republican Robert C. Hendrickson, who voted for it. William Langer also 
voted against it. 
47 One other member of the committee, however, Thomas C. Hennings, was an 
expert in constitutional law who skillfully led the forces in the Senate opposed 
to any amendment. 
4sAlthough the minority report of the Judiciary Committee recommended 
further consideration by the Foreign Relations Committee and several members 
of the latter committee favored such action, no steps were taken. Alexander 
Wiley, a signer of the minority report and chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, publicly suggested that his group reconsider the measure but prob- 
ably did not attempt to force the issue because the Judiciary Committee's 
jurisdiction over constitutional amendments was clearly established under Senate 
rules. 
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COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP 
A high level of bipartisanship has characterized decisions of the 
Foreign Relations Committee and to a lesser extent the other 
committees dealing with foreign affairs. Nevertheless, in the 
absence of strong policy committees or caucuses, these com- 
mittees and their chairmen are important sources of political 
leadership in the Senate. In foreign policy, personal leadership 
has come from committee members more often than from elective 
party leaders, but actually it might be more accurate to say that 
there is a partnership between the top party and committee 
leaders. For in committees along with such leaders as Arthur 
Vandenberg, Walter George, and Richard Russell have served 
elected party leaders like Robert Taft, William Knowland, and 
Lyndon Johnson. 
Political leadership is most effective when there is unity of 
purpose among the top party and committee chiefs, such as the 
Democrats enjoyed during the Truman administration and the 
Republicans lacked in the early Eisenhower years. When the 
leadership is divided on questions of policy, influence becomes 
a matter of personal ability and of viewpoint rather than of 
party rank. Generally, a man of ability will not exercise com- 
mensurate power, however, unless he holds party or committee 
posts. While leadership in the Senate follows such a variety of 
patterns that generalization about it must be limited, on some 
issues certain senators will follow particular leaders. Most of 
the time they will follow members of their own party, particularly 
those holding party or committee posts. 
The influence of senatorial leadership is heavily dependent on 
the role of the president. Senate leaders have commanded sup- 
port most successfully from both the administration and the op- 
position parties when they spoke in behalf of the President's 
program. A senator, as the example of Knowland demonstrates, 
is least successful when he challenges the President of his own 
party. The experience of men as diverse as Taft and Fulbright 
shows the difficulties an opposition leader faces in persuading 
his party to support alternates to the President's foreign policies. 
Thus, a survey of political leadership is not complete without an 
inquiry into the techniques of presidential leadership in the 
Senate. 
The conduct and care of international afairs is a speckzl 
preserve of the President. One consequence of this situ- 
ation is the more direct, personal involvement of the Presi- 
dent in executive-legislative relations. 
-HOLBERT N. CARROLL 
The most important "pressure" on us in this ofice is Dwight 
David Eisenhower and his program. . . . It's not a matter 
of their calling us up or anything-we know what the White 
House wants and we don't have to be told. 
-Republican senator's assistant 
quoted by DONALD R. MATTHEWS 
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 
AND THE SENATE 
DURING THE LAST QUARTER CENTURY THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSI- 
bility for initiating and promoting legislation has steadily grown, 
nowhere more than in the field of foreign affairs. The evidence 
in Chapters 2 and 3 shows that a President can normally depend 
on greater support for his foreign programs from senators in 
his own party than from those in the opposition. It remains nec- 
essary to demonstrate what presidential techniques are most 
valuable in augmenting partisan support and how these can 
be combined with the techniques needed to develop bipartisan 
support for the President's program. 
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There has been congressional resistance to the growth of 
presidential authority in foreign affairs, as is shown by the con- 
troversies over troops for Europe and the Bricker amendment. 
Sometimes, however, it has been difficult to distinguish between 
partisan conflicts and disputes between the two branches of 
government. Democratic senators, for example, may hold the 
middle ground in a conflict between a Democratic President and 
Republican senators. Those who criticize the growth of the 
President's responsibility in foreign affairs are fighting a rear- 
guard action, for world events have forced Congress to recognize, 
however reluctantly, the necessity for the President's authority. 
Consequently the President has acquired important leverage for 
dealing with senators of both his own party and the opposition. 
Other studies have emphasized that "the hard core of a presi- 
dent's support in the Senate comes from his own party," and that 
the initiatives of the President make possible a higher degree of 
unity in his party than the opposition is usually able to achieve.l 
There are reasons why this should be particularly true for for- 
eign programs of the President. A senator belonging to the ad- 
ministration party usually wants to support those measures most 
critical to the prestige of the President and the success of the 
administration. In the postwar period a great proportion of these 
high-priority measures have dealt with foreign affairs. Willing- 
ness to support a program for economic aid or collective security 
is conditioned frequently on confidence in those who will ad- 
minister the program; this confidence is often deeply rooted in 
partisan convictions. In addition to the factors that induce sup- 
port for his party leader, a member of the administration party 
shares with other senators a strong disposition to grant what the 
President requests abroad, particularly in time of emergency. 
The President can frequently generate bipartisan support be- 
cause senators of both parties are reluctant to demonstrate ser- 
ious disunity to either our allies or opponents abroad and are 
reluctant to undermine international commitments often already 
made by the President in public. Moreover, the opposition party, 
lacking the information, the staff, and the machinery to construct 
alternative foreign policies, has little choice except support of the 
1 Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World, p. 145. Truman, The Congressional 
Party, pp. 289-90. 
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President. The reasons why the President often must seek bi- 
partisan support, already discussed in Chapter 1, can be briefly 
summarized: The administration party has often had only a small 
majority or none at all in Congress; party unity has never been 
dependable; and some policies require extraordinary majorities 
to comply with the Constitution or to maximize their impact 
abroad. 
THE PRESIDENT AND PARTY LEADERS 
Presidential leadership may be divided into four categories: co- 
operation with party leaders in Congress, bipartisan consultation, 
private appeals to individual congressmen, and appeals to public 
opinion calculated to generate congressional support. For a 
variety of important reasons, the President must rely primarily 
on his party's leadership in dealing with Congress. David Truman 
has stated the case most cogently: "Relations with the leaders of 
the Congressional party can be supplemented, as they often have 
been, but no substitutes have appeared on which he can rely with 
equal confidence. To the degree that the mechanism of the Con- 
gressional party is relied upon, however, it must be taken as it is, 
with the leaders it has produced. For a President to attempt to 
act directly as the leader of the Congressional party almost cer- 
tainly would be to destroy, for the time being, this valuable if 
variable, governing instr~ment."~ 
From time to time the President will find it necessary to con- 
sult committee leaders, especially in questions of foreign affairs. 
Yet, as Matthews points out, the President is concerned with a 
total program, while the committee leaders are specialists- 
knowledgeable, influential, and perhaps sympathetic concerning 
only a limited portion of the presidential pr~grarn.~ The Presi- 
dent must deal with the generalists in Congress, usually the party 
leaders. He must cooperate closely with the party leaders in 
order to demonstrate his support for them, support that they need 
in order to promote his program most effectively. 
Moreover, the President is forced to deal with party leaders 
2 Truman, p. 298. 
3 Matthews, p. 142. 
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by the pressure of time. As David Truman has said, "In the 
thundering crises that are the normal lot of Presidents in times 
when 'normalcy' exists only in the past, the clock provides no 
hours for the cultivation of rank-and-file legislators which direct 
leadership of the Congress would req~i re ."~  Even in the rela- 
tively few years since Franklin Roosevelt's administration, the 
international burdens of the Presidency have cut deeply into the 
time available for legislative leadership. Roosevelt estimated that 
he averaged "three to four hours a day spent on congressional re- 
lations during the ses~ion."~ Seldom could a President in the 
1950s spare so much time to Congress. Yet even Roosevelt found 
his day too crowded for developing many contacts with the rank- 
and-file.6 
There are other reasons why the President concentrates at- 
tention on the party leaders and occasionally on the committee 
leaders. These are the best informed men on Capitol Hill, the 
men most capable of judging the political climate in Congress 
and weighing the prospects for legislation, and these are men 
familiar enough with the President to express their judgments 
frankly. Finally, when the President directs his appeals for 
legislation through the party leaders, he avoids the possibility 
that personal appeals will lose their impact through ove ru~e .~  
The major instrument of cooperation between the President 
and congressional leaders of his party has been the weekly legis- 
lative conference. Started by Franklin Roosevelt, the confer- 
ences were continued by ~ r u h a n  and Eisenhower and have be- 
come an institution that no successor would likely abandon. 
Political scientists have often proposed that some larger executive- 
legislative cabinet be instituted. The "Big Four" meetings have 
proved their usefulness through durability, however, and their 
value lies in the flexibility and informality of the arrangement. 
4 Truman, p. 297. 
5 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, Vol. 11: The Coming of the 
New Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958), p. 554. 
6 James M. Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, and Co., 1956), pp. 348-50. Early in his first term President Eisenhower 
held a series of luncheons to which all members of the Senate and House were 
individually invited. These were completely social affairs designed to cultivate 
friendly relations with members of Congress, and it may be doubted that 
they served any significant purpose. Donovan, Eisenhower, p. 85. 
7 Truman, p. 298. Matthews, p. 142. 
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Committee leaders or other important members of Congress are 
sometimes included on an ad hoc basis, or separate large-scale 
conferences may be called to discuss major legislation, but the 
party leaders remain the regular core of presidential-congres- 
sional  relation^.^ The success of these meetings depends on the 
candor with which legislative problems can be discussed and 
the mutual trust between the President and congressional lead- 
ers. There were reports that Senator Knowland sometimes used 
the meetings for lengthy speeches expounding his views, while 
Dirksen was more successful in explaining senatorial viewpoints 
and evaluating legislative prospects for the Pre~ident.~ 
The success of presidential cooperation with party leaders 
obviously depends in large part on the skill and the viewpoints of 
these leaders. The President has no choice of Senate leaders; 
he must work with those elected by the senators in his party. 
It is true that Franklin Roosevelt played a quiet role in Alben 
Barkley's election as majority leader.1° Eisenhower, however, 
instructed administration officials to refrain from expressing any 
views on a successor to Robert A. Taft.ll If the senatorial party 
has chosen a leader who lacks the skills necessary for maximum 
effectiveness, there is little the President can do to remedy the 
situation. When the President disagrees sharply with the party 
leader in the Senate, as was often true with Eisenhower and 
Knowland, he is similarly handicapped. The President can try 
to compromise or can bypass him and work with other leading 
senators, but the risks of trying to force a party leader's removal 
are too great to make such a gamble worthwhile. 
Since, with a few exceptions, the details of presidential-con- 
gressional conferences are not made public, the success of presi- 
dential endeavors must be judged by results. The success of 
8 When the President's party controls Congress, the "Big Four" usually con- 
sist of the Vice President, the Speaker of the House, and the majority floor 
leaders in both houses. When the opposition party controls Congress, the minority 
floor leaders in both houses and the minority whip in the House attend along 
with the Vice President. Of course, other congressional leaders may be included 
rather regularly. 
9 Time, LXXIII (June 8, 1959), 15-18. 
10 Burns, Rooseuelt, pp. 309-10. 
11 Donovan, p. 112. Note, however, Eisenhower's role in first discouraging and 
later permitting Charles Halleck's efforts to succeed Joe Martin as minority leader 
in  the House. Time, LXXIII (June 8, 1959), 17. 
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President Truman's foreign programs in Congress and the out- 
ward appearances of his relations with Democratic congres- 
sional leaders suggest that these relations were smooth. Demo- 
cratic leaders in the Senate were all men in sympathy with the 
President's foreign program. Seldom were they forced to report 
to the White House Democratic divisions on foreign policy suffi- 
ciently great to endanger the legislative program. Despite oc- 
casional lapses in coordination, the Truman administration's 
record was a remarkable demonstration of skillful and harrnoni- 
ous relations between the President and senatorial leaders. 
The greater friction between President Eisenhower and his 
senatorial leaders resulted not only from the firmness of Senator 
Knowland's dissents but from serious divisions among Republican 
senators during the early years of the administration. White 
House conferences were not sufficient to eliminate the open 
opposition of Knowland and Bridges to those parts of the aid 
program applying to countries like India and Yugoslavia. The 
differences between the President and Taft and other Republican 
leaders on the terms of the Yalta resolution were clearly re- 
vealed and the likelihood of open conflict became apparent at 
two White House legislative conferences, one before and one 
after the President's formal request to Congress. Later in 1953, 
when Senate Republican leaders, particularly Knowland, planned 
to offer an appropriations rider that would cut off all United States 
funds for the U.N. if Communist China were admitted, Eisen- 
hower persuaded them to agree upon a resolution simply express- 
ing opposition to the admission of Communist China.12 
There were occasions when Republican congressional leaders 
persuaded President Eisenhower to make substantial modi- 
fications in his foreign programs. This was true in 1954, when 
he first sought a three-year extension of the reciprocal trade pro- 
gram and then agreed to a one-year extension. It was true again 
in 1958 when he yielded to the demands of Knowland and 
Bridges and abandoned his support for an amendment facilitat- 
ing foreign aid to certain Communist countries. Despite in- 
stances to the contrary, the regular legislative conferences at 
the White House seem to have played a part in the steady growth 
12 Donovan, pp. 148-53, 48-49, 133-36. 
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of Republican support for most aspects of Eisenhower's for- 
eign program. 
The best example of extended efforts to compromise a serious 
difference between the administration and Republican senators 
is the Bricker amendment, one of the most seriously divisive 
issues encountered by the party during Eisenhower's administra- 
tion. The Republican leaders recognized the dangers of disunity, 
sought persistently to bridge the gap, and appeared successful 
in uniting the party behind a compromise until Senator Walter 
George's alternative produced a new division. 
The President had at first not been familiar with the techni- 
calities of the measure and only gradually began to commit him- 
self against it in the early months of 1953. When Eisenhower 
realized that the Status of Forces Treaty, with which he was 
familiar, would be barred by the Bricker amendment, his op- 
position to the latter sharpened; however, the administration 
was itself divided on the amendment. Secretary of State Dulles, 
after first suggesting that a substitute rather than a mere revi- 
sion of Bricker's proposal be sought, came increasingly to be- 
lieve that an effective compromise was impossible and that the 
Bricker amendment could and should be defeated. Vice Presi- 
dent Nixon and Attorney General Brownell, on the other hand, 
favored continued efforts toward a compromise, for fear that 
an outright defeat of the amendment would seriously split the 
Republican party. President Eisenhower agreed with the views 
of Nixon and Brownell. Republicans in the Senate likewise 
favored finding a compromise that would not divide the party.13 
As a result, the administration engaged in repeated negotia- 
tions with Republican senatorial leaders, with Senator John 
W. Bricker, and eventually with Democratic Senators Walter 
F. George and Lyndon Johnson, meetings in which the President 
often participated. These talks led to the Knowland compro- 
mise, which the President publicly endorsed, and a year later to 
the Knowland-Ferguson compromise, which the Republican 
senatorial leaders said was acceptable to the administration. 
Neither was finally enacted. The administration's prolonged 
efforts at compromise may have encouraged some Republicans 
to vote against the more stringent versions of the Bricker amend- 
13 Ibid., pp. 231-38. 
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ment, but they may also have reduced the resistance of those 
senators in both parties who opposed any amendment. 
BIPARTISAN CONSULTATION 
Bipartisanship is a term with many meanings.14 I t  is defined 
here simply as consultation between the administration and 
leaders of the opposition party in Congress. Primarily we are 
concerned with those instances in which the President has sought 
to win maximum support for a foreign program by directing 
consultations with congressional leaders in advance of present- 
ing the program to Congress. The need for such consultation 
is greatest when the opposition party controls Congress or when 
foreign policy legislation, for either constitutional or political 
reasons, requires an extraordinary majority. 
Though the advantages of bipartisan consultation are often 
so great as to make it a necessity, there are also disadvantages 
from the viewpoint of the administration. It is sometimes dif- 
ficult to find an opposition leader who not only is willing to 
work closely with the administration but also commands broad 
support in his own party.15 Senators with the viewpoint and the 
stature of Arthur Vandenberg or Walter George are not always 
available. Both during and after Vandenberg's period of active 
leadership, the Democratic administration was perplexed about 
how much effort should be made to include Senator Taft in 
consultations. The administration also runs the risk that sen- 
ators critical of its policies will use the information gained 
through advance consultation as ammunition for attacks on these 
policies. If the administration practices "real" consultation and 
invites suggestions for change before the framing of a policy 
has been completed, it must decide how to handle proposed 
changes that it considers unwise. Yet the opposition is more 
likely to be critical when consultation degenerates into a brief- 
ing on already completed policy. A practical argument against 
bipartisan consultation is that high officials in the administra- 
tion and senators both are often too busy to engage in the con- 
14 See Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, pp. 12-13. Crabb, Bipar- 
tisan Foreign Policy, pp. 156-72. 
15 Dean Acheson, A Citizen Looks at Congress (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1957), p. 72. 
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tinuing consultation that might be the most productive.16 The 
administration therefore has tended to use bipartisan consulta- 
tion only when forced to, usually to conciliate an opposition 
majority in Congress. 
The Vandenberg resolution, which passed the Senate in 1948, 
was the result of prolonged talks between Senator Vandenberg 
and Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett. For three or 
four weeks the two met at frequent intervals to draft the reso- 
lution, with assistance from the State Department and Foreign 
Relations Committee staffs. Late in the drafting stage, the mem- 
bers of that committee and John Foster Dulles were consulted. 
The result was a resolution that satisfied the administration's 
needs but was drafted largely by Vandenberg with an eye to 
what the Senate would accept. The resolution passed the Senate 
with only four dissenting votes.17 The "unusual and happy" 
relations between Lovett and Vandenberg, two close friends, 
illustrates the importance of personal factors in successful con- 
sultation between the two branches. "Their work together," in 
Dean Acheson's words, "produced what neither could have ac- 
complished separately."18 
The Japanese Peace Treaty presents an unusual example of 
bipartisan cooperation because the treaty's negotiator, John 
Foster Dulles, was a Republican serving in a Democratic ad- 
ministration. Dulles' performance was a model of consultation. 
In addition to numerous informal contacts with key senators, 
during negotiations Dulles held nine sessions with the Sub- 
committee on Far Eastern Affairs and one with the full Foreign 
Relations Committee. He always met with the senators soon 
after returning from his trips abroad. By this technique of 
participation he was in effect, committing the members to sup- 
port the treaty. He also kept in touch with Taft, Millikin, and 
other important Republcian leaders, and even consulted the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, though it had no jurisdiction 
over treaties. He incorporated some suggestions from senators 
16Acheson, ibid., p. 65, has estimated that as Secretary of State he spent 
about one-sixth of his working hours in Washington testifying before congres- 
sional committees, meeting with congressional leaders, and preparing for such 
meetings. 
17 Vandenberg, The Priuate Papers of Senator Vandenbeg, pp. 404-408. 
18 Acheson, A Citizen Looks at Congress, p. 73. 
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in the text of the treaty; certain financial and military provisions 
of the treaty, for example, were clearly designed to satisfy Re- 
publican viewpoints. He cooperated with members of the sub- 
committee in obtaining formal public assurance from the Jap- 
anese premier that Japan would not recognize or conduct treaty 
negotiations with Communist China. 
Dulles' skill and persistence in bipartisan consultation were 
certainly instrumental in obtaining senatorial support for the 
Japanese treaty with a minimum of opposition. Dulles had full 
authority to act for the President, and in this case presidential 
participation in consultations was unnecessary. In fact, on one 
occasion, Truman through ignorance hindered the treaty's prog- 
ress with a public statement implying that the Senate would 
probably move slowly in approving the treaty when in fact it 
was the Defense Department that was urging delay in ratifica- 
tion while it sought quick Japanese agreement for stationing 
American troops in Japan.lg 
The drafting of the North Atlantic Treaty provides an example 
of bipartisan consultation that is important because it shows what 
intensive collaboration is possible. The preliminary talks on 
NATO among Western nations began in July, 1948, and led to an 
agreed statement of policy by the working group in September. 
There was a lull in the negotiations during the American electoral 
campaign and while the various governments were reaching a 
decision to negotiate a formal treaty. Work on drafting the 
pact was resumed in early December and was nearly completed 
by the end of Jan~ary.~O 
Frequent consultations with senators apparently began in 
December, and Lovett kept in daily telephone contact with 
Connally and Vandenberg. Some senators had seen a draft 
of the pact by mid January. When Marshall and Lovett re- 
signed and Dean Acheson became Secretary of State in early 
January, however, liaison with members of the committee was 
interrupted. Senator Tom Connally has said that Acheson did 
not consult the Foreign Relations Committee until Connally 
insisted on it in early February. At that time, Connally and 
19 Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign Policy, pp. 145-69, 235-50. 
20 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 11: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1956), pp. 247-50. Stephen K. Bailey and Howard D. 
Samuel, Congress at Work (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1952), p. 387. 
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Vandenberg had at least two discussions with Acheson. On 
February 18 and March 8, Acheson held long meetings with the 
full committee; its members gave informal approval to the treaty 
at the second meeting. The agreed text was released on March 
18 and the treaty was signed on April 4.21 
The senators had a hand in rewriting part of Article 5 of the 
treaty, which provided for action by other NATO members in 
case of an armed attack on any member. The draft offered by 
the European countries said that each nation would "take mili- 
tary and other action forthwith." Lovett, sensitive to senatorial 
thinking, suggested changing the conjunction: "take military or 
other action forthwith." Vandenberg and Connally suggested 
simply the words, "take action forthwith," and Acheson proposed 
this language to the other nations. The senators on the com- 
mittee then decided that the Senate would accept firmer word- 
ing. Connally proposed the statement that each nation would 
take "such measures as it may deem necessary." The commit- 
tee as a whole then agreed upon the principle of the final lan- 
guage, that each nation would take "such action as it deems 
necessary, including the use of armed force." The committee 
also succeeded in adding to Article 11 of the pact the state- 
ment, "This treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried 
out by the Parties in accordance with their respective consti- 
tutional proce~ses."~~ 
These detailed changes were important for two reasons: They 
facilitated ratification by meeting the particular anxieties of 
many senators, and the committee's members who helped to 
draft them gained a sense of responsibility for ratification. The 
negotiations were completely bipartisan; in this case, Vanden- 
berg and Connally seem to have shown an equal sensitivity to 
senatorial opinion. 
Other instances of successful bipartisanship were the con- 
sultations between the Eisenhower administration and Senator 
George about the Chinese Mutual Defense Treaty and the 
Formosa resolution and those between the Truman administra- 
tion and Senator Vandenberg about the Marshall Plan. Though 
21 Bailey and Samuel, pp. 387-89. Connally, My Name is Tom Connally, pp. 
332-33. New York Times, January 13, 1949, p. 8. 
22 Vandenberg, p. 476. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Exec, 
L, Exec. Report 8, 81st Cong., 1st sess., p. 3, 
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in each case the discussions undoubtedly resulted in greater 
Senate backing of the measures, they otherwise did not exhibit 
any noteworthy feature of bipartisanship. The quickness with 
which the Greek-Turkish situation developed did not allow any 
extensive discussion of ~ossible measures; nevertheless, two meet- 
ings between administration and senatorial leaders were held a 
few days before the aid program to Greece was presented to 
Congress, and the briefings by Truman, Marshall, and Acheson 
made a great impression upon the congressional leaders. Here 
again, consultation, even though hurried, materially improved 
Senate reception of the program.23 
There are numerous reasons why bipartisan cooperation has 
often broken down. The Point Four Program, like the Marshall 
Plan, was introduced without any significant advance consulta- 
tion-it was a part of President Truman's 1949 inaugural address. 
Not only was the program suddenly thrust upon Congress, it 
was later handled ineptly. Before the measure reached the floor 
of Congress, there was some consultation with Saltonstall and 
Herter, which led to the addition of provisions to encourage 
private investment in underdeveloped countries. Yet the ad- 
ministration failed to consult Senator Taft and other important 
Republican leaders, and failed to keep Democratic leaders in- 
formed about the compromise it had worked out with Salton- 
stall and Herter. 
A problem of transition may have hindered bipartisan con- 
sultation with regard to the Middle East resolution in 1957. The 
close relations between the administration and the chairman of 
the Foreign Relations Committee ended when Senator George 
retired at the end of the 1956 session. The administration evi- 
dently felt that his successor, Theodore F. Green, either lacked 
comparable influence or would not be sympathetic to partnership 
with the administration. In any case, senators first learned about 
the proposed Middle East resolution through the press. On 
January 1 the administration held a bipartisan briefing on the 
proposal, but congressional leaders later complained that the 
proposal was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis that pro- 
vided no opportunity for suggestions. Only later, when the ques- 
23 Truman, Memoirs, 11, 99-105. Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New 
York: Viking Press, 1955), pp. 3-8, 75-77, 129-42, 168-69. 
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tion of U.N. sanctions against Israel became involved, were legis- 
lative leaders invited to a meeting with the President that satis- 
fied the Democrats' definition of "consultation." Surprisingly, 
the administration failed to consult Senator George in advance 
on the substance of the proposal and to seek his advice on its 
handling in Congress. Though George had retired, he was just 
assuming a new post in the State Department as a special con- 
sultant on NATO problems and might easily have been used to 
smooth the way for the Middle East resolution. After the Sen- 
ate began consideration of the resolution, George carefully 
avoided any action that might be construed as an effort to in- 
fluence senatorial views. Earlier and more thorough consultation 
with Democratic leaders might well have paved the way for 
speedier passage of the resolution with fewer dissenting votes. 
President Eisenhower regularly held bipartisan congressional 
meetings prior to the introduction of his annual foreign aid meas- 
ures. Apparently these meetings did not assist significantly in 
gaining passage of the programs. For the most part they were 
no more than briefing sessions; the congressional leaders had little 
opportunity to offer suggestions or propose shifts in emphasis 
of the program. Democratic leaders, for example, were never 
able to make an effective presentation of their case for greater 
emphasis on economic aid to underdeveloped areas. Advance 
briefings on the continuation of existing programs do not seem 
to be a very effective means of presidential leadership. 
By and large it is true to say that prior bipartisan consultation 
has been limited to certain foreign policies requiring legislative 
authorization. It has had little real applicability to diplomatic or 
military decisions outside the legislative sphere. When Presi- 
dent Truman sent American forces to repel the invasion of South 
Korea, congressional leaders of both parties were informed only 
after the decision had been made.24 President Eisenhower in- 
formed bipartisan congressional leaders that he planned to send 
troops to Lebanon shortly before carrying out his decision.25 In 
neither case did the leaders have any alternative but acquiescence. 
In 1954, during the prolonged debate in the administration 
over American intervention in the Indochina war, congressional 
24 Truman, Memoirs, 11, 333-43. 
25 Fletcher Knebel, "Day of Decision," Look, XXII (Sept. 16, 1958), 17-19, 
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leaders were consulted privately. When Secretary of State 
Dulles, in a major speech on March 29, urged "united action" 
by the Western powers to prevent Communist conquest of Indo- 
china, some Democratic leaders complained that they had not 
been consulted by the administration. On April 3, however, a 
bipartisan group of eight congressional leaders were given a 
direct voice in administration policy. Secretary Dulles and Ad- 
miral Arthur W. Radford met secretly with the leaders to seek 
their views on a joint congressional resolution to permit the use 
of naval and air forces in Indochina. The plan then was to use 
American carrier-based planes in an air assault designed to save 
the besieged French fortress of Dien Bien Phu in Indochina. 
Congressional questioning brought out that the proposal did not 
have the support of other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and that the other Western powers had not been consulted. 
The congressional leaders advised Dulles to get support from 
our allies before seeking congressional authorization. In suc- 
ceeding weeks Secretary Dulles sought but failed to achieve 
British support for military intervention; in the wake of this 
failure the Geneva conference met to plan a partition of Indo- 
china. In retrospect, the decision to consult congressional lead- 
ers seems to have saved the administration from the bitter con- 
gressional debate that might have greeted a request for a reso- 
lution authorizing unilateral action. But the consultation had the 
effect of forcing on the administration negotiations with the Brit- 
ish that eventually doomed the plan for intervention. Subse- 
quent to the April 3 meeting, State or Defense officials met with 
congressional leaders on numerous occasions to keep them in- 
formed on administration thinking, but no further specific pro- 
posals on Indochina emerged.26 
Bipartisan consultation has been undertaken with limited ob- 
jectives in recent years, for it only becomes important to the 
administration when the voting support of opposition members 
in Congress is necessary. Where bipartisanship was too little or 
too late, it was usually the result of carelessness or overconfidence 
on the part of the administration. On other occasions the ad- 
ministration was handicapped because no single leader or small 
26 Chalmers M. Roberts, "The Day We Didn't Go to War," Reporter, XI 
(Sept. 14, 1954), 31-35. 
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group of opposition senators was able to speak for the party on 
foreign policy. I t  would be reckless for the administration to 
make concessions to the opposition party that would cost it 
equivalent or substantial support in its own party. Usually, how- 
ever, the techniques of bipartisanship do not contravene those 
necessary to retain the support of the administration party. 
Rather they are likely to strengthen support from those mem- 
bers of that party who may share some of the doubts of the 
opposition about any proposed policy. In sum, bipartisan con- 
sultation, wisely employed, appears to be one of the strongest 
presidential weapons for winning congressional support for for- 
eign programs. 
PRIVATE APPEALS TO SENATORS 
In behind-the-scenes efforts to gain senatorial votes for foreign 
policy measures, the State Department and related agencies have 
been far more active than the White House. They have borne 
the day-to-day responsibility for presenting the administration's 
case to Congress both in formal hearings and in informal dis- 
c u s s i o n ~ . ~ ~  Although most of the work is done at lower levels, 
the men who have served as Secretary of State or who have 
administered the foreign aid program have engaged in personal 
lobbying for their programs. The influence of these efforts should 
not be underestimated. Certainly senators are more likely to 
vote for those programs about which they feel well informed.28 
In terms of political influence, however, the State Department is 
weak; it lacks the powerful constituents of the Agriculture De- 
partment, for example. If a political appeal is to be made by the 
administration to senators, it must come from the White House. 
When approaching congressmen, the President relies mostly 
on members of the White House staff. Personal appeals by the 
President are limited not only by the other demands on his 
time but by the danger of senatorial resentment if such high- 
27According to Acheson, A Citizen Looks at Congress, p. 61: "The center and 
focus of legislative-executive relations lie in the congressional committees and 
in the method of their operation." 
28 For an analysis of this relationship, see Robinson, Congress and Foreign 
Policy-Making, Chs. 5 and 6. This is an excellent analysis of the nature and con- 
sequences of legislative-executive liaison on foreign policy. 
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level pressure is often applied on a member, particularly one who 
is known to be in disagreement with the President. A personal 
call from the President is not effective if it becomes a common 
occurrence. 
The growth of presidential responsibility for a legislative pro- 
gram has led to the appearance of legislative specialists on the 
White House staff. Naturally the work of these staff members is 
little publicized. In addition to conveying the President's views 
on legislative matters, staff members may be able to promise 
White House favors of one type or another to members of Con- 
gress. They serve further as a source of information on the 
sentiments on Capitol Hill. White House staff members work 
closely with the legislative liaison officers of the various depart- 
ments to avoid duplication of effort. In the final analysis, how- 
ever, no special assistant in the White House can make an appeal 
or exert pressure equal to that of the President. 
Some of the President's efforts to influence particular commit- 
tees in Congress are more public than private. When the Senate 
Appropriations Committee or a conference committee is con- 
sidering the restoration of foreign aid funds, for example, a pub- 
licized letter from the President to the membership has become 
almost a routine device of presidential leadership. A more direct 
and presumably more effective practice is to invite a committee 
to the White House for a presidential briefing or exhortation on 
pending legislation. Both Truman and Eisenhower on numer- 
ous occasions gave such briefings on foreign aid measures. At 
such a meeting the President may stress some aspect of his pro- 
gram that he considers particularly important or feels is in great 
jeopardy in Congress. When a foreign aid measure is being 
discussed by a conference committee, the President has occasion- 
ally telephoned key members of the committee to emphasize 
some particularly crucial aspect of the bill. These various efforts, 
usually directed to a group and frequently bipartisan in nature, 
test the persuasive powers of a President, but not his political 
power. 
When the President tries to exert political pressure on a sen- 
ator, he will normally concentrate on members of his own party, 
and his appeal will be direct, personal, and private. The extent 
and effectiveness of such direct private appeals cannot be meas- 
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ured precisely. During interviews in the preparation of this 
study, several senators were asked if they had ever been per- 
sonally requested by the President or other White House of- 
ficials to support a foreign policy measure. Over half of them 
answered negatively. One Democratic senator said that during 
twenty-one years in Congress his vote had been requested only 
once by a President and once by a White House official-both 
times on domestic issues. Two other veteran Democratic sen- 
ators said that their support had been sought by the White 
House only once or twice, and then on domestic issues. In all, 
five Democratic and four Republican senators denied having 
received any White House requests for support on foreign policy. 
Several of these mentioned that high officials of the adminis- 
tration had occasionally asked their support. Five Republicans 
and one Democrat said there had been requests from the White 
House and, in some cases, from the President for voting support. 
President Truman apparently did not frequently contact sen- 
ators personally to seek their backing for foreign programs. 
Truman's effectiveness in recruiting support for his policies was 
limited by his personal coolness toward a number of Republi- 
cans, southern Democrats, and even some northern Democrats. 
For this reason, his calls were most likely to be made to a rather 
small group of senators with whom he was on close terms. Since 
these were usually senators already sympathetic toward his pro- 
grams, his appeals were usually intended to gain more active sup- 
port rather than to change these senators' votes. 
President Eisenhower's personal popularity in Congress was 
higher than Truman's, yet he appears to have been slow in 
fully exploiting his congressional standing to gain voting sup- 
port for his programs. During the 1953 session of Congress, when 
Senator Taft was still alive, the President hesitated to compete 
with him in mobilizing senatorial voting support. In contrast 
to Truman, Eisenhower apparently did not believe at first that 
presidential intervention was wise or proper. 
Eisenhower's willingness to play a direct personal role in the 
search for votes seems to have increased during the course of his 
administration. Yet when he was asked at a press conference 
in 1956 whether he would exert pressure on Congress in behalf 
of his foreign aid program, Eisenhower said, "Well, I have never 
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really understood thoroughly this expression 'pressure on Con- 
gre~s." '~~ During a press conference in January, 1958, he ex- 
plained that he did not offer support in elections or threaten to 
withhold it as a means of winning congressional backing for his 
programs. He described the methods that he did use: "I do 
every possible thing I can in the way of consultation, communi- 
cation, both in Congress, within the Congress, with people out- 
side of Government, to persuade them of the soundness of the 
view that I have put before the Congress for, in my opinion, the 
welfare of the United States. That I will continue to urge and 
argue far more behind the scenes than in front, but, nevertheless, 
I will argue for it as long as I have strength to do it."30 
Personal appeals by the President or by members of his staff 
do not appear to have frequently been important in winning 
votes on foreign policy issues. One reason is that the sanctions 
which a President can profitably invoke are limited. Patronage 
is a question on which knowledgeable persons tend to be un- 
communicative. One well-informed member of Truman's staff 
told the writer that the use of patronage to bargain for votes on 
specific bills was unwise because it created congressional re- 
sentment. He believed that the administration was more likely 
to gain voting support by consulting congressmen regularly on 
patronage questions than by linking patronage to individual legis- 
lative proposals. In the area of private consultation, more can 
probably be achieved by represetnatives of those government 
agencies who can argue the merits of the case than by those 
members of the administration who can exert political pressure. 
PUBLIC PRESIDENTIAL APPEALS 
When the President speaks, he commands attention throughout 
the country and the world. He can make effective use of various 
forums: a joint session of Congress, broadcasts and telecasts, 
speeches to organized groups, and press conferences. Through 
his public statements the President can influence the course taken 
by Congress in two ways. When he publicly announces a new 
foreign policy that requires legislative implementation, the United 
29 New York Times, Jan. 26, 1956, p. 12. 
30 Ibid., Jan. 16, 1958, p. 14. 
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States becomes committed to that course in the eyes of the world. 
Members of Congress who want to disavow his stand face a 
responsibility heavier than most of them wish to bear. Sec- 
ondly, the President can generate public support for a program 
and motivate constituents to put pressure on members of Con- 
gress. 
Several of this nation's most important foreign programs have 
been launched publicly by the administration in such a fashion 
as to make congressional rejection most di5cult. President 
Truman proposed Greek-Turkish aid to Congress in a dramatic 
speech which publicly committed the United States to that policy. 
The Secretary of State's speech launching the Marshall Plan 
had a similar effect on world opinion. This country's commit- 
ment to NATO was more gradual and was undertaken in closer 
consultation with senatorial leaders; yet on the day when the 
Brussels pact was signed, President Truman told Congress and 
the world that the United States would support the movement 
for collective defense in Western Europe. President Eisenhower's 
public requests for passage of the Formosa resolution in 1955 
and the Middle East resolution in 1957 committed this country 
to policies that Congress did not dare to disavow. 
These public statements by the President, tantamount to com- 
mitments on foreign policy, have usually been made after some 
bipartisan consultation with congressional leaders but before 
congressional sentiment on the issue was clearly fonned. By 
adopting the tactic of public commitment, the President is taking 
a risk. He substantially increases the pressure on Congress to 
support his policy, while he maximizes the potential damage to 
national prestige should Congress reject it. In recent years the 
gamble has worked; Congress has not defeated any of these ma- 
jor programs, and on some occasions-notably the Formosa reso- 
lution-the fact of a public presidential commitment has con- 
tributed significantly to voting support. 
Creating public pressure on Congress, like private appeals to 
senators, is a device limited both by the press of time and by the 
danger of diminishing returns from overuse. A President can- 
not expect the American people to deluge Congress with ap- 
proving letters if he is making weekly appeals for his legisla- 
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tive policy. Judicious use of the public appeal by a popular 
President can produce important consequences in Congress. 
President Truman did not make maximum use of public ap- 
peals on behalf of his foreign programs. He was not a highly 
effective speaker, and at times his popularity was at such a 
low ebb that there was little basis for any appeal. The burden 
of public explanation was often carried by his subordinates. As 
public support for the foreign aid program appeared to be waning 
late in his administration, the President did make an intensified 
effort to explain it to the nation. When he sent his aid program 
to Congress in 1952, for example, he described the need for it 
in a radio and television address and supplemented this with 
three speeches. Yet during the prolonged controversy in 1951 
over sending troops to Europe, Truman never used the radio 
and television facilities to explain his case to the public; he 
relied entirely on press conference statements. 
President Eisenhower was more persistent and imaginative in 
his appeals for his foreign policy, particularly in regard to for- 
eign aid. As public apathy grew, Eisenhower increasingly spoke 
out for the program, both in press conferences and on radio and 
television. I t  was a frequent theme of press conferences, and in 
1957 he called a special news conference for the sole purpose of 
requesting restoration of foreign aid funds cut by the House Ap- 
propriations Committee. He warned that the cut might necessi- 
tate a special session of Congress, but the House did not restore 
the funds. During the controversy over the Bricker amendment 
in 1953 and 1954, President Eisenhower presented his viewpoint 
to the public in seven press conferences and public statements 
but did not engage in public speeches, perhaps because he be- 
lieved the issue was too complex for broad public understanding. 
In general it can be said that no President has fully exploited 
the opportunities for generating public support for his foreign 
programs, that no President has fully realized his potential in- 
fluence on the public mind when international issues are under 
discussion. The President occupies the preeminent position in 
foreign affairs and his word carries the greatest weight with the 
public in this area. But his difficulty comes with avoiding further 
wearying of a public already weary of repeated crises. 
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THE POTENTIALS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 
The successful President will use the various devices of leader- 
ship as the occasion demands. It is useful to distinguish between 
those techniques designed to secure partisan support and those 
that are essentially nonpartisan. Fortunately, these techniques 
are not necessarily opposed to one another. There is no evi- 
dence in specific cases that a President's efforts to secure the 
cooperation of senators in the opposition party have been handi- 
capped by simultaneous efforts to create party unity. 
The best examples of effective presidential techniques are 
bipartisan ones. There are circumstances in which advance bi- 
partisan consultation is not only important but essential to the 
success of a legislative program. There are other occasions in 
which a public statement by the President has been effective in 
committing the nation to a policy in advance of congressional 
action or in creating strong public support for a policy. Early 
consultation followed shortly by a public presidential commit- 
ment is probably the strongest guarantee of congressional co- 
operation. These techniques are most valuable when the Presi- 
dent is launching a bold new program such as the Marshall Plan 
or is moving with speed to meet a crisis such as that created by 
Communist pressure in the area of Formosa.31 The President's 
greatest problem with regard to foreign policy, however, is not in 
meeting crises; it is in assuring adequate, sustained support in 
Congress for continuing and expanding existing programs. As 
Richard Neustadt has said, "We may have priced ourselves out 
of the market for 'productive' crises on the pattern Roosevelt 
knew-productive in the sense of strengthening his chances for 
sustained support within the system."32 Advance consultation 
does not seem to aid a continuing program as it does a new 
measure, nor does the technique of public appeal carry weight 
when the question is on the dangers of attaching crippling 
amendments to a reciprocal trade bill. At present there seems 
31 Robert Dahl has pointed out that the President, who has superior facilities 
for influencing the congressional and public view of world events, not only can 
emphasize a foreign crisis, as the Truman administration did in Europe, but can 
play down a crisis, as the same administration did with regard to China. Congress 
and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1950), pp. 103-108. 
32 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1960), p. 186. 
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for the President no simple solution to the problem of gaining 
congressional support for his continuing foreign programs. 
The analysis of foreign policy rollcalls shows that the President 
has enjoyed bipartisan support for most new programs of im- 
portance, but that members of his party have provided greater 
support for existing programs. To maximize this kind of sup- 
port, the President must develop further his role as a partisan 
leader in foreign policy. No President today has time to do all 
those things that are important to the successful performance of 
his manifold duties. He should take on additional burdens only 
if they have a clear priority over tasks he already performs. 
Though a President might win votes for his programs if he de- 
voted more time to personal persuasion of senators and repre- 
sentatives, such a time-consuming effort is difficult to justify. 
Likewise a President might win votes by skillful handling of 
patronage matters, but this weapon is not effective enough to 
justify greater personal use by the President. Most of the re- 
sponsibilities the President has delegated to his leaders in Con- 
gress and to his staff he cannot personally reassume. The argu- 
ments for relying primarily on party leadership in dealing with 
Congress are persuasive. 
To effect such party loyalty the President does not need added 
sanctions so much as a willingness to assert his prerogatives 
boldly. His strongest potential sanction is one that has been 
little used. The President can require substantial support for his 
major foreign programs as the price of campaign support for 
members of his party seeking reelection. The public recognizes 
the President's preeminence in foreign policy and gives priority 
to foreign policy qualifications when it chooses a President, and 
it is more than likely that the voting public would heed the 
President's judgment concerning the relative contribution of vari- 
ous congressional candidates to his foreign programs. 
The unhappy truth is that the prevailing public opinion has 
been destructively wrong at the critical junctures. . . . They 
[the people] have compelled the governments, which usual- 
ly knew what would have been wiser, or was necessary, or 
was more expedient, to be too late with too little, or too 
long with too much, too pacifist in peace and too bellicose 
in war, too neutralist or appeasing in negotiation or too 
intransigent. Mass opinion has acquired mounting power in 
this century. It has shown itself to be a dangerous master of 
decisions when the stakes are life and death. 
-WALTER LIPPMANN 
I see no reason why each senator should not run on his own 
foreign policy. 
-Senator RORERT A. TAFT, discussing the 1942 election 
PUBLIC OPINION 
A SENATOR MAY BE CONVINCED BY A PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS 
that some new foreign program is imperative, he may be per- 
suaded by the Foreign Relations Committee that the program 
is wise, and he may be receptive to the majority leader's pleas 
for party unity in support of the program. Yet he may read his 
mail, visit his constituents, study a public opinion poll, and vote 
no. No one realizes better than a senator what different concepts 
of foreign policy are held by the citizens on Main Street and the 
elected officials on either end of Pennsylvania Avenue. The for- 
eign policies considered essential by the administration in our 
day usually carry risks and a price tag that will not be popular 
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with the voters. The contemporary problem of conducting for- 
eign policy in a democracy centers on the difficulties of gener- 
ating public understanding of international necessities and pre- 
serving ultimate public control over policy without placing 
the administration in a straitjacket. The senator is the middle- 
man in this situation. 
The concern about the effect of public opinion on foreign 
policy in this country is based on a recognition that international 
problems are growing more complex while the average citizen 
remains woefully uninformed about events and problems beyond 
our nation's shores. A consistent finding of the public opinion 
polls is that unless the national leaders and the press have 
carried on a major educational campaign concerning some is- 
sue, a substantial proportion of the population will be totally 
unaware that the issue exists, while only a small fraction will 
have any coherent understandng of its nature. This unaware- 
ness continues despite great improvements in the reporting of 
foreign affairs. But the problems of today are new and bewild- 
ering; they involve countries nonexistent and people unknown a 
few years ago. Disarmament, once a question of sinking equal 
proportions of battleships, today involves nuclear equations 
shrouded in technological complexity and governmental secrecy. 
The challenge of the sixties is a new and difficult one for the 
American public. President Kennedy described it in his inaugural 
address (1961) "not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need 
-not as a call to battle, though embattled we are-but a call to 
bear the burden of a long twilight struggle year in and year out." 
Walter Lippmann and others have argued that the American 
public, ill-informed and parochial in its outlook, creates an in- 
creasing pressure on its leaders to make the wrong decisions in 
foreign policy.' On the other hand, the public is especially de- 
pendent on its leaders for information and guidance when for- 
eign problems arise. We need to understand better how the 
public thinks about foreign affairs, how and when public view- 
points influence the thinking of senators. 
Actually, public opinion is not one thing but many, and is not 
to be covered by simple generalizations. Bernard C. Cohen has 
distinguished usefully between two forms of public opinion: 
1 See Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Co., 1955), Chs. 1, 2, 3, 5. 
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"The first is the background or climate of opinion which, by 
creating in the policy-maker an impression of a public attitude 
or attitudes, or by becoming part of the environment and cul- 
tural milieu that help to shape his own thinking, may con- 
sciously affect his official behavior. . . . The second type of public 
opinion is made up of the active and articulate expressions on 
policy of specific individuals and organized groups, including 
the media of communication. These are the identifiable voices 
that interpret the mood and the strivings of different segments 
of the general public in terms that have some operational mean- 
ing for the policy-makers in g~vernment."~ Though the climate 
of opinion may have an important effect on the senator's range 
of choice, he is particularly concerned with assessing the sec- 
ond category, the articulate expressions of groups and individuals. 
Roger Hilsman has concluded that senators are subject to less 
organized pressure on foreign policy than on most important 
domestic  issue^.^ Nevertheless, there are some types of foreign 
issues on which the pressure of articulate opinion, organized or 
unorganized, is likely to be felt by senators. A senator may 
realize that his constituents know nothing about a pending treaty, 
while they are organized in angry opposition to a reduction in 
tariffs or brood quietly about the cost of foreign aid. The senator 
is naturally most interested in those opinions of constituents that 
are intense and of long enough duration to affect voting habits. 
MEASURING CONSTITUENT OPINION 
A senator faces a serious problem in trying to gauge constituent 
opinion on any issue. Since he is interested in the intensity of 
opinions, a simple yes-and-no poll may be misleading. More- 
over, national polls do not necessarily represent opinion in his 
home state, and for him to conduct a private poll requires expert 
knowledge and considerable expense. The senator reads local 
newspapers with interest but often without knowing whether 
their editorials influence or reflect constituent opinion, or whether 
they do neither. The activity of lobbyists may be a sign that 
groups in his state are concerned about an issue, but the senator 
2 Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign Policy, p. 29. 
3 Roger Hilsman, "Congressional-Executive Relations and the Foreign Policy 
Consensus," American Political Science Review, LII (Sept., 1958), 727-28. 
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still must determine how large a group is involved and how 
accurately a lobbyist reflects their views. The fact that senators 
frequently rely more on mail than on other indications of con- 
stituent thinking, as Donald Matthews points out, often simply 
means there is a shortage of other reliable guides4 Mail has 
serious disadvantages as mirror of opinion. 1t may come from 
pressure  group^;^ it may come from an articulate minority; it 
may come simply from the fact that the opponents of some meas- 
ures seem more inclined to write than the s~ppor ters .~  In addi- 
tion to providing a guide to constituent thinking, letters do 
measure intensity of feeling. Those persons who take the trouble 
to write on an issue are more likely than the average citizen 
to become familiar with the senator's stand on that issue and to 
remember it on election day. On visits to his home state, a senator 
can better judge the intensity of opinion. 
There is no sure or simple way to measure how much senators 
have been influenced either by the general climate of opinion on 
international issues or by groups advocating specific foreign 
policies. It is possible to describe what the polls have shown 
about the climate of opinion on major foreign policy issues, and 
to gauge roughly the influence that the President has had on 
this opinion. I t  is also possible to provide some examples of 
more specific constituent pressures on senators. The average 
citizen looks to the President for knowledge and leadership 
more on foreign affairs than on domestic questions. The greater 
the emergency and the bolder the policy, the greater the Presi- 
dent's potential influence. The public, perhaps unprepared for 
the emergency, unaware of alternatives, and ignorant of the ulti- 
4 Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World, pp. 219-24. Matthews' book 
contains an excellent discussion of senators' relationship to constituents. 
5 An example of an interest group's extr~ordinary success in organizing pres- 
sures on senators occurred during the 1935 controversy over United States 
membership in the World Court. A radio speech by Father Charles E. Coughlin 
denouncing the World Court led to an estimated 40,000 telegrams to senators 
in the two days before the vote was taken; this constituent pressure was credited 
with playing a large role in the defeat of the measure. Grassmuck, Sectional 
Biases in Congress on Foreign Policv, pp. 85-87. 
6 Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy, pp. 33-38, has provided vivid examples 
of the frequent contrasts between letters from constituents and the attitudes 
revealed in polls. In 1939 congressional mail ran more than five-to-one against 
repeal of the arms embargo, but a poll showed almost 60 percent of the public 
favored repeal. The next year 90 percent of the mail opposed a selective service 
measure, while polls indicated 70 percent support for it. 
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mate cost or risks, is likely to respond initially with approval 
to a presidential program, but its support may wane as the 
program becomes an established one. 
PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF FOREIGN AID 
Because of its long duration, the foreign aid program provides 
a good test of constituent influence. In 1947 and 1948 the inter- 
nationalist leaders of both parties were notably successful in 
creating a public awareness of the nation's growing responsi- 
bilities for foreign assistance. President Truman launched the 
Greek-Turkish aid program dramatically in 1947 before a joint 
session of Congress. The Marshall Plan was undertaken with less 
urgency but with a constant stream of high-level publicity. 
Consequently the polls showed that in March, 1947, an unusually 
high proportion of people (82 percent) had heard of the Greek- 
Turkish program, while there was a steady growth of familiarity 
with the Marshall Plan to nearly the same level by November, 
1948. Information did not necessarily mean support. A majority 
favored aid to Greece and Turkey, but there was a preference 
for turning the whole program over to the United Nations. 
Initial opposition to the Marshall Plan gave way to strong sup- 
port (about 3-1) as understanding about it grew, though the 
majority was smaller among those who realized how costly it 
would be. The initial public reaction to a military aid program 
for Western Europe, early in 1949, was nearly as favorable as 
the attitude toward economic aid. Later in the year, as Repub- 
lican leaders attacked the administration's military aid bill, the 
majority ~ h r a n k . ~  
The Point Four Program of aid to underdeveloped areas never 
benefited from such effective promotion by the administration 
or so much bipartisan support as the Marshall Plan had. As a 
consequence, the polls showed that in mid-1950 less than a 
quarter of the voters had heard of the program and very few 
7 Public Opinion Quarterly, XI (Summer, 1947), 285-86, (Fall, 1947), 495, 
(Winter, 1947-1948), 675-76; XI1 (Spring, 1948), 172-73, (Summer, 1948), 
365-67; XI11 (Fall, 1949), 549, (Winter, 1949-1950), 725. The polls cited 
in this chapter are primarily those of the American Institute of Public Opinion 
(Gallup Poll). Those found in the Public Opinion Quarterly during the period 
through 1951 are cited. Others were on file at the Roper Public Opinion Re- 
search Center at Williams College. 
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had any real understanding of it.8 By contrast, the public sup- 
ported the 1957 Middle East aid program (particularly economic 
aid), a measure to which President Eisenhower had given an 
air of urgency. In recent years the polls indicated rather steady 
support for foreign aid. The polls did not reflect the upsurge of 
opposition to foreign aid that many senators thought was occur- 
ring, but polls usually do not measure the intensity of opposi- 
tion. Moreover, the polls showed vast ignorance about just 
how much was being spent for foreign aid. 
In so far as polls are accurate indicators, the extensive pub- 
licity efforts for major new programs in 1947 and 1948 appear 
to have created a favorable climate for foreign aid. There seems 
to be a clear relation between the degree of support which 
major political leaders give to aid programs and the degree of 
support which the public gives. To put this relationship in dif- 
ferent terms, the climate of opinion has not usually created pres- 
sures on senators that contradicted the views of political lead- 
ership in Washington. In recent years, however, when there has 
been broad agreement in Washington about the general nature 
and scope of an aid program-though not about many of its 
features-there has probzbly been less public understanding and 
support, though the polls do not indicate any sharp decline. 
An analysis of senatorial mail would provide another picture 
of constituent influence on senators. Senator Tom Connally's 
mail is perhaps not typical, but it shows an interesting trend of 
opinion during the early years of foreign aid. Connally re- 
ceived over 200 letters on the Greek-Turkish aid program, a 
slight majority of them from opponents, who were concerned 
about the risks of war, the disadvantages of bypassing the United 
Nations, and the imperfections of the Greek and Turkish gov- 
ernments. He received a somewhat greater number of letters 
in 1947 and 1948 on the Marshall Plan. Though the early letters 
on the Marshall Plan reflected reluctance and uncertainty, the 
later ones indicated a strong majority enthusiastically in support. 
Public interest and controversy about foreign aid died quickly 
after 1948. There were only some 35 letters on the military 
assistance program of 1949, a majority favorable, while corre- 
spondence on the Point Four Program was almost nonexistent. 
8 Public Opinion Quarterly, XIV (Fall, 1950), 600. 
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After the first two or three years, ConnallyYs mail on foreign aid 
dealt almost exclusively with legislative details of economic 
concern to the writers, notably agricultural surpluses and the 
use of American shippingsg 
Interviews with senators and their assistants in 1956 and 
1957 concerning their mail showed that most of them thought 
constituent opposition to foreign aid was rising and that posi- 
tive interest was waning. Two assistants, for example, said that 
for a year they had not seen a letter in support of foreign aid 
except from organized groups. At that time, aid to Yugoslavia 
was particularly unpopular with constituents. In many cases 
the mail on foreign aid in recent years may have been so light 
as to be completely unrepresentative.1° Senator Barkley, for 
example, received fifteen letters on foreign aid in 1955, all but 
one favorable and mostly focused on the need for contributing 
to the U.N. technical assistance program. The following year 
he received seventeen letters, all but one urging abolition or 
reduction in the aid program. There is no reason to believe 
that sentiment in Kentucky changed that drastically or that 
either year's mail was typical of views in the state.ll 
Pressure group activity on foreign aid bills has been relatively 
light, less than on reciprocal trade measures, for example. Most 
of the major labor, farm, and business organizations have given 
consistent support to the various aid measures, and church 
groups have endorsed economic aid programs, particularly for 
underdeveloped areas. These endorsements have contributed 
- 
to the general climate of support for foreign aid; consistent and 
vigorous opposition by one of these major groups might have 
created considerable difficulties for the aid programs. On the 
other hand, it is doubtful that the endorsements of these groups 
have created substantial "pressures" on senators, in the sense 
9 The letters received by Senator Connally are among a massive assortment 
of files from his office stored in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Con- 
gress. Though the files may not be complete, they probably at  least provide a 
good sample of his correspondence. 
10 In 1956 William S. White concluded "on the authority of Senatorial contacts 
with the various small publics representing the various states, that the people 
were a bit tired and a bit bored with foreign aid, and possibly a bit hostile 
to it, too." "The Nation's Mood-And the Issues," New York Times Magazine, 
July 15, 1956, p. 20. 
11 Senator Barkley's papers are stored at the library of the University of Ken- 
tucky. The files of correspondence for the period covered appear complete, 
though not all mail may have been saved. 
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that unions put pressure on a senator concerning labor legisla- 
tion or oil companies exert pressure concerning oil depletion 
allowances. In other words, senators have probably estimated 
that these groups are usually not vitally concerned about the 
passage or defeat of foreign aid bills or-more to the point- 
amendments increasing or decreasing the size of aid programs. 
The most vigorous pressure group activity has related to 
specific features of the programs. Agricultural groups have 
been instrumental in the development of legislation designed 
to dispose of agricultural surpluses through the foreign aid pro- 
gram. Congress has generally been more enthusiastic than the 
State Department about these programs. The major farm groups 
have recognized the dangers of burdening the aid program with 
a disproportionate emphasis on farm surpluses, however, and 
have refused to support some proposals with minimum foreign 
benefits. During the early years of the Marshall Plan one of the 
most serious problems of its administrators was the heavy pres- 
sure of shipping interests on Congress that resulted in legisla- 
tion requiring a high proportion of foreign aid shipments to be 
carried in American ships. At various times such diverse groups 
- 
as machine-tool manufacturers, flour millers, and coal exporters 
have sought specific benefits under the foreign aid program.12 
The various groups seeking particular benefits have often con- 
centrated on congressional committees. The average senator has 
probably seldom heard from pressure groups seeking particular 
foreign aid benefits except in the area of agriculture.13 
THE EXPANSION OF AMERICAN COMMITMENTS 
Apparently there was a similar pattern of constituent opinion on 
the question of military commitments to Western Europe. The 
12The activities of pressure groups with regard to foreign aid are discussed 
in Holhert N. Carroll, The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs (Pitts- 
burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), pp. 54-56, 67-72, 125-27, 250-54, 
304-305. See also William A. Brown, Jr., and Redvers Opie, American Foreign 
Assistance (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1953), pp. 166-71. 
13 Note, however, the judgment of Thomas L. Hughes that a growing pro- 
portion of a congressman's errand-running duties involves matters of contracts 
and personnel in the foreign field. Hughes believes that "this is the most im- 
portant kind of Congressional penetration of Executive responsibility." This 
casework may stimulate a congressman's interest in and perhaps criticism of an 
agency operating abroad. "Foreign Policy on Capitol Hill," Reporter, XX (April 
30, 1959), 29. 
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polls showed that in early 1948 there was a small majority in 
favor of American support for NATO, while in 1949 the margin 
of support grew to 4-1.14 The press reported both before and 
after the Senate's debate on ratification that the public appeared 
to be apathetic, ill-informed, but generally in favor of NATO. 
Apparently this was not an issue on which constituent pres- 
sures were strongly felt by senators, while the climate of opinion 
was clearly favorable. Some of the major pressure groups gave 
general support to the North Atlantic Treaty, while some church 
groups and organizations devoted to promoting the United Na- 
tions expressed reservations about it. Neither seems to have 
had much effect. 
Polls taken in 1951 showed that a majority of respondents, 
some of them with reservations, favored sending more troops to 
Europe. These opinion surveys indicated, however, that two- 
thirds of those polled believed Congress should have the right 
to determine how many, if any, troops should be sent.15 Several 
senators at the time stated that some of their constituents, either 
by letters or by answers to questionnaires, had shown a strong 
preference for congressional rather than presidential control 
over the dispatch of troops.16 This issue does not appear, how- 
ever, to have evoked strong constituent pressures on senators. 
Bernard C. Cohen has thoroughly explored the influences of 
public opinion on the Japanese Peace Treaty. The climate of 
opinion toward Japan in the 1950s was "permissive and toler- 
ant, giving policy-makers wide latitude in their search for inter- 
nationally acceptable policy substance. Popular restraints on 
their freedom to decide in concrete terms how Japan should 
be treated were few."17 There was a public belief, shared by 
American military leaders, that our troops should be kept in 
Japan, and there was strong public as well as senatorial insist- 
ence that Japan not trade with Communist China. A poll in 
October, 1951, showed that 52 percent of those interviewed 
favored the treaty, 3 percent opposed it, while 45 percent had 
no opinion or had never heard of it.ls 
14 Public Opinion Quarterly, XI1 (Summer, 1948), 353, (Fall, 1948), 549; 
XI11 (Spring, 1949), 163-64. (Summer, 1949), 351, (Fall, 1949), 549. 
15 Ibid., XV (Summer, 1951), 382-84. 
16 Congressional Record, March 30, 1951, p. 3029. 
17 Cohen, p. 57. 
1s Ibid., pp. 57-61. 
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Among the pressure groups, the treaty was supported by the 
major business, labor, church, and veterans groups that had 
endorsed other important foreign programs. Opposition came 
from fringe ideological groups, pacifists, patriotic organizations, 
and archconservative-isolationist groups. Cohen has pointed out 
that the administration and Congress received conflicting im- 
pressions about pressure group activities. The groups support- 
ing the treaty directed many of their communications to the 
administration, often with specific comments about details of 
the treaty. The groups in opposition concentrated their efforts 
almost exclusively on Congress, and their comments were gen- 
eral and ideological. Senators received little mail on the sub- 
ject; Senator Everett Dirksen, for example, had about a dozen 
letters on the treaty though he had discussed it in state radio 
broadcasts. Consequently the mail from a small group of op- 
ponents was completely unrepresentative, and senators seem 
to have recognized it as such and discounted it. The single 
pressure group with a major economic interest in the treaty was 
the fishing industry on the West Coast. This group enlisted the 
aid of Senator William Knowland of California and other mem- 
bers of Congress. With congressional assistance it was able to 
negotiate a com~romise through the State Department that led 
to a separate fisheries treaty.19 
When President Eisenhower sought approval of Drograms for 
expanding military commitments, there was sufficient public 
support, or sometimes public apathy, to ~ e r m i t  the Senate to 
act without fear of constituent reaction. The President's rather 
vague request for authority to act in the Formosa Straits gen- 
erated some public s~lpport but little understanding. In March, 
1955,32 percent of those polled were willing to have this country 
guarantee the Quemoy and Matsu islands, 21 percent were not, 
24 percent were undecided, and 23 percent had not heard of the 
problem; only 10 percent proved to have accurate information 
about the islands. 
The Middle East resolution illustrated the frequent contradic- 
tion between senatorial mail and opinion polls. In February, 
1957, the New York Times reported that the mail of senators 
on the Foreign Relations Committee was running more than eight 
19 Ibid., pp. 62-109, 253-77. 
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to one against President Eisenhower's proposal for a Middle 
East resolution. The mail was relatively heavy and appeared to 
be unorganized. The critical letters started to arrive in large 
numbers after Democratic senators began their public criticism 
of the Eisenhower proposal.20 On the other hand, a public 
opinion poll at the time showed that over two-thirds of the 
voters were willing to send economic aid to Middle Eastern 
countries threatened by Communist attack, while half were will- 
ing to send both arms and American troops. On neither the 
Middle Eastern nor the Formosa issue does there appear to 
have been strong public support for the action sought by the 
President. Neither was there strong opposition, and senators 
evidently did not believe the critical mail on the Middle East 
resolution was representative. The congressional debates on 
these issues do not suggest serious concern by senators about the 
attitude of their constituents. 
THE ISSUES THAT GENERATE PRESSURE 
These security commitments did not arouse public opinion be- 
cause they did not in fact lead to the involvement of American 
troops in foreign wars. The Korean war overshadowed all other 
foreign policy issues in the public mind because Americans were 
losing their lives on a foreign battlefield. President Truman's 
original decision to defend South Korea had wide public sup- 
port; in August, 1950, two-thirds of those polled favored the 
action and only one-fifth thought it was a mistake. By January, 
1951, after the Chinese Communists had entered the war, half 
the voters thought the decision to defend Korea was a mistake 
and two-thirds of the voters thought the United States should 
pull its forces out of Korea.21 As the stalemate in Korea continued, 
the administration remained unable to convince a majority that 
its limited-war policy was wise. The bitterness engendered by 
the grim deadlock in Korea poisoned bipartisan relations, dam- 
aped other foreign programs, and, after it became an issue in the 
1952 election, forced an end to the war itself. 
The Korean war did not present the Senate with legislative 
20 New York Times. Feb. 1, 1957, p. 3. 
21 Public Opinion Quarterly, XV ( Spring, 1951 ), 170, (Summer, 1951 ), 386. 
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choices; senators could not effectively dictate strategy through 
the power of the purse. Senators realized that the war was 
unpopular, and the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur 
brought criticism of the administration into focus. The crowds 
that greeted MacArthur on his return, the reaction of newspapers, 
and the weight of congressional mail all testified to the unpopu- 
larity of the administration's policies. The senatorial hearings 
on the Far Eastern controversy may have clarified the issues, 
but they did not tip the popular scales in favor of the admin- 
istration. Though the event served to impress constituent senti- 
ment on senators, their mail proved once again to be an inac- 
curate guide. The mail was so overwhelmingly pro-MacArthur 
and anti-Truman that most senators, though recognizing that the 
voters were deeply concerned, decided that a disproportionate 
number of critics were The Korean war illustrates 
the force of public opinion and the difficulty any administration 
faces in carrying on an unpopular war. Neither the public nor 
Congress could force the administration to follow MacArthur's 
policies, but public sentiment eventually made necessary the 
Korean truce. 
Except for the Korean war, the issues of American economic 
and military commitments abroad have not usually provoked 
sufficient public concern to produce pressure on senators. In 
sharp contrast is the question of reciprocal trade. Though the 
basic principle of reciprocal trade probably has as broad public 
acceptance as foreign aid does, the demands for amendments 
to protect specific industries are much more intensive than most 
criticisms of foreign aid. The benefits of reciprocal trade are 
general, but its burdens are specific. Senators whose constituents 
are particularly affected by foreign competition probably face 
more pressure on the tariff question than on any other foreign 
issue except war. 
The polls indicate that in the postwar period there has been 
a climate of opinion favorable to a low tariff policy, though 
the sentiment for higher tariffs has been increasing. The pro- 
portion of those polled who favor higher tariffs was 14 percent 
in January, 1947, 13 percent in June, 1953, 26 percent in Jan- 
uary, 1955, and 30 percent in June, 1959. The polls also suggest 
22 New York Times, April 13, 1951, p. 7; April 22, 1951, sec. iv, p. 7. 
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that the level of information about tariffs and the workings of 
the reciprocal trade program remains low. A favorable climate 
of opinion is of little help to a senator if significant numbers of 
his constituents are unemployed and believe that foreign com- 
petition is to blame for their plight. The senator, always most 
concerned with that type of opinion which is expressed by or- 
ganized and articulate groups, finds a maximum amount of 
organized pressure on the issue of reciprocal trade. 
The role of pressure groups in congressional disputes over the 
tariff has been discussed by other writers.23 It is possible here 
only to cite some examples. In recent years the objective of 
specific interests has been to win special exemptions through 
amendments in the law or to accomplish changes in administra- 
tive procedures designed to help the domestic producers. Tex- 
tile manufacturers both in New England and the South have 
sought protection from Japanese textiles. The manufacturers of 
bicycles, watches, pottery, glassware, and chemical and elec- 
trical products are among those claiming that foreign industrial 
competition has been damaging. While many farmers favor a 
low tariff policy to encourage agricultural exports, there has 
been a growing demand for protection of certain domestic 
products such as cherries, sugar, dairy products, wool, and fur 
products. Perhaps the strongest pressure for protection has come 
from coal mining, petroleum, and natural gas interests, all of 
which compete with imported residual oil, and from the pro- 
ducers of other mineral products, such as lead, zinc, and copper. 
In states with a substantial proportion of persons engaged in 
these areas of production-notably southern and western states- 
the pressure on senators is The reader of the Con- 
- 
gressional Record will find that senators are frank to describe 
which economic groups in their states have forced them to en- 
- - 
dorse amendments designed to give general or specific protec- 
tion to domestic producers. 
Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated the relationship between state 
economic interests and the voting records of senators on recip- 
23 See E. E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, 1935 ) . 
24 Richard A. Watson, "The Tariff Revolution: A Study of Shifting Party 
Attitudes," Journal of Politics, XVIII (Nov., 1956), 678-701. 
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rocal trade legislation. In some cases a senator appears par- 
ticularly sensitive to the plight of a relatively minor economic 
interest in his state. Some of the southern senators trying to 
limit Japanese textile imports come from states that in recent 
years have exported cotton to Japan worth considerably more 
than the textiles imported. Douglass Cater has cited an extreme 
case of protectionist sensitivity: a New York congressman who 
voted against the reciprocal trade program because a birdcage 
manufacturer in his district employing fifty persons was hurt by 
foreign competition, though the docks in his district handle over 
a billion dollars' worth of goods annually.25 
A senator's mail on reciprocal trade legislation is likely to be 
larger and is more often organized than mail on other foreign 
questions. Lewis A. Dexter, who studied the 1955 reciprocal trade 
bill, found that nearly all senators received substantial mail on 
this issue, though they often received little on foreign aid. The 
mail appeared to be organized, much of it by a relatively few 
firms in such industries as electrical equipment, chemicals, coal, 
oil, and textiles. Protectionist mail outnumbered that supporting 
reciprocal trade by at least ten to one, with most of the latter 
inspired by the League of Women Voters.26 
Alben Barkley's mail in 1955 illustrates how reciprocal trade 
overshadowed other foreign questions. That year he received 
34 letters on the Bricker amendment, 15 on foreign aid, 19 on the 
Formosa resolution, and over 400 on reciprocal trade legislation. 
A sample of his mail on the trade question indicated that three- 
quarters of those writing were opposed to the trade bill or wanted 
specific exemptions in it. Nearly all of these mentioned specific 
industries affected by foreign competition. A substantial pro- 
portion of the letters clearly resulted from organized efforts. 
For example, there were many "personal" letters from workers 
in a textile plant; with little variety in wording they said, "My 
job is in danger because of low-priced Japanese textiles." 
In view of the heavy pressure that many senators experience 
25Douglass Cater, "The Southern Textile Tale: Out of Whole Cloth," Re- 
porter, XI1 (June 2, 1955), 29-32. Cater's article is an excellent description of 
the organized campaign by textile interests concerning the trade bill. 
z6Lewis Anthony Dexter, "What Do Congressmen Hear: The Mail," Public 
Opinion Quarterly, XX (Spring, 1956), 16-27. 
182 SENATORIAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
from groups seeking tariff benefits, it is perhaps surprising that 
the reciprocal trade program has been renewed periodically 
with relatively few special exemptions and with considerable 
discretionary authority to the administration to lower tariffs. 
The fact that senators represent a larger constituency than rep- 
resentatives reduces the concentration of pressure on them from 
a few interests and probably explains why the trade bill has 
usually passed with less difficulty in the Senate than in the House. 
I t  is surprising, in a sense, that there are not more "logrolling" 
operations among senators, each seeking special protection for 
a particular industry. In fact, only major industries like textiles 
and coal have been able to win some form of specific exemption. 
Most senators appear to respect the arguments for reciprocal 
trade advanced by the administration and vote for the legisla- 
tion after making efforts of varying intensity to win protection 
for their state's industry. 
If there has been a single foreign policy issue on which the 
climate of opinion could be described as apathetic, it was the 
Bricker amendment. A poll in October, 1953, showed that only 
19 percent of those questioned had heard of it; 9 percent favored 
it, 7 percent were opposed, and 3 percent had no opinion. By 
January, 1954, 28 percent of those polled had heard of it, but 
only 13 percent could give even a partially correct description; 
of these, 4 percent favored it, 7 percent were opposed, and 2 
percent were undecided.27 
In this case, however, the pressure groups working in behalf 
of the Bricker amendment presented their views so persistently 
and were so effective in generating a letterwriting campaign that 
many senators appear to have overestimated constituent interest 
and support for the proposal. The campaign for it was spear- 
headed by the American Bar Association and its Committee on 
Peace and Law through the United Nations. I t  had the support 
of various groups of businessmen and doctors and some women's 
and veterans' organizations. The debate over the Status of Forces 
Treaty intensified support for the Bricker amendment.28 
Numerous senators and senatorial assistants who were inter- 
27Congressional Record, Jan. 22, 1954, p. 672; Jan. 27, 1954, pp. 860-61. 
28 See Edward M. Bershtein, "The 'Bricker' Movement to Amend the Con- 
stitution" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1955). 
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viewed by the writer commented on the large amount of mail 
received during the debate, and most reported that the mail was 
heavily in favor of the Bricker amendmentmZ9 A number of sen- 
ators apparently believed (largely on the basis of mail) that there 
was considerable risk in opposing all versions of the Bricker 
amendment. Certainly one reason why advocates of the Bricker 
amendment dominated the senatorial mailbag was that the 
President had not presented his case against the Bricker amend- 
ment effectively and persistently enough to arouse much public 
support for his stand. The President appears to have erred just 
as much as the Senate in overestimating public support for the 
measure.30 For these various reasons the Senate was peculiarly 
sensitive to constituents on one of the most complicated, least 
understood, and least genuinely popular foreign policy issues 
of the postwar period. 
There is substantial evidence in the polls and in senatorial mail 
that aside from the Korean war, there has been relatively little 
constituent pressure on most senators with regard to foreign 
policy. On many issues the public has been apathetic; on others 
the administration has presented the case for its program vig- 
orously enough to develop substantial public support. Organized 
pressure groups have been active in trying to influence the de- 
tails of legislation, but they have brought substantial pressure 
to bear on senators only with regard to reciprocal trade legisla- 
tion and the Bricker amendment. 
FOREIGN POLICY IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 
The influence of constituents on foreign policy may be measured 
indirectly through a study of senatorial election campaigns. 
Our premise is that when one or the other candidate raises a 
question of foreign policy during a senatorial campaign, it 
usually indicates that this is a matter of concern to the voters. 
Obviously the candidate may misjudge public interest, but dur- 
ing a campaign he is close to the voters, and if he continues to 
29 The mail received in Senator Hubert Humphrey's office strongly favored the 
Bricker amendment and was the third heaviest volume of mail on any issue 
during the 1952-1954 period. Gilbert, "Problems of a Senator," pp. 232-33. 
30 Donovan, Eisenhower, p. 238. 
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emphasize an issue, it is usually because many voters are re- 
sponding favorably. Since domestic issues, local questions, and 
personalities as a rule dominate senatorial election campaigns, 
those international issues that occasionally rise to prominence 
in a campaign have an increased significance as indicating public 
re~ponse.~' In addition, whether a candidate supports, opposes, 
or ignores the stand on foreign policy taken by his national party 
reveals his judgment of public opinion in his state. A campaign 
may also provide clues concerning the President's influence in 
the state.32 
The 1948 election was the first opportunity the voters had to 
pass judgment on the major postwar economic and military 
commitments of the Truman administration. Since both major 
presidential candidates approved these programs, foreign policy 
controversies might be expected to develop primarily in the 
congressional and particularly senatorial carnpaign~.~~ And, sig- 
nificantly for a study of the Senate, at that time there were still 
a number of senators who were isolationists and were therefore 
opposed to the nation's becoming immersed in the affairs of 
Europe and Asia.34 
31 Hughes, p. 29, points out, however, that a candidate may inject foreign 
~ o l i c y  into a campaign for another purpose, "as a device for blunting the attack 
of his opponents on domestic policy." He believes that candidates are making 
increasing use of foreign policy, often in an irresponsible way, because this 
issue "lends itself to grandiose expressions of sentiment that are helpful to the 
campaigning congressman's momentary reputation and are not easily susceptible 
to  convincing counterargument or meaningful repudiation." 
32 The writer has not tried to survey in detail all the senatorial election cam- 
paigns of recent years but has concentrated on about thirty. These were rela- 
tively close contests in which the known views of one or both candidates indi- 
cated that foreign policy was a probable issue. This survey is based primarily 
on a detailed study of one or two newspapers in each of the states involved. 
Every issue of the paper was checked for a period of four to eight weeks. This 
was supplemented by interviews with some of the senators involved and cor- 
respondence with some reporters who had covered the campaigns. Briefer 
information about a number of additional senatorial campaigns was obtained from 
the New York Times and national magazines. 
33 The presidential campaign is covered well in Westerfield, Fmeign Policy 
and Party Politics, pp. 30624. Henry Wallace and the Progressive party, of 
course, sought to make foreign policy a major campaign issue in 1948 but drew 
little public response. 
34 The term "isolationist" is used in this chapter and elsewhere in the book, 
not in a polemic sense, but as a concise and convenient way of describing sen- 
ators who usually voted against the major programs under which this nation 
assumed increased international responsibilities. The supporters of most or all 
such programs are called "internationalists." 
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As it turned out, the 1948 election dealt a serious blow to 
isolationism in the Senate. There were eleven Republicans and 
three Democrats with terms expiring in 1948 who had voted 
against either Greek-Turkish aid or the Marshall Plan. Only 
three of them won reelection; seven were defeated, and four 
did not seek reelection. Yet an analysis of the campaigns does 
not suggest that their isolationist records were frequently a 
cause of their downfall. Only one of the four who retired- 
Albert W. Hawkes of New Jersey-retired because of his record; 
party leaders were reported to have cast him aside because of 
his isolationism and conservatism. One of those who was re- 
elected, Kenneth S. Wherry of Nebraska, won in a strongly 
Republican state with an isolationist record, while another, Ed- 
win C. Johnson of Colorado, won despite the fact that his op- 
ponents in both the primary and general election labeled him 
an is~lat ionist .~~ The seven isolationists who were defeated in 
1948 were all  republican^.^^ In only two cases did their Demo- 
cratic opponents make extensive use of the foreign policy issue. 
Paul Douglas believed that his repeated attacks on Senator C. 
Wayland Brooks of Illinois as an opponent of the bipartisan 
foreign policy did in fact win some Republican votes. I t  is less 
likely that Hubert Humphrey's charges of isolation contributed 
materially to the defeat of Senator Joseph H. Ball of Minnesota, 
whose record was a mixture of internationalism and isolationism. 
There appear to be several reasons why foreign aid was not 
a major issue in the 1948 senatorial campaigns. By that time the 
issue had already become less controversial. Public opposition 
to aid programs was declining, but it was probably still strongest 
in several of the states, such as Nebraska, Iowa, Idaho, and Col- 
orado, where isolationist senators were running. Their oppo- 
nents were often dubious that an internationalist stand would pro- 
duce votes. Isolationist senators or candidates in many states 
had even more reason to doubt that their views on foreign policy 
35 The third who won reelection, Democrat James E. Murray of Montana, had 
a generally internationalist record despite his vote against Greek-Turkish aid. 
36They were: C. Wayland Brooks of Illinois, Joseph H. Ball of Minnesota, 
Chapman Revercomb of West Virginia, C. Douglass Buck of Delaware, Henry 
C. Dworshak of Idaho, Edward V. Robinson of Wyoming, and George A. 
Wilson of Iowa. 
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would be popular; frequently they minimized the issue. A final 
and important reason why the issue was subordinated is that it 
did not play a part in the presidential campaign (except as 
Henry Wallace raised it). 
In subsequent elections there were only a few occasions when 
Democratic candidates sought to make an effective issue out of 
the isolationism of Republican senators; the issue seldom ap- 
peared to affect the outcome. In 1950 Senator Scott Lucas at- 
tacked his Republican opponent, Everett Dirksen, as a "bumb- 
ling, fumbling, confused isolationist," but Lucas was defeated 
and, as majority leader, may have been hurt by some of Dirk- 
sen's criticism of the Truman foreign policy. Republicans Homer 
Capehart of Indiana and Henry C. Dworshak of Idaho are ex- 
amples of senators who won reelection in 1950 despite Demo- 
cratic criticisms of their votes against foreign aid. In Ohio it 
was Senator Taft who took the initiative in raising foreign policy 
issues, against the advice of some supporters who feared the 
"isolationist" tag. He reiterated and expanded his many criti- 
cisms of the Truman administration, ranging from the failure 
to rearm Germany to appeasement in Asia. But his Democratic 
opponent lacked the necessary experience to join the debate, 
and the election never became a referendum on foreign policy. 
In 1952 Democratic candidates seldom emphasized foreign policy 
in their campaigns. Senators like William E. Jenner of Indiana 
and John W. Bricker of Ohio ran successfully for reelection 
with little criticism of their isolationist record. In Missouri, how- 
ever, Stuart Symington defeated Republican Senator James P. 
Kem in a campaign that emphasized the charge that Kem was 
"the most isolationist senator of them all." 
In most of the 1950 and 1952 elections candidates of both 
parties appeared to believe that the issues of foreign aid and 
military commitments did not concern the voters enough to be 
valuable campaign issues. There were internationalists like 
Symington and Lucas and isolationists like Jenner and Bricker 
who stressed them, but often the candidates seemed to lack 
confidence that there was a preponderance of public support 
for their views. A more important factor was that in 1950 and 
especially in 1952 these issues were overshadowed by the Korean 
war. During the 1950 campaign most Republican candidates 
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criticized the Truman administration for originally withdrawing 
American troops from South Korea, excluding that country from 
our defense perimeter, and failing to maintain a strong enough 
military establishment. There was little criticism, however, of 
Truman's decision to defend South Korea. As the United Nations 
counteroffensive gained momentum during the fall, Republican 
candidates made less use of the Korean issue. Although the 
news of Chinese troops in Korea late in October raised doubts 
about American policy in Korea, the full implications of Chinese 
entry did not become apparent until after the election, when 
United Nations troops were forced to retreat and the war 
eventually became stalemated. Had the election occurred two or 
three months later, the Korean war would have been the dom- 
inant issue, and more Democrats probably would have lost their 
seats. 
In 1952 the Korean war was the single most important issue 
in the presidential campaign; polls showed that three-quarters of 
the voters thought the Republicans would end the war more 
quickly than the Democrats would. Republican candidates for 
the Senate took their cue from General Eisenhower, who put 
increasing stress on the issue as the campaign developed and 
eventually promised that he would go to Korea and seek an early 
end to the war. The Korean war intensified the issues of Com- 
munists in government, stimulated inflation, and eclipsed the 
Democratic boast of p ro~per i ty .~~  There was probably not a 
single Republican senatorial candidate, internationalist or isola- 
tionist, who did not make the Korean war a significant campaign 
issue. 
The 1952 campaign demonstrated two things. First, and most 
obvious, a war like that in Korea which had become unpopular 
was a far more potent issue than questions of foreign aid, military 
37Louis Harris, Is There a Republican Maioritv? (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1954), pp. 22-26, 31-32, 43, 178. Harris discussed polls conducted by 
Elmo Roper in 1952. These also showed that the percentage of persons describ- 
ing the Korean war as an important issue rose from 30 in June to 53 in late 
October. Lubell, Reuolt of the Moderates, pp. 39-43, 118, 265-66, reported his 
interviews showed: "In 1952 the public's thinking was dominated by the bloody 
stalemate in Korea. On that issue the popular mood was to demand a decision 
-to get the war over with one way or another." He believed the Korean war 
motivated the voters' switch to Eisenhower well in advance of the latter's promise 
to go to Korea. 
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treaties, or isolationist voting records. Second, the fact that this 
was a dominant theme of the presidential campaign gave it 
particular importance in all the senatorial contests. Senatorial 
campaigns had a unifying foreign policy theme in 1952 that 
had been lacking in 1948, when Truman and Dewey had no 
important differences on foreign policy. 
THE PRESIDENT AND SENATORIAL CAMPAIGNS 
Foreign policy was a unifying theme for Republican senatorial 
candidates in 1952 because even those whose voting record and 
views conflicted with Eisenhower's could join him in urging an 
end to the war. The campaign tactics of those Republicans who 
differed greatly with Eisenhower's internationalist views but who 
usually ignored or discounted these differences demonstrated 
how completely a presidential candidate can dominate the cam- 
paign. 
A particularly interesting example is Senator William Jenner 
of Indiana, whose voting record was one of the most isolationist 
in Congress and who was seeking reelection in a state where 
Taft had been more popular than Eisenhower and where isola- 
tionist sentiment was relatively strong. Despite these factors, 
Jenner repeatedly asserted that his record was "very little dif- 
ferent" from that of Eisenhower, whose endorsement he claimed 
to have. Jenner repeated but did not emphasize his opposition 
to NATO and foreign aid. Senator Kem of Missouri, under attack 
as an isolationist by Stuart Symington, said little about his for- 
eign policy views because he recognized how much he differed 
with Eisenhower and believed that this difference would hurt 
him at the polls. Senator Bricker, on the other hand, took the 
offensive on foreign policy questions with little apparent worry 
about his disagreements with Eisenhower. Democratic oppo- 
nents frequently criticized these and other Republicans for being 
out of step with the Republican presidential candidate. 
In subsequent elections other Republicans were embarrassed 
by their differences with the President on foreign policy. An 
example is Joseph T. Meek, who opposed Illinois Democratic 
Senator Paul Douglas in 1954. Early in the campaign Meek 
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left no doubt about his opposition to "foreign giveaway pro- 
grams" and his support for the Bricker amendment. In an ex- 
change of letters late in July, however, he pledged support for 
the Eisenhower administration and received the President's en- 
dorsement. Thereafter Meek's statements on foreign policy were 
more cautious and less frequent, though he did not entirely 
abandon the expression of isolationist viewpoints. Douglas be- 
lieved that the isolationist reputation helped to defeat Meek. 
The same year, Senator Guy Cordon of Oregon said little in his 
campaign about a voting record on foreign policy that frequently 
conflicted with Eisenhower's. He did emphasize that he had 
only voted for the less extreme versions of the Bricker amend- 
ment. His Democratic opponent, Richard Neuberger, attributed 
his narrow victory in part to the differences between Cordon and 
the President on foreign policy. 
The role of the Bricker amendment as an issue in the 1954 
campaign sheds light on presidential-senatorial relations. Despite 
the concern of many senators over constituent reaction to this 
issue, there is no good evidence that any senator was seriously 
hurt at the polls in 1954 because he voted against the Bricker 
amendment. Republican Senator Homer Ferguson, who lost 
his bid for reelection in Michigan, has attributed his defeat to 
his vote against the Bricker amendment, arguing that his stand 
caused Republicans to abstain from voting in the senatorial race. 
This estimate is not borne out, however, by other political ob- 
servers or by a cursory examination of the Michigan election 
returns.38 On the other hand, Republicans such as Meek and 
Cordon were on the defensive because they disagreed with 
Eisenhower. 
Loyal defense of the Eisenhower administration's foreign 
policy and particularly a firm stand against the Bricker amend- 
ment proved to be serious handicaps, however, for Alexander 
Wiley, the senior Republican on the Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee, who sought reelection in Wisconsin in 1956. Foreign 
policy dominated the Republican contest that preceded the state 
38 Approximately 43,000 more votes were cast in the gubernatorial than in the 
senatorial election. In order to have won, Ferguson would have had to receive 
virtually all of these 43,000 votes-a prospect made more unlikely by the fact 
that Ferguson actually led his gubernatorial running mate, in percentage terms. 
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convention in late May. At a series of caucuses, Senator Wiley's 
three competitors for the Republican nomination-former Rep- 
resentative Charles J. Kersten, Mark Catlin, Jr., and Howard H. 
Boyle, Jr.-repeatedly attacked Wiley's record on foreign affairs. 
While all three of Wiley's original competitors represented an 
extreme isolationist point of view, the Republican convention 
nominated a compromise candidate, Representative Glenn R. 
Davis, who-although more moderate-had a record of opposition 
to foreign aid. During the primary campaign following the 
convention, he urged a reduction in foreign aid and the passage 
of a constitutional amendment based on the principles of the 
Bricker amendment. He devoted comparatively little attention 
to foreign policy, however, and emphasized his strong support 
for Eisenhower's domestic policy. The campaign became less 
vitriolic, less a test of foreign policy, and more an informal hand- 
shaking campaign, which both Wiley and Davis seemed to prefer. 
Wiley was nominated with a margin of approximately 10,000 
votes. The narrowness of his victory can be seen in the 20,000 
votes polled by the third candidate, an isolationist, who obviously 
drew votes from Davis. Doubtless, Wiley's fervent international- 
ism and particularly his opposition to the Bricker amendment 
were important factors undermining Republican support for him 
in Wisconsin. He realized that isolationist sentiment was strong 
among Republicans, avoided discussing foreign policy, and 
argued that his voting record had been dictated by loyalty to 
Eisenhower. Davis' tactics indicated, however, that he did not 
consider extreme isolationism and hostility to the Eisenhower 
administration politically advantageous in the primary. The 
circumstances of the campaign suggest that Wiley's victory did 
not prove whether a majority of Wisconsin Republicans en- 
dorsed Eisenhower's foreign policies. 
The views and records of senators were of declining import- 
ance as election issues during the campaigns of the Eisenhower 
administration. Republican candidates usually refrained from 
attacking Democratic senators for supporting Eisenhower's for- 
eign programs. Despite growing Democratic criticism of some 
aspects of these policies, Democratic candidates usually did not 
make them a campaign issue. The international issues of 1956 
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and 1960 did not involve voting records. In 1956 Republican 
senators echoed the national party theme that the Eisenhower 
administration had preserved peace and was best able to steer 
the nation through the crises that emerged at the last minute 
involving the Suez and H ~ n g a r y . ~ ~  In 1960 senatorial candidates 
repeated the Kennedy-Nixon debates over declining national 
prestige and the preservation of peace. 
ISOLATIONISM AS AN ISSUE IN SOUTHERN PRIMARIES 
The clearest recent examples of foreign policy as a campaign 
issue have been in southern Democratic primaries. The South 
is one of the regions where senators have sensed growing op- 
position to the foreign trade program as well as to foreign aid. 
Southern candidates, furthermore, were bound by no sense of 
loyalty to the administration, as were Republican candidates. 
Foreign policy became a major issue in Georgia months before 
the 1956 primary in which Walter F. George, chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, was expected to seek renomina- 
tion. His prospective opponent, former Governor Herman Tal- 
madge, started his campaign early and, among other issues, 
stressed his support for the Bricker amendment and his opposi- 
tion to foreign aid, the Point Four Program, and particularly 
those forms of aid that would intensify foreign competition with 
Georgia's textiles and agricultural products. He argued that the 
aid program was lavish compared to the inadequate federal aid 
given to Georgia farmers. Although he did not recommend 
abolishing foreign military assistance, he expressed doubts about 
its value. Talmadge avoided personal attacks on Senator George 
but obviously was criticizing programs with which George was 
closely identified. Unwilling to carry the burden of a prolonged 
campaign against a strong opponent, George withdrew from 
the race before the primary. Thereafter, Talmadge continued to 
39 The studies of the Survey Research Center showed that in 1956, in con- 
trast to 1952, Democratic voters were no more likely than Republicans to give 
internationalist responses to questions on foreign policy. This probably resulted 
from the internationalist policies of the Eisenhower administration, and it illus- 
eates "the role played by the parties in lending structure to mass public opinion." 
A. Campbell and others, The American Votm (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1960), pp. 198-200. 
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take an isolationist line, which his remaining opponent, M. E. 
Thompson, occasionally ~riticized.~' 
Since George withdrew from the race, it is difficult to esti- 
mate the effectiveness of Talmadge's isolationist arguments, but 
Talmadge was familiar with public opinion in the state and pre- 
sumably had reason to believe that the issue was a strong one. 
One clbse observer of Georgia politics has suggested, however, 
that Talmadge criticized foreign aid primarily to win campaign 
funds from the Georgia textile interests, which were strongly 
opposed to the aid There were other factors that con- 
tributed to Talmadge's strength: his gubernatorial record, com- 
parative youth, his name, and strong rural support. The for- 
eign policy issue in Georgia stood out primarily as a symptom 
of a trend in southern politics. 
The trend has not gathered momentum rapidly in the South- 
in part because veteran southern senators do not often face serious 
primary competition. Estes Kefauver and Albert Gore of Ten- 
nessee have both been under attack in Democratic primaries 
because of their votes for the aid and trade programs. What- 
ever the effectiveness of isolationism as an issue in Tennessee, it 
has not prevented the reelection of Kefauver and Gore. In 1954 
Kefauver's opponent in the primary, Pat Sutton, described 
Kefauver as an "internationalist" and a "one-worlder" and de- 
fined the major campaign issue as "internationalism as opposed 
to Americanism." His specific criticisms were directed against 
foreign aid and the United Nations. Kefauver largely ignored 
foreign affairs during the campaign. In the 1960 campaign 
Kefauver emphasized foreign policy more; his opponent, Judge 
Andrew Taylor, while saying less about it, leveled his criti- 
cism primarily at the foreign trade program. In 1958 Senator 
Gore was criticized in the primary because of his voting record 
on foreign policy. His opponent, former Governor Prentice 
Cooper, attacked both the aid and trade policies as "a do-gooder, 
one-world, global give-away program." Gore met the challenge 
head on. He vigorously defended the foreign trade program, 
40 Cabell Phillips, " 'Hummon'-Chip Off the Talmadge Block," New York 
Times Magazine, May 20, 1956, pp. 12, 68-69. George McMillan, ". . . So Goes 
the South," Collier's, CXXXVII (June 8, 1956), 42-47. Douglass Cater, "Re- 
gression vs. Conservatism in Georgia," Reporter, XI11 (Oct. 20, 1955), 13-16. 
Issues of the Atlanta Constitution. 
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reminding Tennessee audiences that it was established by their 
native son, Cordell Hull, and emphasizing the stake that both 
cotton farmers and manufacturers in Tennessee have in foreign 
trade.41 
It is too early to evaluate whether isolationism is strong enough 
in the South to become an effective campaign issue; it has yet 
to be decisive in a southern primary. Most of the southern sen- 
ators who have remained loyal to internationalist principles either 
have been able to defend this position in campaigns or have 
found defense unnecessary. It may be that southern isolationist 
candidates will find the issue even less effective with a Democrat 
in the White House. Southern isolationists on domestic issues are 
generally segregationists and often fiscal conservatives as well. 
In the South, then, questions of foreign policy have been lost 
beneath more urgent domestic problems. 
THE IMPLICATIONS 
The senator is relatively free from constituent pressure on most 
issues of foreign policy. His mail and his other guides to opinion 
usually show that the voters have little interest in most foreign 
problems because they do not believe these questions affect them 
directly. An issue like the Korean war will stir deep public con- 
cern because of its direct effect on the average citizen, while an 
issue like the tariff, with its specialized economic impact, will 
produce some pressure on the senator, often through organized 
groups. The relationship between senator and constituent cannot 
be understood without reference to a third factor, the influence 
of the President. 
More than anyone else, the President determines both the 
climate of public opinion on foreign issues and the extent and 
nature of public pressure on a senator. Through bold action in 
an emergency or through persistent efforts to explain the facts of 
international life to the citizens, the President can-on occasion- 
mobilize public support so strong that the senator becomes con- 
scious of it and may hesitate to vote against presidential pro- 
41 David Halberstam, "The 'Silent Ones' Speak up in Tennessee," Reporter, 
XXIII (Sept. 1, 1960), 28-30. Washington Post and Times Herald, Aug. 6, 1958, 
p. A12, 
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grams. If the President fails to develop or maintain public under- 
standing of his policies, the result may be public apathy or re- 
sistance. In the case of foreign aid, some senators believe the 
public is apathetic while others feel it is growing hostile. If the 
public is apathetic, the senator may have a free hand; in the case 
of the Bricker amendment, however, public apathy and ignorance 
permitted a small pressure group to create a distorted image of 
national opinion, and the President's efforts did not supply a 
sufficient cushion of public support to protect those senators 
sympathetic to the President. The Korean war demonstrated 
that massive opposition can develop when the President has 
been unable to create public understanding of his policy. The 
policy of limited war in Korea was by its nature difficult to ex- 
plain to a public accustomed to the idea of unconditional sur- 
render. Respect for presidential authority and knowledge in 
foreign affairs was great enough, however, that the Republican 
leaders in Congress needed a man of General MacArthur's stature 
to take the initiative in seeking public support for an alternative 
policy. The most serious handicap faced by the opposition party 
in Congress is its inability to compete with the President in for- 
eign policy, for no opposition leader can speak with comparable 
authority. 
Senatorial election campaigns in recent years confirm these 
conclusions. Except for the Korean war and the associated issue 
of which party could best keep the peace, foreign policy has 
seldom been a major issue in postwar election campaigns. 
Though a significant number of isolationists lost at the polls in 
the early postwar years, there is little reason to believe that iso- 
lationism was the prime reason for their defeat. When the 
voters did give weight to foreign policy questions, they usually 
paid little attention to the voting records of individual senators 
on specific issues. Instead, they sometimes chose a senator be- 
cause of what his party and its presidential candidate stood for.42 
42The results of public opinion research show what a small proportion of 
voters are familiar with political issues and perceive interparty differences on 
these issues. What we know about the American voter supports the conclusion 
that he would seldom be familiar with senatorial voting records and would more 
likely judge a senator by the success or failure of the administration in general 
areas of foreign policy, such as maintaining peace. It is also reasonable to sup- 
pose that the issue of a senator's loyalty to his President might be easier for 
voters to understand than the details of a voting record. See Campbell, Chs. 
8, 9, and 10. 
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In choosing a President, the voters have been paying increasing 
attention to his views on foreign policy and particularly his 
ability to handle grave questions of war and peace. In every 
election since 1940 (except 1948), this has been the outstanding 
factor in the voters' minds. It is likely that the split-ticket voting 
that predominated during the Eisenhower era occurred largely 
because many voters had confidence in Eisenhower as a foreign 
policy leader but preferred the domestic program of the Demo- 
cratic party. The voters recognized the President's primary re- 
sponsibility for the conduct of foreign relations, while relegating 
to Congress the responsibility for domestic affairs. 
For these reasons, it would be a mistake to exaggerate the 
number of votes won or lost by senators because of the voters' 
attitude toward the administration's foreign policy. Nevertheless, 
a senator's political future may sometimes be greatly affected by 
the administration's success or failure. There is no doubt that 
Democratic candidates suffered in 1950 and 1952 because many 
voters believed the Truman administration had failed first to 
maintain peace and then to win the war in Asia. Republican 
candidates benefited in later years because Eisenhower had 
kept the peace. 
While a senator may be helpless if his party's President is un- 
popular, he does not profit automatically if the voters approve 
of his President. He may benefit if he has been a loyal supporter 
of the President's policies; if not, he may lose votes. There are 
not enough examples to establish proof in any sense, but the 
recent history of campaigns suggests that Republican voters in 
some states expected Republican senators to give Eisenhower 
more consistent backing for his foreign programs than on do- 
mestic issues. This may be one explanation of the growing sup- 
port given by Republican senators to Eisenhower's foreign policy 
as the administration progressed. 
Though the evidence is fragmentary, it is important because 
it casts a new light on the President's leadership of his party in 
the Senate. If voters in at least some states expect a senator to 
support the President of his party on foreign policy matters, the 
President can afford to use the promise of support or the threat 
of withholding it as a weapon of leadership. President Eisen- 
hower did not in fact use this tactic, though his popularity was 
great enough so that he could have. Eisenhower carefully 
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avoided intervention in Republican contests for senatorial nomi- 
nations. In 1958 he told a press conference: "I have always re- 
fused in advance of any primary or of any selection of Repub- 
lican candidate [sic] for any office to intervene in any way."43 
Franklin Roosevelt's 1938 experience in trying to purge con- 
servative Democratic senators by backing their opponents in 
primaries seems to have made a lasting impact on American poli- 
ticians. It should not be considered conclusive proof, however, 
that a President could never dislodge a senator who consistently 
opposed his views. There would be greater justification and 
chance of success if the President found some means to support 
a loyal senator of his party who was facing stiff primary op- 
position. In the case of Alexander Wiley's 1956 primary, the 
President deliberately sidestepped this opportunity to strengthen 
his own political hand. 
- 
In general elections the President has greater opportunity to 
use his endorsement as a tool of leadership. Particularly since 
his time for campaigning is limited, the president can indorse 
his loyal supporters with enthusiasm and demonstrate his sup- 
port by campaigning in their states, while giving only a per- 
functory endorsement or completely ignoring those senators or 
candidates in his party who have frequently differed with him. 
Eisenhower abstained from this technique also. In 1952, for ex- 
ample, he endorsed isolationist Senator William Jenner in an 
Indianapolis speech and stressed his respect for independent- 
minded Republicans, though in Missouri his endorsement for 
another isolationist Republican, James Kem, was more perfunc- 
tory. In 1954, when he made a whirlwind trip on one of the last 
days of the campaign to help out several Republican senatorial 
candidates, he sent publicized telegrams to all the other Repub- 
licans campaigning for the Senate, including several strong iso- 
lationists, asserting that their election was of equal imp~r tance .~~  
In 1958 it began to appear that the President intended to use 
his endorsement as a method of developing support for his 
major programs. At a January press conference he denied that 
he intended to follow this tactic. At a March press conference, 
however, Eisenhower emphasized that he would not support 
43 New York Times, March 27, 1958, p. 18. 
44 Ibid., Oct. 29, 1954, pp. 1, 16, 17. 
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candidates who were in disagreement with him on such major 
issues as national security, foreign aid, and economy in govern- 
ment. In May he added the issue of reciprocal trade as a test of 
candidates' loyalty.45 In the 1958 elections there were six Re- 
- - 
publican senators seeking reelection with records that could 
clearly be called internationalist, while seven others had strongly 
isolationist voting The President did not make it clear 
to the voters that he was endorsing some but not others. Though 
he did not make any speeches in the states where isolationist 
senators were running, he spoke in only one of the states with 
an internationalist Republican candidate. Vice President Richard 
Nixon, who played a much more active role in the campaign, did 
not seem to make any clear distinction between the two types of 
Republicans. Had the President really desired to put to the test 
the theory that his endorsement was worth votes, he might have 
campaigned intensively for such senators as Edward Thye of 
Minnesota, William Purtell of Connecticut, and J. Glenn Beall 
of Maryland. The risks of such a policy are clear, however; 
Eisenhower's prestige and authority in the party might have 
been diminished if he had campaigned vigorously for selected 
candidates in a year when the Democrats were capturing num- 
erous seats in the Senate. 
Until the President is willing to test his iduence on the voting 
public, the issue will remain in doubt. Nevertheless, it seems 
reasonable that if a President made foreign policy issues the 
major criteria of loyalty, he might be able to demonstrate that 
such loyalty is an asset and disloyalty a liability for senators in 
his own party seeking reelection. 
45 Ibid., Jan. 16, 1958, p. 14; March 6, 1958, p. 12; May 7, 1958, pp. 1, 20. 
46 The internationalists were: William A. Purtell of Connecticut, Frederick 
G. Payne of Maine, J. Glenn Beall of Maryland, Charles E. Potter of Michigan, 
Edward J. Thye of Minnesota, and Arthur V. Watkins of Utah. The isolationists 
were: Barry M. Goldwater of Arizona, John J. Williams of Delaware, Roman L. 
Hruska of Nebraska, George W. Malone of Nevada, William Langer of North 
Dakota, John W. Bricker of Ohio, and Frank A. Barrett of Wyoming. The two 
Republicans from West Virginia, Chapman Revercomb and John D. Hoblitzell, 
served too briefly and had too mixed a voting record to classify. 
The great gaping hole in the structure of responsibility is 
the empty place left by the American party system. With- 
out responsible parties, Congress cannot be responsible; 
and unless Congress is responsible, it has slight claim to 
enforce responsibility on the P T ~ s ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . - R o B E R T  A. DAHL 
THE ROLE OF PARTIES I N  THE 
FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS 
CAN THE AMERICAN PARTIES CONTRIBUTE A GREATER MEASURE 
of rationality and responsibility to the policymaking process in 
foreign affairs? The problem is a twofold one. The President 
needs more help from his party for the initiation and particularly 
for the continuation of foreign programs. These programs require 
the dependable support of a party majority; they must not be 
subject to the vicissitudes of shifting coalitions in Congress. The 
opposition party faces a greater problem. Lacking a President, 
it needs machinery to devise and publicize agreed-on alternatives 
in foreign policy. Even if the opposition can seldom offer com- 
plete alternatives, it has a responsibility for constructive criticism. 
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THE SENATE PARTIES 
What is the prospect for a greater party role in the Senate? The 
rollcalls during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations 
show what a significant role party has played in the recent past. 
The President has normally been able to depend on more support 
from senators of his own party than from opposition senators. 
Often the majority in his own party for his programs has been 
a lopsided one and has included senators who harbored serious 
doubts about the programs. On the other hand, the opposition 
party has been frequently divided; though its members owe no 
loyalty to the President's party, many feel he deserves support in 
foreign affairs. The geographic patterns of voting suggest that 
senators opposing the administration's programs often believe 
they are either expressing constituent views of isolationism or 
fiscal conservatism or are defending local economic interests. 
Senators with such views will naturally resist efforts at party 
unity when the party's position conflicts with theirs. 
With a large measure of party unity on foreign policy, what 
changes in party leadership and institutions are feasible? Ex- 
perience suggests that stronger parties will come from strong and 
skillful leaders more than from a new institutional framework. 
The position of majority leader has grown in importance chiefly 
as a result of Lyndon Johnson's vigorous control. The problem is 
to assure that men of high ability have the chance to assume 
leadership in the Senate and to suggest institutional techniques 
these leaders might use. 
The senatorial parties have usually shown more skill and less 
regard to seniority in choosing party leaders than in other choices. 
Lyndon Johnson was selected by the Democrats as floor leader 
in 1953 after only four years in the Senate. Taft, as chairman of 
the Policy Committee and later as floor leader, was the natural 
Republican choice. The parties, however, have not always 
chosen so well. Ernest MacFarland lacked vigor as Democratic 
floor leader, while Kenneth Wherry as Republican leader did not 
represent his party's views in foreign policy. The Republicans 
have sometimes chosen a party whip who appeared seriously out 
of step with the views of the floor leader. The Democrats, in 
particular, have sometimes promoted the party whip to be floor 
leader with little discussion; if the floor leader is given wide 
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discretion in choosing the whip, as Lyndon Johnson had, this 
gives the party a minimum of actual choice in picking its leader. 
Though the incumbents are normally subject to reelection by 
party caucus every two years, this practice has not forced them 
to be more responsible to the party. I t  is not realistic to expect 
rank-and-file senators to challenge an incumbent's leadership in 
most cases, nor would this promote party unity. Yet, if there 
were modern precedent in the Senate for such action, it might 
minimize the danger that leaders would grow unrepresentative 
of the party. 
Since the President has such a stake in the senatorial leader- 
ship of his party, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that 
he should play some informal role in the choice of these leaders. 
This too is a matter of tradition but it is also an area where presi- 
dential influence has been felt in the past. While the President 
may have some influence over the initial choice of party leaders, 
he is less likely to succeed in encouraging a change in leadership. 
Any strong effort by President Eisenhower to remove Senator 
Knowland as floor leader would have run into opposition not 
only from Republican senators who shared Knowland's views but 
from those who were jealous of senatorial prerogatives. The most 
the President might successfully do would be to give informal 
approval to a change initiated in the Senate; this appears to have 
been the extent of Eisenhower's participation when Charles Hal- 
leck replaced Joe Martin as Republican leader of the House. 
The most serious barrier faced by able senators seeking po- 
sitions of leadership is undoubtedly the seniority principle in 
committees. The issue of seniority is one on which reformers in 
quest of a stronger party system and practicing politicians fa- 
miliar with the Senate usually clash. The reformers insist that 
committee chairmen who owe their position to seniority are 
able to flaunt every effort at increased party unity. The politicians 
argue that the seniority system minimizes intraparty conflict and 
serves the vested interests of most senators. The sanctity of the 
seniority rule did not prevent Lyndon Johnson, a most practical 
politician, from making one important breach in the principle in 
1953, when he decided to use other criteria in making the intial 
appointments of senators to committees and to guarantee each 
Democrat at least one major committee assignment. 
The rule that the senior member of the majority party becomes 
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chairman of his committee is undoubtedly more important, more 
disruptive of party unity, and more difficult to break. I t  should 
not be assumed, however, that this principle must stand un- 
changed, nor should it be assumed that the only alternative is 
to ignore seniority completely in picking a chairman. The prin- 
ciple of appointing experienced men to responsible positions is 
too reasonable to need defense. Yet experience needs to be 
combined with capability. The seniority principle can promote 
such obviously qualified men as George and Vandenberg on the 
Foreign Relations Committee. At other times, however, on the 
same committee it has advanced men like Theodore F. Green, 
aging and infirm at 89, Alexander Wiley, who lacked party stat- 
ure, and, during World War I, William J. Stone, an isolationist 
senator who completely opposed Woodrow Wilson's foreign 
policy.' 
- 
Deep-seated customs in the Senate are changed only gradually. 
The best chance of modifying the seniority rule will come when 
that rule makes eligible for the chairmanship of a committee some 
senator who is fundamentally in disagreement with most mem- 
bers of his party on issues directly relevant to that committee. 
Such an opportunity for change did come in 1956, when Senator 
James Eastland of Mississippi inherited chairmanship of the Ju- 
diciary Committee, with its jurisdiction over civil rights measures 
and judicial nominees. On that occasion the Senate followed the 
seniority rule, but it need not always do so. From a few excep- 
tions to the rule might easily grow a practice of choosing from 
among the two or three senior men on a committee the senator 
who is most able and whose viewpoints are representative of his 
party. Ideal standards of party unity would require that re- 
calcitrant committee chairmen be subject to removal by the 
party. This is not realistic in the forseeable future, nor is it a 
practical necessity for stronger party organization; in fact, the 
resulting periodic controversies might well be disruptive of 
party unity. 
If the rules and customs of the Senate can be improved to 
facilitate the emergence of strong leaders, there is less need for 
1 Stone retained his post as chairman despite an effort in 1917 to remove him 
and despite an unsuccessful attempt to expel him from the Senate for treason. 
George H. Haynes, The Senate of the United States (Boston: Houghton MifEin 
CO., 1938), I, 297-98. 
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building elaborate institutions of party leadership. Existing insti- 
tutions may be adapted to present needs. A staff of skilled as- 
sistants now exists and, with the increase of details to be con- 
sidered, has become a necessity. The policy committee, while 
it has varied with leaders and circumstances, has the greatest 
potential of any institutions that have been tried, providing that 
its limitations as well as its possibilities are realized. It cannot 
effectively compel unity in the party, and often it cannot use- 
fully promulgate a party policy; but it can serve as an agent of 
compromise, and it can devise tactics and offer legislative pro- 
posals to exploit any substantial party unity. It cannot make the 
floor leader accountable to the party, though it can provide him 
with valuable advice and with judgment on the temper of sena- 
torial opinion. To operate most successfully, the policy com- 
mittee must represent regions and viewpoints in the party and 
include the most influential senators and chairmen or ranking 
members of a few major committees. 
By contrast, the opportunities for greater use of the caucus in 
the Senate appear relatively small. The familiar arguments 
against the caucus have considerable weight: It is impotent, 
unwieldly, time-consuming, and disruptive of unity. Although 
there may be occasions when they serve the purposes of the 
party leadership, regular or frequent caucuses would seem to be 
a liability. 
THE PRESIDENT AS PARTY LEADER 
Skillful leadership and effective organization in the admini- 
stration party in the Senate are important, but the ultimate 
leader of foreign policy must be the President. He must de- 
velop programs and means of supporting them in the Senate. 
On most important matters the President will usually attempt 
to secure bipartisan support and at the same time assert his 
party leadership. He can develop programs through advance 
consultation with leaders of both parties, a public announce- 
ment committing this country to the program, and an educa- 
tional campaign to stimulate approval from at least the en- 
lightened public. Senators and the public alike respond to 
these initiatives because they recognize that the President has 
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superior access to information, holds the responsibility for de- 
veloping policies, and-particularly in times of crisis-needs 
united support to make these policies effective. Both Presi- 
dents Truman and Eisenhower used these techniques well on 
most occasions. A review of the postwar period suggests that 
when foreign crises arise, the President has ample resources 
for inducing the necessary degree of congressional support. 
It  is for the less dramatic responsibility of continuing and 
expanding an existing foreign program that the President must 
rely particularly on party support. As W. Y. Elliott has said, 
"Party discipline is, therefore, necessary to maintain the co- 
herence and continuity of foreign policy through adequate 
legislative support. It is also essential in winning popular 
support by seeing to it that the Administration's policy is de- 
fended by effective political ~pokesmanship."~ When there is 
sentiment in Congress for paring a half billion dollars from 
the foreign aid program or for limiting the President's author- 
ity under the reciprocal trade act, the President usually must 
rely primarily on his own party to hold the line for his policy. 
Elliott points out that party responsibility also assures "the 
stable nucleus of support for issues that to the average voter or 
Congressman may seem unimportant or peripheral to foreign 
policy, but that in reality are central to it.773 In the early postwar 
period, there were a multitude of foreign crises in which the 
President could rely on broad, bipartisan support. In later years, 
the success of foreign policy has depended increasingly on the 
continuity of support for established programs. We have learned 
that the nation's foreign responsibility is a long-term undertaking, 
not fulfilled simply by signing a pact, issuing a congressional reso- 
lution, or granting stopgap aid to an ally in distress. We have 
also come to recognize that there is no clear separation between 
foreign and domestic problems. 
This trend suggests that the President is increasingly depend- 
ent on partisan support for most of his foreign programs. This 
may even be true if his party lacks a congressional majority. 
Since his time is severely limited, the President must rely upon 
the leaders in the Senate to consolidate partisan support. The 
2 Elliott, United States Foreign Policy, pp. 135-36. 
3 Ibid., p. 135. 
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skillful use of patronage and support for legislation of interest 
to particular senators is a device occasionally valuable if used 
with caution, but here again he must rely largely upon subordi- 
nates for the actual detailed work. 
Probably the single most effective tactic for the President is 
a forthright public stand on foreign policy. As leader of the 
party, the President has at his disposal relatively few sanctions 
but is its primary spokesman. When a President makes full use 
of the authority resident in him as leader of foreign policy and 
his party's chief spokesman, constituents may begin to expect 
members of Congress in the President's party to give him sup- 
port. There is some evidence of such a trend in recent senatorial 
elections. Neustadt has said, "Assured support [for the President] 
will not be found in Congress unless contemplation of their own 
electorates keeps a majority of members constantly aligned with 
him."4 As a further step in forging party unity, the President 
might well consider the judicious use of endorsement and non- 
endorsement of candidates in primaries and elections, using the 
criterion of foreign policy voting records. Members of the Presi- 
dent's party in Congress can frequently vote against him on 
domestic issues because their stand serves the interests of their 
district or state. In relatively few cases does foreign policy have 
such a directly adverse effect on constituents as to dictate con- 
gressional opposition. The President should be able to demand 
loyalty from his party on foreign policy and make this prerequi- 
site to his endorsement without alienating those members of 
the opposition who frequently support his policy. In the years 
ahead, the President will be frequently advocating foreign pol- 
icies that are demanding, expensive, and potentially unpopular. 
He has the resources, if used imaginatively, to win continuing 
legislative support for these policies. 
DILEMMA OF THE OPPOSITION 
If the administration already has the resources and techniques 
available for foreign policy leadership, the opposition party does 
not. It may be argued that the dangers resulting from opposition 
failure are less serious than those resulting from deadlock or 
4 Neustadt, Presidential Power, pp. 186-87 
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erosion of the administration's policies in Congress. Some ob- 
servers differ, however. They point to the dangers of a presi- 
dential fait accompli and the increasing risks that nuclear war 
might result from an ill-advised step taken by the President 
- 
without congressional approval. They argue that with increasing 
presidential authority to shape the course of foreign policy, the 
opposition has a growing responsibility to criticize mistakes of 
policy and to focus attention on neglected problems a b r ~ a d . ~  
The difficulties faced by the opposition party in devising a 
foreign policy are formidable. I t  has no leader or group of leaders 
with a staff or sources of information equal to the President's or 
with widely recognized responsibilities for foreign policy. The 
opposition is handicapped if it tries to develop foreign policy 
issues for use in election campaigns. The public is seldom inter- 
ested in foreign policy unless it is some overwhelming problem 
comparable to the Korean war. Some foreign problems fade in 
importance before the next election is held, and others are too 
subtle for campaign purposes. In the 1960 campaign, for ex- 
ample, Senator Kennedy made an issue out of declining American 
prestige but made no serious effort to discuss the need for a 
foreign aid program aimed more at underdeveloped and un- 
committed countries-though this had been a theme of some 
Democratic senators. There can be serious risks in making for- 
eign policy a maior election issue. As a consequence, the victory 
of one party might cast doubt on American commitments abroad; 
whatever the outcome, the cam~aign alone might make this 
country appear to be an unstable ally. Unless the administration's 
foreign policy is thoroughly unpopular, the opposition party may 
hesitate to challenge the policy vigorously in an election cam- 
paign. 
A fundamental difficulty the opposition party faces is that of 
developing alternative policies. As one writer has said, "In the 
framing of foreign policy the only real possibility of an inte- 
grated program of policy and action lies with the chief ex- 
ecutive."' The opposition party may easily develop comprehen- 
5 See, for example, Thomas L. Hughes. "Foreign Policy on Ca~i to l  Hill," 
Reporter, XX (April 30, 1959), 28-31; Arthur N. Holcombe, Our More Perfect 
Union (Camhrid~e: Hnrvard University Press. 1950), np. 280-83, 424-29. 
6 Malcolm Moos, Politics, Presidents and Coattails (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1952), p. 160. 
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sive legislation for federal aid to education or labor reform, but 
in the foreign field it often lacks the information necessary for 
action. In some cases the opposition is restrained from offering 
an alternative program because the President has already so 
deeply committed the nation to one course that a different one 
could not succeed. The administration party has a leader in the 
President; while his colleagues may disagree with him, none are 
able to challenge his leadership successfully. The opposition 
party usually has no single spokesman (except during presi- 
dential campaigns). Some of the strongest leaders are often 
outside Congress and consequently lack immediate and direct 
policy-forming responsibilities. For these reasons the opposition 
is seldom able to unite behind a single policy and, even when 
successful, lacks a leader able to present such a policy as authori- 
tatively as the President presents his. 
If the opposition party is sometimes able to agree on an alter- 
native program, it is usually unable to get it enacted. Presidential 
vetoes are seldom overriden, and the chances are least if foreign 
policy is involved. If Congress avoids a veto by enacting a new 
program as part of broader legislation, the President can delay 
implementing it, as President Truman did in the case of aid 
programs for Spain and Nationalist China. Many foreign pro- 
grams are dependent less on legislation than on methods of ad- 
ministration and diplomatic initiatives over which Congress has 
no direct control. In Roger Hilsman's words: "Although Con- 
gress could almost always find a way of denying support to a 
particular policy and dictate policy in the sense of paralyzing it, 
one must doubt whether it can force the Executive to accept a 
positive alternative in foreign policy by the exercise of its formal 
powers. It has no way of making an Executive follow a different 
policy, and there are always tempting, if devious, routes by which 
the Executive can follow its own policy no matter how many 
obstacles Congress puts in the way."7 
If the opposition party is to have any role beyond mere ac- 
quiescence, it must, in Senator Vandenberg's words, add its 
trademarks to the President's policy. The opposition can be 
alert for aspects of proposed legislation that it considers unwise 
or dangerous, it can seek to clarify vagueness or contradictions 
7 Hilsman, "Congressional-Executive Relations and the Foreign Policy Con- 
sensus," American Political Science Review, LII (Sept., 1958), 730, 
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in policies, it can try to raise or lower the financial costs of pro- 
grams, and it can attempt to make foreign commitments com- 
patible with domestic programs or the interests of American 
citizens. Many of the changes sought by the opposition may be 
of considerable importance, but they are likely to fall short of 
radically different policies. Even if the President has a majority 
in Congress, one disciplined enough to provide the votes for his 
policy, he will not necessarily ignore the arguments of the op- 
position. There will be times when a broader, bipartisan base of 
congressional support is important enough to justify yielding to 
some of the opposition demands. If the President has a depend- 
able majority, he is free to make the choice. There is no con- 
tradiction between the need for an administration party united 
enough to carry out the President's desires and the need for a 
vigorous and cohesive opposition party; if the first is achieved, 
the second becomes even more necessary. 
There are occasions on which a single opposition leader can 
force the administration to reconsider or modify its proposals by 
the strength and wisdom of his criticisms. Too often, however, 
the opposition is ineffective because it speaks with different and 
contradictory voices or because its spokesman has little effective 
party support. What are the methods available for giving the 
opposition a more unified voice? All that has been said in this 
chapter about the practices and institutions of the Senate applies 
to the opposition party, which must promote men of ability to 
party and committee leadership, give them maximum flexibility 
of leadership, and develop institutions such as the policy com- 
mittee to greater usefulness. 
Because of its handicaps in dealing with foreign affairs, the 
opposition party must utilize all of its resources, and some of 
these lie outside of Congress. During the Eisenhower admini- 
stration, for example, the Democrats leaned heavily on Adlai 
Stevenson and on men with diplomatic experience such as Dean 
Acheson, Averell Harriman, and Chester Bowles. These men 
played as big a role as the congressional leaders in developing 
an "opposition foreign policy," and these were among the men 
chosen to carry out a new policy under the Kennedy admini- 
stration. In foreign affairs, perhaps more than in domestic prob- 
lems, the opposition leadership must come largely from sources 
outside of Congress. Since it is Congress that must do the voting, 
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there needs to be some liaison and cooperation between these 
two elements in the opposition party. Chairman Paul Butler 
devised the Advisory Council for the Democratic party. I t  gave 
the noncongressional Democrats a useful vehicle for express- 
ing their views on both foreign and domestic issues. Its weak- 
ness was that congressional leaders, for very natural reasons, 
did not want to serve on it and be under any resulting obligation 
to accept its lead. Consequently, there was often a wide gap 
between the goals of the council and the strategy of Democratic 
leaders in Congress, though this difference affected domestic 
more than foreign policy. 
The Advisory Council and most Democratic leaders outside 
Congress frequently urged greater emphasis on aid to under- 
developed areas than the Eisenhower administration was willing 
to give. Though this view was shared by some Democratic sen- 
ators, there was not sufficient Democratic party unity in Con- 
gress to accomplish a change in the Eisenhower program or 
even to make a clear party record on this issue. During the 
debate over Formosa and the offshore islands, congressional 
leaders rejected a criticism of the administration's policy pre- 
pared in consultation with Dean Acheson and other Democratic 
foreign policy leaders and circulated by the Democratic National 
Committee. Adlai Stevenson spoke out in criticism of the ad- 
ministration's policy after Democrats in Congress had approved 
the Formosa resolution and the Chinese Mutual Defense Treaty. 
During the 1957 Middle Eastern debate, former President Truman 
urged prompt approval of the resolution sought by President 
Eisenhower, but the Democrats followed Dean Acheson's advice 
and added Democratic "trademarks" to the resolution. On this 
issue the public image of the Democratic stand was blurred 
because critics of the administration's policy acted from a wide 
variety of motives and sought a variety of alternatives. Demo- 
cratic disunity on international issues was not merely a result 
of mechanical difficulties in coordination. Acheson and Steven- 
son, for example, differed considerably in their attitudes toward 
handling the challenges of international Communism. Most 
national leaders of the party believed in long-term aid and trade 
policies unacceptable to many Democrats in Congress who were 
sensitive to constituent opinions. 
Today there are equally serious divisions in Republican ranks. 
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Though the isolationist attitudes of the 1930s and 1940s are 
nearly dead, there is a wide range of opinion concerning the 
scope and the purposes of American commitments abroad. Those 
Republicans who had international responsibilities in the Eisen- 
hower administration have an outlook different from that of 
many members of Congress. Republicans in Congress who sup- 
ported international programs largely because of loyalty to and 
confidence in the Eisenhower administration will probably be- 
come increasingly critical of expensive international commit- 
ments. 
Lacking the President as a unifying force, the opposition party 
is likely to be divided on foreign policy, but it must constantly 
seek unity if it is to influence the administration's policy or even 
establish a record for itself. The use of some device like the 
advisory council seems to be in order. If opposition leaders 
in Congress are reluctant to serve on it, means can be found 
for consultation between the leadership of such a council and 
the congressional leaders. Perhaps such a council should rely 
more on private consultation than on public manifestoes to co- 
ordinate policy. There is no point in underestimating the oppo- 
sition party's difficulties, but if that party is to carry out its own 
responsibilities, it must improve the political machinery both 
in Congress and between the congressional and national party 
leadership. 
PARTIES AND POLICY 
The successful conduct of foreign policy depends on many fac- 
tors-such as able and experienced officials, adequate congres- 
sional staffs, and a steady flow of information to Congress- 
which have no relation to parties. A foreign policy that is soundly 
conceived and frankly presented to Congress stands a better 
chance of approval than an inadequate policy, even though the 
latter is buttressed by strong party discipline and elaborate con- 
sultation. 
Political parties are not a cure-all but a resource in making 
policy which has not yet been fully exploited. Both parties can 
play a more effective role in policymaking without damaging 
the possibilities of bipartisan cooperation. Holbert N. Carroll, 
a careful student of the congressional policymaking process, be- 
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lieves that the potential of parties has barely been tapped: "The 
political parties can be used as effective agencies for the develop- 
ment of consensus within a party, between the parties, and with 
the executive branch, both with regard to particular policies and 
over broad policy areas. Of all agencies of the Congress, parties 
alone bear some responsibility for what the Congress does or 
fails to do. Party resources also can, and have, been used to 
elevate the quality of the congressional response in foreign policy 
and to instill a sense of discipline and responsibility upon the 
parts of the Congress and among the members. In this regard, 
it is not sufficiently appreciated that a member of Congress 
normally enjoys a free hand, unhampered by constituency pres- 
sures, in dealing with foreign policy. To the degree that party 
pressures are applied in these circumstances, the parties are 
filling a vac~um."~  Party discipline can be more effective in for- 
eign than in domestic policy because it is here that constituent 
pressures are usually at a minimum. When foreign policy does 
become an election issue, a skillful President can make his pro- 
gram-and a senator's support of it-an issue in senatorial cam- 
paigns. The opposition is seldom likely to make foreign policy 
the dominant theme of its campaign, but it can clarify its views 
more successfully for the voter. 
Party organization in the Senate grows by trial and error 
from senatorial experience. It  will vary to suit the needs of 
individual leaders, and no scheme of itself will produce a per- 
fectly disciplined party. In the Senate it is most important to 
insure that the ablest men-preferably those with experience in 
foreign policy-may take places where their capabilities and in- 
fluence may have the widest range. Skillful leaders in turn 
should devise practices and institutions that can strengthen 
party responsibility. For parties with greater responsibility offer 
the best hope of maintaining a balance in making foreign policy 
between President and Congress. Responsible political parties 
would give careful scrutiny to policies advanced by the President 
and would provide him with the best assurance of the votes to 
carry them out. The experiences of the past fifteen years amply 
demonstrate the need for such a scrutiny and such an assurance. 
8 Holbert N. Carroll, "Congressional Politics and Foreign Policy in the 1960's" 
(Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science As- 
sociation, New York, Sept. 8, 1960), pp. 13-14. 
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